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Dynamic Game Analysis of Anti-Monopoly Regulation in Digital Payment Markets
- 1 Southwest University of Finance and Economics
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Abstract
This paper employs a dynamic game-theoretic framework to analyze anti-monopoly regulation in digital payment markets, characterized by network effects, data-driven monopolies, and rapid technological innovation. By modeling strategic interactions between regulators and dominant platforms (e.g., Alipay, PayPal, Apple Pay), the study examines how multi-stage regulatory interventions—such as data-sharing mandates, interoperability requirements, and ex-ante prohibitions—shape market competition and consumer welfare. Using a combination of backward induction and numerical simulations, the analysis reveals that delayed or inconsistent enforcement amplifies monopolistic behaviors, while proactive, rules-based regulation fosters long-term competition. Case studies from the EU, China, and the U.S. illustrate the trade-offs between innovation incentives and market fairness. Policy recommendations emphasize adaptive regulatory frameworks, cross-jurisdictional coordination, and algorithmic transparency mechanisms.
Keywords
Anti-monopoly regulation, digital payment markets, dynamic game theory, network effects, platform dominance
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Cite this article
Guo,Y. (2025). Dynamic Game Analysis of Anti-Monopoly Regulation in Digital Payment Markets. Journal of Economic and Managerial Dynamics,1(1),39-45.
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Journal：Journal of Economic and Managerial Dynamics
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