

The Possible Reasons for the Declining Fertility Rates in China

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Abstract: The low fertility rate is not only a circumstance experienced by developed countries but also in China after 2002. Many social problems occur when the fertility rate is low, so the reasons for the declining fertility rate in China need to be discussed to help to improve. From a macro perspective, scholars have already found several causes including China's public policy, national conditions, as well as world situations, and environmental pressures. But the exploration of reasons from a micro viewpoint is still limited. So the research is aim to collect first-hand material from a real micro angle to search for the reasons for decreasing fertility rate in China based on qualitative analysis using observation and also the interviews of 35 interviewees who were born from 1970 to 2002 by asking two to eight questions person to person. What's more, three controversial measures, illegitimate childbirth, legitimate surrogacy, and legitimate homosexuality that could raise the fertility rate in the Chinese context are also discussed. According to the results, it is suggested that the thoughts and values of marriage and fertility are different from age to age. And the views on marriage and fertility can be diverse in the same age generation, even total opposite opinions in the same generation also exist. But most people have negative or partly negative attitudes to marriage or fertility(including first child or second child), mainly restricted in a kind of social and realistic problems. When it comes to illegitimate childbirth, legitimate surrogacy, and legitimate homosexuality in the Chinese context, most interviewees have neutral or supportive attitudes toward legitimate homosexuality, but partly negative and negative attitudes to illegitimate childbirth, and legitimate surrogacy.

Keywords: possible reasons, declining fertility rates, China

1. Introduction

From a world scale, many developed countries and developed regions have already become into a low fertility rate condition mainly in the 1970s, which has resulted in bad consequences such as labor shortage, and heavy pension burdens in society. That's why the reasons for the low fertility rate need to be paid attention to and discussed urgently not only at the country's level but also at the individual's level. When it comes to China, is a special developing country that has already entered a low fertility rate like developed countries in 2002, and for about 20 years now, it has also been facing labor and pension issues. So the reasons for the low fertility rate in China also needed to be studied.

It's no doubt that currently, the three-child policy released in 2021 is still a kind of restrictive birth policy in China and still has a limited effect on fertility to some extent. But since the strict one-child policy was mandatorily released in 1979, the fertility rate decreased dramatically. To be specific, as Research Group of the Development Research Center of the State Council [1], Ding et al. [2], and Jingzhe Lou [3] all argue that China's low fertility rate has already surpassed other countries at the same level of development. After 1997, it entered a state of low birth rate, low mortality rate, and low growth rate with a population growth rate of less than 1%. And after 2002 the population growth rate fell below that of high-income countries. What's more, although the two-child policy was released completely in 2015, the birthing increased slightly but with birthing, demands fade away soon, and the two-child policy got into trouble as Jiang et al. [4] said.

Until now, Chinese researchers have already conducted many academic studies on fertility decline based on China's public policy, national conditions, and world situations. And the research results here are studies based on the impact of the epidemic, economic development, fertility willingness, delay in marriage and pregnancy, improvement of women's family status, improvement of women's education level, high cost of women's fertility, pressure on fertility cost, environmental pressure, world population capacity, and the current condition of the low fertility rate in developed countries, declining causes continuous declining, etc. Although the research was very further and completed, however, most of them are analyzed from a macro perspective and mainly focus on the national height to analyze to put forward the macro public policy suggestion or supports. There is a lack of firsthand material demonstrations from a micro perspective and personal perspectives in social lives, such as young people's thoughts, media infiltration, traditional conventions, current situation, life pressure, and discrimination against women.

This paper aims to analyze the reasons for the decline in the fertility rate from a micro perspective and based on social life experience, by qualitative method, through observation and interview, to make certain supplements to the existing research results. Finally, three discussion questions, an illegitimate birth, homosexuality legal, and surrogacy legal, are thrown out to discuss rationally.

