

# ***The UNSC at a Crossroad: Urgency and Necessity for Reform***

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**Abstract:** The UN Security Council plays a crucial role in maintaining global peace and security. However, the Syrian Civil War and data reveal that the abuse of the veto and the decline in the representativeness and legitimacy of the permanent members hinder its effectiveness. The international community needs to reconsider the powers and structure of the UN Security Council, including reforming the veto system, the permanent seats, and the distribution of powers within the Security Council and other United Nations bodies. Furthermore, this study proposes several reforms, such as limiting the scope of veto use, especially in cases of conflicts threatening international peace, and introducing regional representation to better reflect the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. Additionally, the International Court of Justice should be empowered to interpret the UN Charter, enhancing the role of the Secretariat, and granting the General Assembly greater oversight over the Security Council's actions. These reforms aim to increase the UN Security Council's legitimacy, fairness, and capacity to act decisively in maintaining peace and security, ensuring it remains an effective body in the evolving landscape of international relations.

**Keywords:** UN Security Council, permanent members, veto power, membership expansion.

## **1. Introduction**

“Veto power in the hands of the aggressor is what has pushed the UN into deadlock.” Ukrainian President Zelensky told the UN Security Council (UNSC) on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2023, condemning Russia for vetoing Ukraine's peace and security issues. [1] He proposed to change the voting rule to override vetoes, which intended to prevent conflict escalation, yet often led to deadlock and impeded effective peacekeeping action. The permanent members that cast vetoes, meanwhile, focus on their national interests and gradually lack representation as the emerging powers rise. In addition, there is a notable absence of supervision and regulation regarding how the Council exercises its power.

This paper argues that in an era of great power competition, the structures of the UN as designed after World War II (WWII) are no longer fit for purpose. A new “Constitutional Convention” must be convened to redesign the UN, including a fundamental rethinking of veto rights, the UNSC

membership and the allocation of powers and responsibilities among UN bodies. The paper will begin by exploring why the UNSC has been ineffective, with a quantitative research methodology of data combined with a qualitative research methodology of case studies employed. This will be followed by proposals regarding internal and external reform. The effectiveness of the four veto power reform options will be tested by qualitative analysis of historical cases with quantitative survey data to provide a comprehensive understanding. Subsequently, three solutions to the structural reform and their related cases or data. Finally, the paper will apply literature research and case analysis as the main methods to test the assumptions related to the reform of the three major UN agencies: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Secretariat, and the General Assembly (GA).

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Veto Power

According to Dwight E. Lee, the Council considered that including the “concurring votes of the permanent members” is essential for peaceful settlement and avoiding wars. However, Lee contends that the national interests also influenced this decision, and hence the voting system alone cannot maintain peace and security; only compromise and negotiation can achieve this. [2]

Lee’s concerns are echoed by contemporary scholars who advocate for UNSC’s reform due to its current ineffectiveness. Edward C. Luck states that the need for UN reform arises from its complex structure, diverse and ambitious mandates, changing global politics, slow implementation of changes, and the divergent interests of its member states, all of which led to persistent calls for institutional renewal and adaptation. In particular, he points out that “the *inequities* of the veto power granted to the “big five” raised concerns of many delegates, deviating from their “august mission”. This argument reflects that the nature of the UN determines that it would oftentimes require reforms, yet national interest often outweighs the goal of maintaining peace and security when countries call for it. Nonetheless, Luck claims that the challenges posed by the veto power held by P5 made the reforms more complicated. [3]

Similarly, David D. Caron also considers the veto power a challenge as it undermines the UNSC’s legitimacy. The veto power creates a double standard by allowing certain states to avoid governance, whilst reinforcing the dominance of the permanent members leading to unequal treatment within the Council’s decision-making process. This is also a prime reason why the UNSC is unable to sufficiently fulfil its goal. [4]

More recent scholars such as Philippa Webb take a milder stance and recognize the veto as a neutral technique. She argues that while the veto could be ineffective due to its contradictory nature, it could also have an impact such as slowing down military action.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the veto system within the UNSC presents certain challenges. In the existing research on the veto system in the UNSC, the main debate among different scholars is whether veto power should be abolished or reformed. [5]

#### 2.1.1. Reforming Veto System

The options for reforming the veto power can be broadly categorized into two: limiting the scope of the veto power and adjusting the number of veto-holding countries.

Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys oppose expanding the permanent membership, but they appeal that every region should be awarded one veto. Meanwhile, the permanent membership should be reviewed after 10-20 years for extension or rotation. However, as they point out in the article, the more countries obtain the veto, the harder it will get to limit its use. [6] Granting a veto to each region would make it more difficult for the Security Council to reach an agreement and it would render the permanent members meaningless, as the veto would no longer be exclusive. However, their point about the

existing shortcomings of the veto system is valuable, and this paper will build on their study to further explore how to limit the scope of the veto's use.

While questioning the possibility of the actual reform on the substance of the veto, Saleh Al Shraideh also suggests that norms of restriction were achievable. For example, restricting the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. [7]

C. E. Okeke, on the other hand, proposes restrictions on the use of the veto in the admission of states to the membership of the UN and in pursuing national interests. [8] Unfortunately, while this is a consensus, it is still a distant goal.

All three aforementioned studies provide this analysis with a foundation of the veto that will undergo a detailed elaboration in a later chapter, exploring the utilities of the power of the veto.

### 2.1.2. Abolishing the Veto Power

Dilip Sinha is a strong supporter of the abolition of the veto power. The Security Council was deemed by him as a special body to maintain the hegemony of the P5[9]. Nevertheless, he does not provide any evidence to prove this argument.

Blessing Nneka Iyase and Sheriff Folami Folarin share the view that the veto system should be abolished and replaced by a system that would integrate developing countries into the global decision-making process unconditionally. [10]

Both Sinha and Iyase and Folami argue only one side of the story, namely that the veto has many drawbacks, but not demonstrate that global peace and security would be better maintained by abolishing the veto. Iyase and Folami propose a new alternative to the veto system, but unfortunately, they do not give a detailed account of it.

This paper inclines toward reforming veto power and will continue to discuss why the veto should be reformed rather than abolished and further discuss how to limit the scope of the use of the veto.

## 2.2. Representation and Seats

Ian Hurd emphasizes the legitimacy of the UNSC (2014). He argued that the power of the UNSC is derived from not only the Charter but also the political interests of powerful states and the legitimacy (a right to be obeyed) that the institution commands in the international system. However, he claims that the challenge is that enforcement could not take place if countries oppose each other, not the veto power itself. In fact, he believes that legal authority takes effect only when the UNSC are "sufficiently in agreement".

A document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan introduced three significant factors contributing to the necessity of reform, which are UNSC role change, size, and regional representation. The functions of the Council should keep pace with the times. It is no longer just an institution used to prevent war just as when it was founded, but also responsible for other issues, such as counter-terrorism and nuclear proliferation prevention. Besides, the number of its members remains almost unchanged, while the size of the UN has nearly quadrupled. [11]

### 2.2.1. Proposal and Feasibility

Documents that introduce the major issues related to reform promotions are as follows. Blum analyzed the crucial one of them, a report submitted to UN Secretary-General Kofi Atta Annan by a sixteen-member high-level panel, addressing "threats, challenges and change" confronting the UN in the 21st century. As a proposal to reform the UNSC through changing its structure and membership, the panel offered two models. Both models planned to enlarge the UNSC to 24 members. Under Model A, 6/9 newly added seats would be permanent without veto rights, while Model B would not add any permanent seats. Instead, Model B creates eight four-year renewable-term seats to be

allocated equally among four regions, and one two-year nonrenewable seat. The 11 ordinary nonpermanent seats would be distributed to 4 in Africa, 3 in the Asia-Pacific region, 3 in the Americas and 1 in Europe. However, these ideas and their related reform draft resolutions submitted by state coalitions were all blocked by competition and conflicts of national interests. [12]

