Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Financial Technology and Business Analysis
DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

A Study on Collaborative Governance of Tourism Default

---- Analysis Based on Three-way Deductive Evolutionary Game Theory

Jie Gao[1,a,*]

[1]School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China
a. 20150435418@mail.sdufe.edu.cn
**corresponding author*

Abstract: With the opening up of the domestic epidemic and the tourism heatwave, hotel default behaviors have emerged one after another. With the increasing exposure of default issues, the contradictions between tourists and businesses, tourists and the government, and government and businesses have become increasingly prominent, and have once become the focus of social attention. This article fully considers the regulation and supply-demand relationship of stakeholders in the tourism industry in environmental regulations and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, businesses, and tourists. It analyzes the strategic evolution paths of each participant and the factors that affect their evolution. The research results indicate that the enthusiasm of government regulation is a key factor in solving the problem of default, and the fluctuations in its behavioral strategies simultaneously affect the behavior of tourists and businesses; Consumer rights protection is another key factor in promoting compliance behavior among businesses; The probability of merchants choosing compliant behavior reaches its maximum when the government and tourists work together; In the process of collaborative governance, the government can effectively suppress the motivation of merchants to adopt default pricing by adopting active regulatory measures such as increasing the amount of punishment and compensation. However, more importantly, it can improve consumers' willingness to protect their rights by reducing the cost of tourists' rights protection and establishing appropriate reward systems, making up for the lack of government regulation.

Keyword: industry; breach of contract, collaborative governance, evolutionary game

1. Introduction

The tourism industry plays an important role in the modern service industry and has become a strategic pillar industry of the national economy. Due to the relaxation of epidemic control measures at the end of 2022, the domestic tourism industry has experienced a strong recovery. However, businesses that have been almost unprofitable for three consecutive years have become instinctive to pursue profits in the face of a constantly surging passenger volume, and default is the fastest and most profitable way to achieve profits. In the initial stage of tourism recovery, when the number of tourists is relatively small, businesses will determine a price slightly higher than the off-season based on the supply and demand relationship in the market. But as the number of tourists continues to grow, businesses will find that the supply and demand of accommodation in the market is becoming

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

increasingly unbalanced, with demand far exceeding supply. The supply of accommodation is fixed, but the demand is still increasing. Under the premise that the pandemic has been almost unprofitable for three years, price increases are the ultimate choice for every merchant. However, tourists have already paid the room reservation price, and in order to gain more benefits from the price increase, they can only use breach of contract behavior, such as using various farfetched reasons such as "the room type is currently uninhabitable" or "the room you previously booked cannot be provided now" to force tourists who have already booked the room to check out, and then raise the price of the vacant room before listing it, and the increased price is often more than six times the original price. Tourists facing skyrocketing housing prices will choose to complain to relevant government departments, and the government will take punitive measures accordingly. But when the fine is much lower than the benefits of default, the merchant will not hesitate to continue the default behavior. When tourists discover that the merchant's breach of contract has not ended with the complaint, they will complain and lose trust with the government. Therefore, in-depth analysis of the strategic choices between the government, businesses, and tourists hidden behind the breach of contract by businesses can promote the transformation of traditional regulation to a collaborative governance model, which is of great significance for governing the breach of contract in the tourism industry and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.

2. Literature Review

Scholars at home and abroad believe that the phenomenon of "refunding and changing housing prices" in the tourism industry is essentially a breach of contract and have analyzed the causes of such breach from the perspectives of the defaulting party and government regulation [1]. The government has always played a leading role in the breach of contract behavior in the tourism industry, but the breach of contract behavior has not been significantly reduced due to the active supervision of the government. Instead, it continues to breed in the tourism market in a more hidden form [2].