2. Literature Review

Firstly, both Wei Chen [5] and Xin Yuan & Shengjian Zhang [6] believe that the period of recovery from persistent disaster events will lead to economic instability and spirit pressure, so people have no economic ability and confidence to bear children, which will result in the decline of fertility rate. While the covid-19 from 2020 on until now has been a contributor to the fertility decline. Because covid-19 isn't finished until now, the fertility rate will continue to decline or stay low rate these years. But Wei Chen [5, 7] added another two reasons come from two similar opinions articles that result in low fertility. One factor that affects the fertility rate is the married fertility rate, while the willingness of Chinese women to bear children is low, even below the replacement level by a demographic breakdown. While Baochang Gu, Jiawei Hou & Nan Wu added [8] this below-replacement level phenomenon is also influenced by the Game of Delay and Compensation. In general, the analysis of my country's fertility trends since 2000 shows that in the reproductive behavior of women in my country, the delay effect of young people is very strong, while the compensation effect of older people is very weak. If this trend remains unchanged and continues to develop, it is foreseeable that my country's fertility level will inevitably remain far below the replacement level for a long time and continue to decline. Although in 2013, the family planning policy was adjusted so that if any one of the couples is the only child, they can have a second child, and in 2016, the second child was fully born, what is obvious is that the effects of the two-child policy fade, China's fertility rate has fallen rapidly. It's like the Chinese government says that it encourages people to have children on a policy basis, implicitly suggesting a shift from an anti-birth

policy to a partial-birth policy, when in fact birth control has not stopped completely. However, this implicit claim does not work for raising fertility levels. [4]. This is because the relationship between population policy and fertility is a complex dynamic two-way relationship. The effect of population policies to suppress births is more obvious and stable, while the effects of policies to stimulate births are weaker. This is also verified from an international perspective and applied to many countries in the world that have the same conditions as China now as Xiafei Tao [9] argued. Besides, the average age of Chinese women at first marriage rose from 23.6 in 2006 to 26.5 in 2016. But it's still lower than in developed countries, which leaves room for the age at first marriage to rise and depress fertility over the next 10 to 20 years according to the 2017 National Fertility Survey. And this phenomenon of Chinese women's marriage delay has been very obvious since 2006 also supported by Yue Li & Xuying Zhang [10]. So the continuous decline in the proportion of women who are married has always had a downward effect on the total fertility rate, and the strength of the downward effect has been increasing.

Then, women's willingness to bear children and the decline in fertility rate can be further analyzed from the perspective of the improvement of women's family status. Linhao He and Meng Chen [11] both say that the status of Chinese women in the family has increased significantly in recent years. Since women bear the main cost of childbirth, as women's status in the family improves, women will choose to reduce the number of births, which will have an inhibitory effect on family fertility. To be specific, families with higher education levels of wives compared with husbands have fewer children. That is to say, the educational level of women has been improving, which can lead to a decline in the lifetime fertility rate caused by the improvement of women's education level and the continuous "upgrade" of the educational structure illustrated by Siyu Tian [12]. When it comes to the improvement of women's educational structure, Bo Hu [13] believed that the expansion of higher education enrollment is a very important reason. Specifically, the expansion of higher education enrollment not only improves the education level of girls but also delays the time of marriage and pregnancy by paying more energy into studying and reduces the fertility rate by updating their values to some degree. Another reason for women's family status improvement can be found in the sexual quality angle. As Ruixia Geng, Shenglong Liu & Shenxiang Xie [14] argued that the implementation of the family planning policy has directly led to a decline in the fertility rate generally acknowledged, thereby promoting gender equality. This is because, under a certain family income, the scarcity of children can ensure that girls are not sacrificed to ensure the education of boys in China so that girls can live with the education resources they deserve, which will help improve their competitiveness in the labor market. Bridging the wage gap between women and men. The narrowing of the education gap and wage gap between women and men will further enhance women's family status. So, enhancing women's family status continued to decline the fertility rate as suggested at the beginning of this paragraph.

Thirdly, according to both the Research Group of the Development Research Center of the State Council [1] and Ding et al. [2], the income level has increased, and the willingness to have children has continued to decline. This opinion of income increasing to prompt the fertility rate decline is also supported by Jingzhe Lou [3]. China has already surpassed other countries at the same level of development. After 1997, it entered a state of low birth rate, low mortality rate, and low growth rate with a population growth rate of less than 1%. And after 2002 the population growth rate fell below that of high-income countries. While Ding et al. [2] also argue that the population size of the world and major countries is approaching its capacity limit and will break through the capacity limit driven by inertia, and then approach the population capacity in a negative growth manner after reaching the peak. The same is true for China.

Forth, Biao Li, Desheng Lai & Goldman [15] focused on the Internet's Effect on Fertility. They found that Internet use has a significant negative impact on fertility. Internet use has a more

significant negative impact on urban residents compared with rural residents. What's more, Internet use has a significant negative impact on highly educated groups, especially female groups. It can be seen that the relationship between Internet use and fertility in China There is a clear "digital divide" in relevance.