Even so, there is no doubt that state coalitions have been effective in overcoming the limitations of the UNSC. Parvanova pointed out the consensus of the ineffectiveness of the UNSC and mainly researched the most influential state coalition, G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)'s potential to become permanent members. She suggested changing the structure of the UNSC (especially permanent members), such as adopting criteria for the legitimacy of permanent membership. [13]

Christopher et al. explored the trend of expansion and hegemony in the UNSC, which lacks international representation and the group of permanent members is a nuclear club with unchecked power to veto. This power is used as a tool of hegemony to block other UN members from permanent seats in the UNSC. They also suggested expanding the Security Council and include Africa and other rising powers for fair representation. [14]

Unlike the scholars mentioned above, Ronzitti offers a comprehensive analysis of UNSC reform by reviewing proposals from the 1950s to the 2010s and assessing their feasibility. He examines the rights of permanent members, including the veto safeguarded by the Lisbon Treaty, and addresses core issues related to UNSC reform, such as enlargement, seat categories, regional representation, veto rights, working methods, and the relationship with the General Assembly. Additionally, Ronzitti discusses the potential for the European Union to play a more significant role in the UNSC, emphasizing that closer coordination among EU member states could enhance Europe's influence within the Council. [15]

### 2.2.2. Challenges

Leigh-Phippard and Mikhailitchenko doubted that the UK and France would not give up their seats in the Security Council and their own national interests for a seat in the whole EU. Besides, as Mikhailitchenko claimed expanding the UNSC can increase its legitimacy and fairness, limiting the number of members is key to ensuring the Council's efficiency. Even so, a reform which can allow more states to participate in the UNSC affairs and reflect democratic principles is still necessary, relying on the initiative of individual member states and the feasibility of the reform program. [16][17]

However, the scholars' suggestions for the reform of the membership structure of the UNSC mainly focus on its expansion and rarely consider changing or reducing the seats. As mentioned, adding more seats in the UNSC could make it less efficient, but a reform without enlargement can completely avoid the problem. Although such ideas will face huge resistance, especially from the permanent members, they are indeed feasible and effective.

### 2.3. Other Principal Agencies of UN

Bruce claims that the UNSC has shown its capacity to "initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a new world order" if and only if the UNSC acts collectively on their commonality of interests. Also, he cites instances of UN mediations to demonstrate that while the UNSC frequently used military force, the limited availability of such resources constrained the UN's ability to enforce and maintain peace. [18]

Hence, scholars like Gould and Rablen focus on the reforms related to the Secretariat and standing armed forces. They claim that the Military Staff Committee mechanism envisioned in the original design of UN system has not been realized, resulting in the UN's lack of control over the military. Therefore, in order to build and maintain peace, the Secretariat should lead a standing armed force. [19]

Martini points out that different major powers or regional groups, such as the G4 proposal, the UFC proposal or the AU proposal, all hope to gain more influence in the current reform of the UNSC, leading to a deadlock in the current reform. While waiting for the decision of the major powers, these proposals also require the approval of the 128 members of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). [20]

In addition, Natalino mentioned the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA. In fact, the reports submitted by the UNSC to the UNGA have failed to achieve the traditional purpose of accountability. Regardless, there are unique provisions in the UN Charter that provide for greater information sharing between the two institutions. However, the idea of redistributing powers between the two institutions to benefit the UNGA and harm the UNSC has been questioned by Russia. There is still a lack of broad consensus on this issue. [15]

Bektas explored the possible benefits of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the reform of the UNSC. He pointed out that most of the reform of the UNSC has focused on changes to the existing structure of the institution, while the fact that reforming other UN agencies can help the UNSC operate more efficiently has been ignored. As the main UN judicial agency, the ICJ plays a significant role in resolving international disputes. Although the UN Charter emphasizes the necessity to comply with the purposes of the organization, it is difficult for the ICJ to take coercive measures in violation of the UNSC resolutions in the absence of judicial review. Bektas points out that the jurisdiction of the ICJ can be redefined as mandatory for all member states, so that it is not just a non-binding advisory opinion. If such a reform is implemented, the UN Charter may need to be amended. [21]