(1) The reasons for the breach of contract. Firstly, there is a lack of effective tourist rights protection. Wang Ting emphasized the urgent need to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of tourism consumers [3]. In the formulation of laws, it is suggested to supplement the issue of compensation for consumer rights damage. Secondly, due to the excessive benefits that high pricing can bring, even if the defaulting store is punished, the cost of punishment is far lower than the benefits that can be obtained, so punishment cannot have the expected effect. Zhang Kai et al. found through game model analysis that discriminatory pricing is beneficial for platforms to increase profits, but not conducive to enhancing the utility of bilateral users on the platform [4]. Thirdly, separate government regulation can easily create regulatory gaps. Professor Liang Huixing conducted a systematic and extensive study on consumer policies and existing consumer associations in China, and found that protecting the legitimate rights and interests of consumers cannot rely solely on one party [5]. Li Ling believes that the existing market regulatory structure is still dominated by government agencies and does not provide corresponding policy space and implementation mechanisms for the supervision of platform enterprises [6]. It is precisely because the current regulatory framework is difficult to accommodate multiple regulatory entities such as government agencies, tourists, and merchants that the phenomenon of excessive regulation or regulatory gaps often occurs in the tourism industry.

(2) Scholars have proposed corresponding improvement suggestions based on the causes of breach of contract. Firstly, self-discipline and supervision of merchants. Norman Kogan et al. believe that companies value management and take corresponding measures to resolve travel related disputes, which is the most acceptable settlement method for consumers and maximizes their satisfaction [7]. Haasea Daniel et al. proposed the concept of self-regulation, emphasizing its important role in the tourism market [8]. Secondly, improve the government regulatory system. Xu Zhongwei believes that

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

in an environment where market structure remains unchanged, simple government regulation is difficult to achieve the desired governance effect [9]; Tian Minna pointed out that the government should improve its law enforcement system and strengthen its enforcement efforts, fully utilizing the power of the internet for dynamic regulation [10]. Thirdly, establish collaborative governance. Xu Feng et al. conducted research based on Bayesian network methods and found that improving the synergy between the government and netizens can improve the effectiveness of internet collaborative governance [11]. Wang Cheng and Liu Yujie believe that the rise of the exhibition industry cannot meet the development needs of the industry solely relying on traditional government regulatory methods [12]. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a new regulatory system that integrates industry autonomy, government regulation, and social supervision within the industry.

The existing theoretical achievements have important reference significance for the governance of default behavior of tourism industry merchants, but there are still areas that need to be improved: on the one hand, the default behavior of tourism industry merchants is temporary and complex, and it is difficult to achieve regulatory effects solely through the government itself. Exerting the role of multi-party supervision not only has a significant impact on enterprise decision-making, but also is a necessary way to improve the efficiency of government governance; On the other hand, most existing literature adopts the idea of a game between two parties, which easily overlooks the important role of other entities in the entire system. In order to effectively govern the default behavior of tourism industry merchants, joint efforts from all three parties are needed.

Therefore, this article constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for merchants, governments, and tourists, and explores the stability of strategy choices among all parties in the tripartite game system by replicating dynamic equations. It analyzes the impact of factors such as government penalty amounts and government rewards for consumers on the system evolution, providing reference for further exploring the governance of tourism industry default behavior.

3. Analysis of the Three-Party Evolutionary Game Structure for Collaborative Governance of Breach of Contract Behavior

In the process of tourists paying for housing prices in the tourism industry, default behavior has become increasingly rampant and complex, seriously infringing on the legitimate rights and interests of tourists. Government regulation alone is difficult to effectively curb the occurrence of such behavior. Collaborative governance emphasizes a continuous, orderly and dynamic governance process in which various governance entities interact in multiple directions within the system. Evolutionary game theory, as a combination of multi-agent game analysis and dynamic evolutionary process analysis, provides a suitable research method for studying the collaborative governance of tourism industry default behavior.

According to the motivation, opportunity and control of the Routine activity theory, the relevant subjects of the game are analyzed.

The main motivation for breach of contract is the merchant. On the one hand, with the liberalization of the epidemic, people who have been "imprisoned" for a long time choose to travel or vent or celebrate, and the large number of tourists provides conditions for companies to choose to default and seek excess profits; On the other hand, the pandemic of over two years has had a huge impact on the tourism industry, with too many inns, hotels, and others unable to survive this long winter. However, after more than two years of consumption, businesses that can persist in waiting for the tourism industry to recover have limited economic resources. It is difficult to wait for a large number of tourists, how can we let go of this immediate excess profit?