Finally, Beibei Li [16] argued that by analyzing "the mother's income penalty" based on institutional economics, China does not have family-friendly policies and social support policies, and cannot make the cost of family support compatible with the ultimate social benefits. For example, there is no way to help women balance family and work responsibilities, promote female labor force participation, turn children into public goods, socialize the cost of childbirth, and provide financial support and the education and health care coverage children need. Besides, Liquin Zhou and Xiaobo Zhou [17] also add something from the whole family perspective, it is the internal relationship between childbirth and old-age care has been neglected, that is, the child-bearing supply and support costs are now borne by the family, but the pension benefits and externalities of population production are shared by the society, causing families with more children to lose money. For example, Fang et al. [18] say that the high house price is a kind of high-cost child-bearing cost. It burdens the families a lot in many cities in China and families cannot buy houses to bear children.

Then upon my personal life experience and observation, I want to give four hypotheses before I conducted interviews.

3. Hypothesis

- The common value of a large number of the 00s and late 90s as the current and near-future fertility force are the strong supporters of having late marriage and late childbearing or even being unmarried and infertility, which causes the decline of fertility rate in China now and in the following decades. Also, many of them are fearful of marriage or childbearing. The reasons may come from the fear of undertaking fertility cost, the passive attitude toward being married and bearing a child, the positive attitude toward the pension system's improvement, the high educational level of women, the support of achieving personal values, etc.

- The results and thoughts of women and men born in the 90s and 00s may different because they have different focuses. For example, women are people who don't want to have children or don't want to be married. But men are.

- The thoughts and attitudes about having a second child or not among the 80s are not so positive. Also, most 80s don't want to choose to have a second child because of many realistic reasons.

- The reasons the vast majority of the 70s, who used to be the major force of bearing, didn't choose to have a second child after the publishing of the two-child policy in 2015 resulted from getting old when the two-child policy was published, the unsuitable physical conditions to have another child, over 70-year-old parents cannot help to look after another child.

4. Method

This is a qualitative method-based study that uses both observations that focus on the real-life experience related to China and interviewed 35 Chinese citizens who come from relatively developed cities and relatively high economic income areas, was conducted between August 10th to 30th in 2022 in China.

Participants are chosen from both male and female people born from 1970 to 2022 in relatively balanced sex and gender distribution, who are suitable for marriage and fertility physiologically and legally in China. Although the exact birth year of the interviewees has no regularity and symmetry, all of them are representative to some extent. Then all of the interviewees were asked two to eight

questions via Wechat chatting or in-person interviews in Chinese depending on their real circumstances to explore their views and attitudes on marriage and birth, which are the indirect and direct reasons leading to the fertility rate in China from micro perspectives. To be specific, four categories are divided. The 80s are a group of people who are still suitable and have the potential ability to have a second child or even third child, while birth years around 90-95 are many people who are planning to marry, have access to marriage, preparing for the first baby, or have already had the first children and considering about having the second child. Or in other words, they are currently the birthing main force in China, and their attitudes, as well as their choice, has a great influence on China's fertility rate. What's more, around 00 to 02 are the youngsters have just arrived at the age of marriage and birthing legal requirement at present, which means that their attitudes have an irreplaceable impact on the fertility rate in the following decade or more. In addition, unique to this study is that the fourth category 70s were also interviewed when investigating the reasons why the 70s as a former fertile population usually did not have children after the opening of the two-child policy. And 70s can also be considered as the research samples to look back at the reason for the low fertility rate in the 10s.

5. Results

Table 1: Date of birth and sex.

Date of birth	men	women	total
70s	0	5	5
80s	4	6	10
90s	5	5	10
00s	5	5	10
total	14	21	35

Table 2: Workers or students.

Workers or students	workers	students	total
70s	5	0	5
80s	10	0	10
90s	8	2 (born in late 90s)	10
00s	0	10	10
total	23	12	35

Table 3: The list of questions.

Questions	Each participant was asked 2 to 8 questions according to their real circumstance. And the interviewers are not known to each other.
Question one	May I ask why you chose to have a second child after the two-child policy was published in 2015 or not? What are the reasons?
Question two	Do you positive to have a second child? What are the reasons?
Question three	Are you positive about getting married and having children? Do you tend to fear marriage or childbearing? What are the reasons for being positive or fearful?
Question four	If you like a girl but she doesn't want to have children, do you still want to marry her? Can you tell me your reasons?

Table 3: (continued).