Regarding the reforms related to the UN Charter and the ICJ, Jacovides believes that although the UN still has much room for improvement in peacekeeping and human rights protection, the provisions of the UN Charter themselves can stand the test. Therefore, the focus of UN reform should be on the reform of the organizational system and on maintaining the authority of international law itself. He called for the ICJ to fully recognize the essential function it has in adjudicating disputes between states. To this end, countries that have not yet recognized the compulsory jurisdiction should recognize it in more specific circumstances. The advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ can also indirectly prevent disputes and conflicts through a unified interpretation of relevant rules. Jacovides advocates that the ICJ can issue advisory opinions through resolutions of the UNGA or the UNSC. [22]

In summary, the literature reviewed highlights the complexities and challenges associated with the legal structure, veto power, representation, and the roles of principal organs within the UNSC. The evolving nature of international relations and global governance necessitates ongoing reforms to the UNSC to enhance its legitimacy, fairness, and effectiveness. Scholars have explored various reform proposals, ranging from adjustments to veto power and membership structure to the roles of the ICJ and other UN organs. While there is consensus on the need for reform, differing views on the extent and nature of these reforms underscore the ongoing debate. This review underscores the importance of balancing historical context with contemporary demands to ensure that the UNSC remains a relevant and effective body for maintaining global peace and security.

### 3. Case Study

The case study of this paper will be divided into four parts: current challenges, structural reform or seats, reform of the veto system, and reform of other UN agencies. It will use historical cases, legal analysis, data analysis, and comparative analysis to research on the current challenges that UNSC confronts, and the feasibility of internal or external reforms of the UNSC.



### 3.1. Current Challenges

#### 3.1.1. Veto Rights

Article 27 Paragraph 3 of the UN Charter articulates that nine members of the UNSC should vote “affirmative” including the permanent members voting concurrently. [23] According to the Customary Law, it is interpreted as every permanent member has veto rights. However, it was not until the UK abstained from a resolution and clarified that it didn't intend for this to be considered a veto that the Council stated that an abstention does not count as a veto, and the affirmative votes of participating permanent members are sufficient to meet the requirement of concurring votes. [24] This case clarifies the definition of “veto” has enabled the UNSC to reach more agreements, thereby enhancing its efficiency.

However, it is worth noticing that the intent of this item is not drafted merely to make peacekeeping more effective. The Soviet Union remained adamant about the “full and unconditional implementation of the unanimity principle”, [25] and insisted that no major power should be obliged to abstain from voting when directly involved in a conflict, [2] claiming that it should “be permitted to be one of the judges rendering a decision affecting its own interests”. [26]

Hence, as discussed in the Literature Review section, veto rights written in the Charter may be effective in preventing superpowers got involved in warfare with each other by negotiation. A clearer interpretation of veto rights can further enhance the effectiveness of decision-making and peacekeeping. However, the intention of drafting may pose potential threats to peace and security when the mission clashes with permanent members’ interests.

Also, data illustrating the exercise of veto power during the initial 20 years of the UN’s establishment (1945-1965) and the most recent 20 years (2005-2025) are examined.

52 vetoes of new members were cast between 1945 and 1965, 51 of which were from the Soviet Union, with the exception of China's 1955 veto of Mongolia's entry. Notably, prior to 1953, fourteen non-Communist applicants were rejected due to Soviet vetoes despite receiving majority support. [27] This pattern potentially substantiates Lee’s argument that the Soviet Union’s frequent use of the veto was driven by its mistrust. [2]

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union provided justifications for their vetoes. For example, in vetoing the Republic of Korea’s admission, the Soviet Union claimed that force was used to impose the South Korean government as a result of US military occupation, and accused the US of endorsing South Korea to further its own national interests. Similarly, it denied memberships of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, alleging that their applications were set up by puppet governments to sustain colonial rule by French and Americans. In this case, the Soviet Union’s statements seem to have benevolent intent, yet the reasons all involved Western “superpowers”, which leaves space for doubt. In addition, although the Western powers refrained from vetoing admissions directly, they exerted influence over other UNSC members, preventing these “Soviet Union’s ‘satellite states’” from securing the required seven votes for admission. In contrast to all the non-Communist states receiving more than 8 votes for admission, it may also explain why the Soviet Union exercised the veto more than other Western countries. Hence, the core intent of the Soviet Union using veto power remains ambiguous, potentially driven by its rivalry with Western powers. [27]