The opportunity for merchants to default is reflected in the attitude of tourists towards merchant default behavior. Due to more than two years of limited mobility, many tourists have developed a tourism concept of retaliatory consumption. As long as tourists are able to travel, no matter how

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

crowded and expensive the prices are, even if businesses violate the contract by repeatedly raising prices for tourists, tourists will use the excuse of "rarely being able to travel" to make themselves accept high accommodation fees. Even if some tourist's express dissatisfaction with the price, they often hesitate to protect their rights due to high costs and difficulties in providing evidence, which undoubtedly encourages merchants to default. But with the development of new media technology, consumers can expose the default behavior of merchants through new media channels, in order to obtain corresponding compensation and reduce the chances of merchants' default to a certain extent.

The government provides methods of control. The government's regulatory approach and intensity will affect the behavior of businesses. Faced with the default behavior of businesses, government departments face problems such as a lack of professional personnel, unclear law enforcement boundaries, and high regulatory costs. The government's regulatory methods need to be innovative; In addition, the government's regulatory efforts are relatively weak, which has a relatively small impact on businesses and makes it difficult to curb their default behavior.

It can be seen that businesses, governments, and tourists interact with each other and jointly affect the effectiveness of governance. Collaborative governance of tourism industry default behavior means that, with the participation of multiple entities such as businesses, governments, and tourists, coordinated governance measures are taken to effectively regulate the pricing of businesses and promote the rational development of the tourism industry economy. In the process of collaborative governance of breach of contract behavior, businesses, governments, tourists, and other entities participate, playing different governance roles and interdependent. Through division of responsibilities and complementary advantages, they curb breach of contract behavior, achieve maximum benefits, and promote the healthy development of the tourism industry from point to area.

4. Construction of Collaborative Governance Model for Breach of Contract in the Tourism Industry

4.1. Assumptions

In order to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model among merchants, government, and tourists, and conduct a comprehensive analysis of the strategies and influencing factors of each party, the following assumptions are put forward:

Assumption 1: Due to the limited knowledge and ability of businesses, governments and tourists, they are not Perfect rationality rational, but Bounded rationality in the actual decision-making process. They need to constantly learn and adjust their behavior to achieve the goal of maximizing benefits.

Assumption 2: The merchant's behavior combination is {compliance, breach of contract}, the probability of choosing a compliance behavior is x, and the probability of choosing a default behavior is 1-x, $0<x<1$; the government's behavior combination is {active supervision, negative Supervision}, the probability of choosing positive supervision behavior is y, the probability of choosing negative supervision behavior is 1-y, $0<y<1$; the behavior combination of tourists is {complaint, no complaint}, the probability of choosing complaint behavior is z, choose The probability of not complaining is 1-z, $0<z<1$.

Assumption 3: When a merchant chooses a compliance strategy, the pricing of the product is P1, and when choosing a default strategy, the price is P2, with P2>P1. In the tourism boom period, the Marginal cost of adopting the default behavior tends to be zero, so whether the business chooses to default or not, the commodity cost is C1.

Assumption 4: Tourists will protect their rights through government channels when encountering a breach of contract by a merchant. If the government department actively supervises, the cost of protecting rights such as money and energy paid by tourists is C2, and the fines imposed by the government on merchants and the compensation received by tourists from merchants total M1. If the

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

government department is passively supervised, the cost of protecting the rights of tourists remains unchanged, but the fines imposed on the merchants by the government and the compensation received by tourists from the merchants are M2 (M1>M2); at this time, regardless of whether the merchants have defaulted on pricing, the affection of the merchants' reputation is D.

Assumption 5: When the government actively regulates, the reward amount for tourists who choose to protect their rights is A, and the regulatory cost is C3; When the government passively regulates, the reward for tourists who choose to protect their rights is 0, and the regulatory cost is 0. When tourists choose rights protection strategies, the loss when the government passively regulates is L, and the profit when the government actively regulates is R.