Question five	Do you hold a positive attitude towards China's gradually improving pension system? Do you think the improvement of the pension system will to some extent promote late marriage and late childbearing or unmarried and infertility?
Question six	Do you think that the increasing availability of higher education and the tendency of pursuing master's and doctoral degrees will in part promote late marriage and late childbearing or unmarried and infertility, especially for women?
Question seven	What are the marriage and birthing states of your peers? What are the reasons causing this?
Question eight	Can you accept a boyfriend or husband who is younger than you?/Can you accept a girlfriend or wife who is older than you?
Question nine	Whether the awakening of individual consciousness and female consciousness is a cause of late marriage and late childbearing or unmarried and infertility?
Question ten	What is your attitude about legitimate or illegitimate childbirth, legitimate surrogacy, and legitimate homosexuality? And then how about under the Chinese context?

In terms of the interviewees, it is found that a total of 35 interviewers in a relatively balanced sex distinction. And they have strong characteristics of the time they were born in. To be specific, besides interviewees who were born in the late 90s and 00s are still undergraduate or postgraduate students, other interviewees have been working for a long time. So the views of these 35 interviewees have representative roles to explore the declining fertility in China.

According to the results, the answers of interviewees partly verify my hypothesis but also overturns or complement other points of view. Firstly, not all late 90s or 00s tend to fear marriage or childbearing, which may cause late marriage and late childbearing or unmarried and infertility. Specifically, 3 of 12 late 90s or 00s including both men and women have a very positive attitude to marriage and fertility, even if they want to have two or three or six children, which threatens my first hypothesis. While in comparison, what confirms my hypothesis is that the other 9 of 12 late 90s or 00s are not so positive or passive to marriage and fertility no matter for men or women. But the emphasis on women and men is different. Economic burdens of marriage, having children, and then raising a child, which is considered rooted struggle by men. Men group fear their possible wages cannot support the cost of a family. While women pay more attention to the marriage cost and fertility cost and relatively little to economic burdens, mainly including both the cost of taking care of a family and the cost of pregnancy. Women groups have the potential fear of being out of shape after pregnancy and also men not taking on their supposed share of household responsibilities in marriage. And according to the family communication theory, women indeed usually take double or even triple housework as men, which supports the concerns of women. In a small summary, these scruples are the core reason why the late 90s or 00s are negative to marriage and fertility. Besides, about half of these late 90s or 00s are positive about the Chinese pension system and also think the pension system's improvement is a helper that declines marriage and fertility rate. Then about 80% of interviewees believe that achieving personal values rather than contributing to a family like the Chinese traditional value asks is indeed a reason that decreases marriage and fertility rate. Besides, the current high educational level of women especially postgraduate and doctoral degrees as well as the late graduation ages of women is also a cause of late marriage and late fertility and agreed by most interviewees. A large part of women refuses to have children during the student period because of academic pressure and inconvenience. But some men's interviews add that this is not so working for men because men take limited fertility costs. Also, the updated viewpoint of women through education that prompts the awaking of female consciousness and helps women to get rid of

the shackles of marriage and childbearing to pursue the life they want is a reason why unmarried and infertility choices exist. The last point to add to my hypothesis is that although there is a stigma of the older sister and younger brother love in China, most men are very able to accept women who are older than themselves as girlfriends or wives, but women can hardly accept boys who are younger than themselves as boyfriends or husbands because women think that men who are younger than them are naive except very matured younger men. Women generally need men to be older 0 and 5 years older than boys as partners because men will like the care of older women, but women can't wait to grow up with younger men. Differences in the age requirements for partners between boys and girls are also a real reason for the decline in marriage rates.