More recent conflicts mainly focus on the Middle East. On the Syria Civil War issue, Russia and China cast 28 vetoes altogether, which severely hindered the UNSC from taking prompt action to counteract the conflict. While the Western countries argue that Assad’s atrocities should be repressed, China and Russia argue that the international community should not interfere in internal affairs. [28] Behind this conflict, however, are the different ideologies held by these groups reflected in the ‘Arab Spring’ and Assad’s government. Therefore, it reflects that these vetoes may be cast mainly because the resolutions do not align with the strategies or ideologies of these two countries that clashed with

those of Western countries. [29] Since no new resolutions met consensus and the Syria crisis was not handled effectively, it certainly does not help maintain peace and security.

Hence, these cases demonstrate that, despite the reduction in the number of vetoes in recent years, the motivations for casting them remain consistent. With veto power, countries putting national interests before peacekeeping seem inevitable. In fact, Stalin's insistence on this item when the Charter was drafted may underscore its purpose in safeguarding the interests of superpowers, a notion further corroborated by the exercise of veto rights over the past 80 years.

### 3.1.2. Memberships

In terms of the UNSC membership, the number written in Article 23 of the Charter, fifteen, has caused debates. In 1945, according to the UN Charter, eleven members were in the UNSC, with five permanent and six non-permanent, as shown in Figure 1. The original members of the General Assembly were 51. In 1963, the UNSC was enlarged into fifteen members – ten non-permanent members, with 113 members in total, as shown in Figure 2. Today, the UNSC remains unchanged, while the UN has 193 member states, as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 1: The Percentage of the UN Member States in the UNSC (1945)




Figure 2: The Percentage of the UN Member States in the UNSC (1963)




Figure 3: The Percentage of the UN Member States in the UNSC (2024)  
Data Source: UN Charter

The graphs above illustrate an increasing discrepancy in the ratio between the UNSC members and other countries. While the UNSC members comprised over a fifth of the total member states in 1945, it is only 7.8% of the General Assembly. This data suggests that the membership has become less representative over time. Compared to the General Assembly, it has far fewer countries to get involved in decision-making, causing unfairness and ineffectiveness. Therefore, although the legal structure in 1945 may be reasonable, the current structure may require expansion to better reflect the growing membership of the UN.

Another potential issue is that the post-WWII power structure may be outdated, and the current structure fails to represent the emerging powers.

This subsection examines the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the UNSC, comparing their rankings from recent years to those in 1960, shown in Figure 4 and 5. A high GDP is indicative of a large, productive economy that can generate significant wealth and resources. Consequently, such economies have the capacity to allocate more resources to their military and exert a greater influence on the global economy. Hence, the paper underscores the importance of GDP in evaluating the economic power and potential impact of UNSC permanent members.




Figure 4: Global GDP vs. Permanent Members' GDP (2023)






Figure 5: Global GDP vs. Permanent Members' GDP (1960)  
Data Source: World Bank

Through the data depicted above, it is apparent that P5 represents the majority of Global GDP (above 60%) in 1960, while only 50% in 2023. Also, P5 were among the top ranking then, but now only the US and China remained first and second, followed by Germany, Japan, and India. [30]

According to Hurd, P5 is considered legitimate as it is in a position of dominance over the others, [31] and P5 was the most influential in 1960. However, the legitimacy of P5 may be questioned in recent years as it no longer represents the most powerful states around the globe. Hence, in terms of peace and security issues, they may lack the authority to call for action and make binding decisions for all countries, hence making peacekeeping more challenging than before.

The graphs above compare global GDP and populations to those of the permanent members of the UNSC. Although they occupy relatively high percentages in the category, their percentages are insufficiently representative. The countries with larger GDPs, such as Germany and India, are excluded from making key decisions. Compared to G20 which represents approximately roughly 90% of global GDP, the UNSC should reform to represent more countries, aligning with its original goal of better maintaining global order, peace, and security.