Based on the above assumptions, the parameters and meanings of the evolutionary game model of government, merchants and tourists are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Evolutionary Game Model Parameters and Implications for Merchants, Government, and Tourists.

parameter	meaning
x	The probability of merchants choosing compliant behavior
y	The probability of the government choosing active regulatory behavior
z	Probability of tourists choosing complaint behavior
P1	Pricing of commodities when merchants choose normal Pricing
P2	Pricing of commodities when merchants choose default Pricing(P2＞P1)
C1	Regardless of whether the merchant chooses to default on the cost of goods
C2	The cost of money, effort, etc. paid by tourists to protect their rights
C3	Regulatory costs when actively regulated by the government
M1	When the government actively regulates, the total fines and compensation of merchants
M2	Total fines and compensation for businesses under negative government regulation(M1>M2)
D	The impact of negative government regulation on the reputation of businesses caused by tourists choosing to protect their rights
A	The amount of rewards given to tourists who choose to protect their rights when actively regulated by the government
L	Losses obtained under passive supervision when tourists choose rights protection strategies
R	Benefits obtained under active supervision when tourists choose rights protection strategies

4.2. Payment Matrix for Game Entities

Based on the above assumptions, a mixed strategy game matrix between merchants, tourists, and government regulatory authorities can be obtained, as shown in Table 2.

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

Table 2: Tripartite evolutionary game payoff matrix.

Tourist: Complaint(z)				Tourists: no complaints(1-z)			
		government				government	
		active regulation (y)	passive regulation (1-y)			active regulation (y)	passive regulation (1-y)
merchant	compliance (x)	P1-C1, -A-C3+R, -C2+A	P1-C1-D, -L, -C2	merchant	compliance (x)	P1-C1, -C3, 0	P1-C1, 0, 0
	breach of contract (1-x)	P2-C1-M1, -C3+R-A, A+M1-C2+P1-P2	P2-P1-D-M2, -L, P1-P2-C2+M2		breach of contract (1-x)	P2-C1, -C3, P1-P2	P2-C1, 0, P1-P2

5. Stability Analysis of the Collaborative Governance Model of Tourism Breach

5.1. Stability Analysis of Merchant Strategy

(1) Analysis of business strategy evolution. By analyzing the payment matrix, it can be seen that the replication dynamic equation of the merchant's choice of compliance behavior strategy probability is:$F(x) = \frac{dx}{dt} = x(1-x)[P1 - P2M1 + (1-y)zM2]$.

According to the stability principle of the differential equation and calculated, it can be known that if $z<\frac{C4}{L+R-A+(1-x)M1]}$, $x>1-\frac{C3+y(L+R-A)}{yM1}$,x=0 is the evolutionary stable strategy of the merchant; otherwise, x=1 is the evolutionary stable strategy. This shows that during the evolution process, the probability of merchants' compliance behavior increases with the increase of the probability of tourists' rights protection and the probability of active supervision by government regulatory agencies.

(2)Analysis of related parameters. Calculate the first-order partial derivatives of each element for V(HM) , and get:$\frac{\partial(V(HM))}{\partial(M1)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HM))}{\partial(P2-P1)}<0$, Therefore, with the increase of M1 or the decrease of P2-P1, the probability of merchants choosing compliance behaviors will increase.

The above analysis shows that the merchant will choose to default when the excess profit obtained by the breach of contract is large, but the probability of default will be reduced when the merchant chooses to pay a high price after the breach is discovered. Therefore, the government can encourage businesses to adopt compliance behaviors by increasing punishment.

5.2. Stability Analysis of Government Strategy

(1) Analysis of the government's strategy evolution. By analyzing the payment matrix, it can be seen that the replication dynamic equation of the probability that the government chooses an active regulatory strategy is:$F(y) = \frac{dy}{dt} = y(1-y)[-C3 + z(L+R-A) + (1-x)zM1]$.

Calculations based on the stability principle of differential equations show that: when $z<\frac{C4}{L+R-A+(1-x)M1]}$, $x>1-\frac{C3+y(L+R-A)}{yM1}$, y=0 is the government's evolutionary stable strategy; otherwise, y=1 is the evolutionary stable strategy. It shows that the probability of active government supervision

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

in the evolution process increases with the increase of the probability of tourists' rights protection and decreases with the increase of the probability of merchants' compliance behavior.

(2) Analysis of related parameters. Calculate the first-order partial derivatives of each element for V(HG) separately, and get:$\frac{\partial(V(HG))}{\partial(M1)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HG))}{\partial(L)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HG))}{\partial(R)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HG))}{\partial(C3)}<0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HG))}{\partial(A)}<0$.Therefore, with the increase of , L and R or the decrease of C3 and A, the probability of the government choosing active regulation will increase.