Secondly, when it comes to the 90s, there is a clear division between the two groups. One group of them is positive about marriage and fertility. So, 2 of 10 interviewees are in a positive attitude to consider marriage in recent years or fertility in following years because they have already had a very loving partner. Another group is also negative about marriage and fertility, which is almost the same as the negative attitudes of these 9 late 90s or 00s. So, the remaining interviewees don't want to be married, especially passive to have a child (besides two in special conditions like lack of original family love and homosexuality orientation want to have a baby but cannot consider marriage because not confidence in love and the current illegal homosexuality love in China), not to say two children. They may consider getting married if they meet a very suitable partner but don't consider having a child. Because they generally feel that the cost of having children is too high and that raising them requires too much effort. That is to say, having kids is no happier than being single or a dink from their views. In addition, compared with the 80s or 70s, 90s or 00s have an inherent sense of responsibility for childbirth, they do not think that children can be raised well no matter in which family conditions, they think that only when their conditions can provide a very good environment for children's growth, they may choose to have children. But then their realistic conditions cannot satisfy. They do not want their children to have the same unsatisfactory life as themselves and do not want to impose this pain on the next generation. However, what is interesting is that no matter these 10 interviewees' attitudes to marriage and fertility, most of them express that part of their peers have already married, pregnant, or raised (one or two children) status. But their peers who have already entered the marriage and fertility don't all think it is worth it, part of their peers feel not worth it and suggest they delay or give up marriage and fertility. That is also a reason that makes them feel negative about marriage and fertility. In addition, they also add that my assumption that men would tend to have children and that if women don't want to have children, men will force women to have children or choose not to marry is wrong. Both 90s and 00s men said they didn't have a strong desire to have children as I thought, and the reasons the vast majority of men think about having no children are stated above. If women don't want to have children, all of them will respect and agree, and one interviewee says "it's great and also meet my thoughts". And in that situation, men will try their best to persuade parents to give up having grandchildren, although it is difficult under the traditional Chinese concept of succession.

Next, although all 80s that I interviewed had already chosen to be married and had a child because compared with the 90s or 00s they have a more traditional view of building a family and having children under the influence of their parents, as the major force of having a second child, 80s are divided into two opposite groups when choose to have the second child or not in a relative averaged conditions. 4 of 10 interviewees choose to have another child. One interviewee thinks that 80s, as a representative first generation of only one child, they feel lonely in the process of growing up, so they want their children to have a partner. At the same time, the two children can discuss family matters together. If the parents are sick, they can take turns to help take care of them, which can also relieve the pressure of old age. While the other 6 interviewees choose to have an only child caused of two reasons as one interview suggests. The first is the problem of child care. Many

couples cannot spare time to take care of their children due to work or other reasons, and their parents also cannot help to take care of another child. Second is the problem of economic pressure. China now requires huge energy and huge financial resources to raise children for a couple, which reduces the existing quality of life. In addition, it costs too much if two children are both in elite education. So a couple cannot afford it and it is better to cultivate one. In a small summary, 80s interviewees also say that their peers are also in such a situation, about half of 80s will actively choose to have a second child, and half will give up.

Finally, these five female 70s all gave up to have another child when the two-child policy was published in 2015. The reasons for their choices are almost the same as the fourth hypothesis. The unsuitable physical conditions to have another child are the most important reason because the risk of being an elderly pregnant woman about 40 to 45 years old is known by the 70s. In addition, 70s over 70-year-old parents cannot help to look after another child, which may cause no adult to take care of the second child. Also, 2 of 5 interviewees add the high economic burdens to bear another child is also a reason. In conclusion, all of these three reasons are widespread why 70s interviewees gave up having two children although they wanted to have a second child. It is obvious that the 70s is a generation that wants to have two children but is restricted by the one-child policy when they can have another one.

6. Limitations

Firstly, the interview samples all come from relatively high-income cities with relatively high education levels, without considering economically backward areas with low education levels. But as the fertility rate in undeveloped areas is relatively high, so the research on the reduction of the fertility rate is not very valuable in the less developed areas. Secondly, the number of interviewees who are research samples is small, and the questionnaire survey analysis that can be sent to hundreds of people has not been done, which may not be universal enough. Thirdly, to a certain extent, there is a lack of quantitative method support such as big data analysis, which is useful to fulfill the research richness of the decline of fertility rate.

Fourthly, although interviewee diversity, such as joining single-parent households and homosexual interviewees was taken into consideration, the exact influence of the original families, disappointment in previous failed relationships, and sexual orientation on attitudes toward marriage and fertility may result in decreasing fertility rate were not carefully explored. So, further research can focus on this point to explore the potential influence on the fertility rate of people from single-parent families and how people with homosexual sexual orientation. Finally, the number of male and female samples is not average in the 1970s. Specifically, only women were interviewed when investigating the reasons why most 70s as the former fertile population did not have children after the opening of the two-child policy. However, since women are indeed the main bearing subjects of childbirth, the opinions of women in the 70s can represent the opinions of the whole family to a certain extent.