### 3.2. Reform of Veto System

This chapter will test both the hypotheses that the veto system should be abolished and that all members should be granted a veto. These two hypotheses again echo the League of Nations' unanimity rule and the UNFCCC's consensus mechanisms, and thus this chapter will examine the feasibility of both hypotheses in the cases of the League of Nations (LN or LON) and the UNFCCC.

The appeal for reform of the veto system has long existed within the United Nations. The African Union, the Arab League, the Group of Non-Aligned Nations, and many Western countries have advocated for the abolition of the veto, while Iran and Cuba have consistently insisted on its immediate abolition, claiming that the system violates the principle of "sovereign equality". [6]

However, the veto system was devised as a reaction to the LN's blemishes to intervene if the UN is faced with the same fate. The LN eventually fell apart because of the absence of significant superpowers such as the US, the USSR, and Japan, and due to its structural flaws. [32] As Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State noted in his memoirs that initiating the UN system required each of

the large nations on the Council to preserve veto power. Otherwise, the US would not stay in the organization for a day without keeping its veto authority. [33]

As a result, if the veto was abolished, the great nations' withdrawal from the LN may reoccur.

The unanimity rule within both the Council and Assembly of the LN also makes it difficult to take effective action. Likewise, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is also in a similar predicament.

The UNFCCC was initiated in 1994. According to the Convention, one of the first tasks assigned to the very first "Conference of the Parties" (COP1) held in 1995, was to draft its own set of "rules of procedure". Furthermore, in accordance with Article 7.2k, the adoption of these rules requires the consent of all member States. However, it should be noted that as of 2024, the draft for these regulations is not yet finalized, even though they are enforced as such during each organizational COP session. Because there are no "last resort" voting rules, decisions are made by consensus by default. [34]

Both the failure of the LN and UNFCCC have proven that the consensus rule leads to an inefficient decision-making system with very limited effectiveness. Countries are unwilling to compromise when it comes to matters that affect their national interests. This reluctance is the reason the UAE Consensus has not been able to decisively call for the fossil fuel phaseout necessary to limit warming to 1.5 degrees, and why the "rules of procedure" remain unresolved.

If all countries had veto power, the dilemma faced by the League of Nations and the UNFCCC would be repeated in the Security Council. As Depledge explains in the UNFCCC context, the conflict over decision-making rules doesn't come from arguments among lawyers, but from a planned effort by groups trying to weaken the international response to climate change. [8] Not only will states veto proposals that are detrimental to their national interests, but they will even deliberately prevent the Council from playing an outsized role in international politics to ensure that it is not subject to the scrutiny of other countries and the UN. Therefore, it is not feasible to grant the right of veto to all countries.

The data and the Suez Crisis can examine the hypothesis that a double veto system should be implemented and that the scope of its use should be limited. The number of double vetoes provides evidence of the impact of the double veto. The Suez Crisis, in which the UK and France twice vetoed the Council's proposal for Israeli withdrawal, provides evidence to verify the effectiveness of the double veto and the scope of its use. The case of the Russo-Ukrainian War, on the other hand, serves to explore the scope of the use of the veto in more detail.

Some countries have also advocated changes to the double veto system, which demands a minimum of two permanent members to veto a resolution. [6] Until April 24, 2024, the permanent members have vetoed 280 agenda items, of which only 38 were vetoed by two or more permanent members. [35] This implies that under the double veto system, historically, 86.5% of proposals have been approved, which will have significant implications for the veto system. However, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 6, of those 38 double vetoes, 95% of the double vetoes have been cast by the three major groups: the UK, France and the US, the UK and the US, and China and Russia. There are no other combinations, such as the US and China or the UK and Russia voting vetoes at the same time.

Table 1: The Number and Percentage of the Double Vetoes

Permanent Member Casting Vetoes	Number of uses of double veto	Percentage
UK and the US	8	21%
UK and France	2	5%
China and Russia	15	39%
UK, France and the US	13	34%




Figure 6: Distribution of the Double Vetoes  
Data Source: Dag Hammarskjöld Library

These data indicate that within the permanent members, there already exist relatively fixed blocs based on national interests. The implementation of the double veto will force states to unite to secure their veto right, which will inevitably lead to a complete split within the Council into different blocs. Once such a split is created, the national groups can easily block resolutions in the UNSC, as France and the United Kingdom did during the Suez crisis. The effectiveness of the double veto would be greatly diminished.