The above analysis shows that: the higher the penalty amount, the greater the probability of active government supervision; the increase in reward amount and supervision cost will reduce the probability of active government supervision. First, the government should increase the number of penalties and establish an effective reward amount; second, the government should optimize the regulatory functions of various departments, improve work efficiency, and realize the timely and effective transmission of regulatory information. cost. Third, the government should expand the channels for tourists to complain, receive feedback from multiple dimensions, solve problems for tourists with an efficient speed and a fair and comprehensive attitude, and further improve the construction of government credibility.

5.3. Stability Analysis of Tourist Strategies

(1) Analysis of tourists' strategy evolution. By analyzing the payment matrix, it can be seen that the replication dynamic equation of the probability of tourists choosing rights protection strategies is:$F(z)=\frac{dz}{dt}=z(1-z)[y(A-C2)+(1-x)yM1+(1-x)(1-y)M2]$.

According to the calculation of the differential equation stability principle, it can be known that when $x>1-\frac{y(A-C2)}{yM1+(1-y)M2}$, y=0 is the evolutionary stable strategy of tourists; otherwise, y=1 is the evolutionary stable strategy. It shows that when the motivation of merchants to breach the contract increases, the rights and interests of tourists will be violated. In order to protect their legitimate rights and interests, tourists will tend to choose rights protection strategies.

(2) Analysis of related parameters. Calculate the first-order partial derivatives of each element for V(HT), and get:$\frac{\partial(V(HT))}{\partial(M1)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HT))}{\partial(A)}>0$, $\frac{\partial(V(HT))}{\partial(C2)}<0$。Therefore, with the increase of M1 and A or the decrease of C2, the probability of tourists choosing to defend their rights will increase.

The above analysis shows that: when the cost of rights protection for tourists is high, tourists will reduce their enthusiasm for rights protection; when the amount of fines and compensations imposed by merchants increases, the probability of tourists' rights protection will increase. When the rights of tourists are infringed, if the government wants to increase tourists' willingness to defend their rights: first, it should simplify the procedures for rights protection, reduce the cost of tourists' rights protection, and improve the efficiency of rights protection; second, it should increase the standards of compensation and rewards.

5.4. Stability Analysis of the Tripartite Strategy

The strategic choice of one party will not only affect the strategic choices of the other two parties, but also be affected by the other two parties. The choice of business compliance behavior is positively correlated with the intensity of government incentives and punishments, the reputation loss caused by tourists, and the compensation for losses; the choice of government's active regulatory behavior is positively correlated with the benefits of active regulation and the losses caused by negative regulation; tourists' choice of complaint behavior It is positively correlated with the government's active supervision to reduce the cost of tourists' complaints, the rewards for complaints, and the compensation brought by merchants' breach of contract. When the government chooses an active

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

supervision strategy and the probability of tourists choosing a complaint strategy increases, the probability of merchants choosing compliance behaviors increases; when the probability of merchants choosing non-complaint behaviors and tourists choosing non-complaint behaviors increases, the probability of government choosing negative regulatory behaviors will increase; when the probability of merchants choosing breach of contract and the government choosing active regulatory behavior increases, the probability of tourists choosing to complain will also increase. Therefore, only by giving full play to the synergistic effect of businesses, government and tourists can the three parties reach a balance.

6. Conclusion

This paper builds a dynamic model of the three-party evolutionary game among merchants, government and tourists, and studies the influence of punishment, reward and compensation under different parameters on the three-party evolutionary game behavior. The following conclusions and suggestions can be obtained.

6.1. Conclusion

(1) The merchant’s breach of contract can bring him excess benefits. If the excess benefit of the merchant is lower than the compensation and reputation loss for tourists under the passive government supervision or the compensation and fines under the active government supervision, the merchant will have a lower income. Motivation to take breach of contract behavior, so that the business strategy evolution is stable in compliance behavior.

(2) The probability of tourists' rights protection increases which can reduce the probability of business default. According to the evolutionary game model, the factors that affect the probability of tourists choosing rights protection strategies include: the cost of rights protection, the amount of government incentives and the amount of compensation from merchants.

(3) The probability of the government's active regulatory behavior increases, which can reduce the probability of business default. According to the evolutionary game model, the factors that affect the probability of the government choosing an active regulatory strategy include: the amount of punishment, the cost of regulation, and the amount of reward.