7. Discussion

From the interview results, only about 3% of the interviewees hold the view that illegitimate childbirth and surrogacy can be permitted in law because it is a kind of freedom and reproductive right of women that is not restricted by marriage. But about 97% of respondents from the 70s to 00s all believe that it is not feasible for illegitimate childbirth and surrogacy, although may be helpful to increase the fertility rate. In other words, these two policies are not feasible in the Chinese context. Even if illegitimate childbirth can indeed allow girls to remain single and have children at the same time, surrogacy can help homosexual groups get their children and remain helpful to people who

want children but do not want to be pregnant. So, both can help to increase the fertility rate to a certain extent. However, due to the limited number of illegitimate births and the homosexual group, legal measures have a limited effect on raising the fertility rate. More importantly, illegitimate childbirth and surrogacy will bring about a series of social problems such as the loss of ethics and morality, materialization of women, selling the uterus, the formation of related industrial chains, and chaos in social relations. Besides, one 80s interview says that "children are the crystallization of the love between two people. Since they choose to have children, they should participate in the whole process of gestation, which will be helpful to enhance relationship, parenthood, and responsibility". Therefore, illegitimate childbirth and surrogacy cannot be legally implemented in China for sake of protecting women at large. However, 96% of the interviewees were neutral or supportive of legitimate homosexuality. A large part of people with a positive attitude believe that with the development of society, homosexuality should not be a taboo topic, and the homosexual community should get their rights and legal identities in China. While some people suggest that they cannot understand homosexual people, they should show respect for them and homosexual people should be treated with respect by society which is a kind of social bottom line in Chinese modern society. But some of them also add that legal homosexuality can not be applied in a short time in China considering the whole acceptance of homosexuality and traditional views of elders. But from a general angle, the proposal to legalize homosexuality is constructive in the Chinese context in the future.

8. Conclusion

It is still unclear whether the three-child policy can promote the increase of my country's fertility rate to a certain extent, and whether there will be an unrestricted fertility policy in the future. However, the one-child policy will have a significant impact on China's fertility rate according by decreasing compulsorily starting in the 70s. Then the two-child policy had a limited effect on the promotion of the fertility rate in China, so limited interviewees of the research born in the 90s or 00s have brothers or sisters.

The phenomena of late marriage and late childbearing or unmarried and infertility are very widespread in developed countries, which indeed results in all kinds of social problems such as a limited workforce, and high burdens of providing for the aged no matter in which country. That is the reason why the possible reasons for a low fertility rate need to be explored. In that case, China, as a special developing country, has already entered a low fertility rate like developed countries in 2002, and also suffered related social issues. As the recent news suggests that the number of married people dropped below 800 million couples in 2021 in China for the first time, which is obvious that the fertility rate will also be influenced by going down because it is still only legitimate childbirth allowed in China. Also, the average age of couples who choose to be married is about 25 to 29 years old, which verifies the opinions in the literature review that the average age of women will become older and also get close to the developed countries' levels in the following years. But the social reality in China also adds to the late marriage choice of men. What's more, besides changing public policy that causes the decreasing fertility rate, the bad impact of the epidemic, the decline in fertility rates that accompany economic growth, improvement of both women's family status and women's education level, high cost of women's fertility rate and high burdens of bearing the cost for couples, and the environmental pressure, as well as the world population capacity, are all possible reasons may cause the decreasing in fertility rate in the literature review from a macroscopic perspective.

The first-hand reasons from the microscopic viewpoint are also important. In terms of the results of 35 interviewees that I interviewed, regardless of whether all the 70s and most 80s choose not to have a second child or most 90s and 00s choose or plan to get married and have children at a later

age or even not marry and infertile, it was a forced formation that was trapped in the passive personal and social realities. Specifically, the 70s express that the opening of the second-child policy was too late, so they gave up having a second child because they were too old and had no parents to take care of another child. Then most of the 80s said that the government and society could provide extremely limited support for childbirth, so the pressure on the economy and parenting was huge, thus giving up having a second child is a good choice. Besides, the 90s and 00s also suffer from economic burdens, but some 90s and 00s are also more concerned about fertility costs and family costs. In addition, they are also reluctant to have children due to their inherent strong sense of responsibility for taking a life.

According to the results of the discussion, from a public policy perspective, measures for illegitimate childbirth and surrogacy that may increase fertility are not feasible in the Chinese context according to the research outcomes of this essay. But for homosexual groups, public policies should have a relatively open attitude. This article believes that homosexuality should be legal or at least gain society's permission, which shows supposed respect for the homosexual group as a minority group in future years in China. Also, to a certain extent, it will promote an increase in the fertility rate.

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