The Egyptian government announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which was mainly under Britain and French ownership, and the transfer of all the company's property to Egypt on July 26, 1956. As a response, the UK and France decided that Israel would first launch an attack on the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula to draw the main body of the Egyptian army to support. This attack allowed the UK and France to interfere in the name of restoring peace and seizing control of the Suez Canal. On October 30, the US prompted the UNSC to convene and introduce a draft resolution demanding that Israel promptly withdraw its military behind the established armistice lines and urging every member state to stop using or threatening force in a manner contrary to the Purposes. [36] Nevertheless, the resolution was blocked by vetoes from France and the United Kingdom, and a similar resolution submitted by the USSR suffered the same fate.

The Suez Crisis displays the shortcoming of the double veto system when any coalition of states with aligned interests comes to form, they can almost automatically and completely block any resolution in the UNSC. The way in which the UK and France employed military action is a flagrant breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter, which absolutely forbids the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state or any act that is not in line with the Purposes of the United Nations.[23] Besides that, the military action also poses a danger to international peace and constitutes an act of aggression in violation of Chapter VII. [37] However, the UNSC could not adopt proposals to impose effective measures.

The implementation of the triple veto system might have prevented a repetition of the Suez Crisis, but the problem is that the triple veto system would be tantamount to the majority voting system within the permanent membership. This would radically change the essence of the veto mechanism as a special voting system in which a minority resists the majority, and the effectiveness of the veto would be greatly weakened. This, like the abolition of the veto system, is likely to trigger resistance and withdrawal by the major powers.

Reflecting on the consequences of the Suez Crisis, the main revision that must be proposed is the reduction of the veto power's scope. The imperative of removing veto power in matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which deals with threats to peace, breach of peace, and aggressive actions, is

not only highlighted by the Suez Crisis but also by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. [23] Since 2014, Russia has repeatedly exercised its veto in the Ukraine conflict, firmly opposing any resolution condemning its actions as violations of Article 2.

As Article 27(3), which requires parties to a dispute not to vote on matters under Chapter VI, and under Paragraph 3 of Article 52, the Russian example brings forth some substantial shortcomings of this regulation. [37] The fact that there is no direct boundary between the matters under Chapters VI and VII enables the permanent members to else claim that the matter belongs to the later chapter and use this argument to circumvent the abstention obligation. [6] These chapters raise the issue of the large difficulty in defining what matters under these parts. The solution that would most naturally address this problem is the decrease of the scope of veto to include all the matters under both parts VII and VIII.

The failure of the LN illustrates that the participation of great power and a well-structured system is fundamental to the effective functioning of international organizations. The veto system is a revision of the LON, guaranteeing the active participation of great powers and addressing the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The case of the UNFCCC further demonstrates the difficulty of reaching consensus. Given the experience of the LN and the UNFCCC, the veto mechanism should not be abolished, nor should it be granted to every country. However, the Suez Crisis and the war between Russia and Ukraine indicate that the veto system is flawed and requires to be reformed. As the data and the Suez Crisis have revealed, the double veto system is powerless to prevent two countries with similar interests from banding together to threaten peace, and the most fundamental problem lies in the gaps in the articles of the Charter. To better preserve peace, matters covered by Chapter VII should also be included in the constraints to fill the gap in Article 27(3).