(4) From the perspective of the joint participation of the three parties, when the evolution strategy is (compliance, active supervision, no complaints), the business, government and tourists will reach a balance, and the coordinated development of the three parties can be realized. The conditions for achieving the optimal evolutionary strategy are: when the sum of the rewards and punishments of the government, the reputation enhancement and loss brought by tourists, and the amount of compensation for breach of contract is greater than the benefits brought by the breach of contract, the merchant will choose compliance behavior; the compensation paid by the government When the sum of the incentive cost of merchants and the cost of active regulation is less than the benefits of active regulation and the losses caused by negative regulation, the government will choose active regulation; tourists will choose not to complain when the government actively regulates and the merchants take compliance behaviors Behavior.

6.2. Suggestions

(1) Tourists should actively participate in collaborative governance. On the one hand, tourists should improve their rights protection awareness and ability. When they are violated by breach of contract, they should keep evidence in time, take the initiative to expose through new media or assist relevant departments to conduct investigations, actively participate in rights protection actions reasonably and legally, and give full play to their rights. The role of compensation for losses; on the other hand, to

DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/46/20230338

increase the reputation pressure of tourists on business breaches and government "inaction", this needs to stimulate the enthusiasm of tourists to participate. Since the cost of tourists' complaints can be reduced under the government's active supervision, the government should actively expand tourists' complaints channel, innovate incentives, and provide timely feedback.

(2) Improve the reward and punishment mechanism and refine the supervision system. First, the relevant government departments need to clarify regulatory responsibilities, increase the probability of active supervision, and improve the punishment and compensation mechanism, so that businesses do not have enough incentives to breach contracts; second, the government should strengthen cooperation with new media, build online channels, and collect relevant information, to build a comprehensive regulatory network with zero dead ends.

(3) Improve the internal driving force of merchants' compliance behavior. First of all, in the tourism industry, the government and tourists can manage the reputation of merchants, cultivate their own long-term development vision, and let them focus on the accumulation of their own reputation; secondly, more professional industry organizations should be fully mobilized to supervise and carry out self-discipline Behavior.

References

[1] *De Nijs R. Behavior-based Price Discrimination and Customer Information Sharing[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, 50: 319-334.*

[2] *Avraham E. Nation branding and marketing strategies for combatting tourism crises and stereotypes toward destinations[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2020, 116: 711-720.*

[3] *Wang Ting. Study on the Perfection of the Law on the Protection of Tourism Consumers' Rights and Interests[J].Legal Expo,2019(19):194.*

[4] *Zhang Kai, Li Huachen, Liu Weiqi. User Satisfaction and Choice of Platform Strategy in Bilateral Market[J]. Journal of Management Science, 2017,20(06):42-63.*

[5] *Liang Huixing. China's Consumer Policy and Consumer Legislation[J]. Law Science, 2000(5): 20-26.*

[6] *Li Ling. The development of platform economy and the reform of government regulation model[J].Economist,2015(07):27-34.DOI:10.16158/j.cnki.51-1312/f.2015.07.004.*

[7] *Norman Congun, Ken K. Cox, James Higginbotham, and John Burton.Consumerism and Marketing Management [J]. Journal of Marketing, April 1975, 39: 3.*

[8] *Haase Daniela,Lamers Machiel,Amelung Bas,et al.Heading into uncharted territory Exploring tiie institutional robustn^s of self-regulation in the Antarctic tourism sector [J]. Journal of Sustainable Tourisra,2009,17(4).411-430.*

[9] *Xu Zhongwei. The Economic Explanation of "Zero Negative Tour Fee"——Comment on "Tourism Law"[J].,2016(03):67-71.DOI:10.16059/j.cnki.cn43-1008/c.2016.03.013.*

[10] *Tian Minna. Research on the phenomenon of ultra-low-cost tourism[J]. Commercial Economics Research,2017(03):201-202.*

[11] *Xu Feng, Qi Yong. Research on Internet Collaborative Governance Based on Bayesian Network[J].Journal of Management,2017,14(11):1718-1727.*

[12] *Wang Cheng, Liu Yujie. On the Innovation of the Government Supervision System of the Import Expo[J].International Business Research,2018,39(06):78-86.DOI:10.13680/j.cnki.ibr.2018.06.008.*