### 3.3. Structural Reform of Seats

#### 3.3.1. Case 1: historical events reflecting P-5 members' ineffectiveness in defending peace

It can be spotted that in the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations, the permanent members of the League Council failed to fulfill their duty to maintain world peace or security. Two of the original four permanent members, Japan and Italy, invaded Northeast China and Ethiopia respectively in the 1930s, and ended up becoming Axis powers in World War II. The other two, France and the UK, pursued a policy of appeasement. In addition, the later added two members, Germany and the Soviet Union, also launched aggression and expansion in Europe. [38]

Such situation is also happening among the permanent members of the UNSC. From 2003 to 2011, the United States had been invading Iraq. In 2014, Russia occupied Crimea, and further invaded Eastern Ukraine under the name of "special military operation" eight years later. Both of these wars are not authorized by the UNSC and violate the UN Charter and international law. [39][40] Although the Security Council did have some members opposing the wars, it was not effective in preventing the emergence and development of the war, because the aggressors themselves are permanent members of it with veto rights. It has been proved difficult for the Security Council to take almost any effective measures against major crises when it was divided by the emergence of aggressors within in history, such as the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War in the 1960s, and the subsequent war in Afghanistan. [15] This phenomenon is still inevitable nowadays due to the lack of reform in the UNSC. In February 2022, a draft resolution accusing Russia's invasion of Ukraine was vetoed by Russia. [41] Later in September, Russia again vetoed a UNSC resolution describing its attempt to annex Eastern Ukraine illegally. [13]

Under these circumstances, instead of safeguarding world peace, these permanent members used their veto power to deprive the capacity of the whole UNSC to act according to international law. [13] The UNSC is the only authority designated by the Charter to take legitimate military actions, and the

only legally binding body for the authorized military actor. [13] This means that although their vetoes do not exist outside the UNSC, other organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly, cannot impose effective sanctions other than condemning the invader or proposing a ceasefire. [42]

### 3.3.2. Case 2: Data comparison between rising powers and current permanent members in economic and military powers

In Figure 7, the GDP of Japan (\$4212945m) and India (\$3549919m) ranked 4 and 5 in 2023, both were higher than the UK (\$3340032m) and France (\$3030904m). [43] Besides, according to the newest military strength ranking by Global Fire Power in Figure 8, the PwrIndx of India (0.1023) is better than the UK (0.1443), and Japan (0.1601) is better than France (0.1878). **It needs to be emphasized that “the higher the PwrIndx value, the less ‘powerful’ a nation’s conventional fighting capability is”.** [44] It may be argued that India and Japan do not own nuclear weapons, but their economic and military power is indeed no longer inferior to the UK and France as time goes on.




Figure 7: Gross Domestic Product 2023  
Data Source: World Bank



Figure 8: 2024 PwrIndx Ranking  
Data Source: Global Fire Power

The data shows another problem of permanent memberships, which is they cannot accurately reflect the political landscape of the world. Some of the P-5 nations are becoming less powerful and no more suitable than other states. However, their hegemonism is guaranteed by their veto power, which is not only used to keep their expansions or invasions away from international sanctions in the UN, but also to serve their own interests and block the rising powers’ way to become new permanent members. [14]

Simply replacing the permanent memberships will not solve this problem, because in the future, the overall national strength of Japan and India may be surpassed by other countries too. This situation will always happen as the power of nations go up and down.

### 3.3.3. Case 3: historical UNSC reforms and proposals

The only reform of the Security Council took place in 1963, added nonpermanent seats from 6 to 10, all of which have been distributed by region since then (2 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5 in Asia and Africa, 1 in Eastern Europe and 2 for Western European and Others Group states), and almost all subsequent proposals of reform have followed this philosophy. [12]

Most proposals for the UNSC reform continue to request adding the seats and allocating them by region. It is true that increasing the number of seats in the Security Council could make it cover more regions and voices, and to some extent reflect the changes in the international political setup. In 1945 the UN had 51 members, and the UNSC (11 members) covered 21.57% of it. Today, there are 193 members in the UN, but the UNSC (15 members) can only cover 7.77% of it. [13]

Nevertheless, it cannot overcome the shortcomings of the UNSC fundamentally and may become inefficient due to the increase in seat number. [17] A 15-member Council can summon a meeting quickly after the crisis happens, but an enlargement will make it slow to respond, which is contrary to the purpose of Article 28 in UN Charter. [23][13] Also, the enlargement will make it more difficult to achieve substantial results. After the 1963 reform, the number of votes needed to pass a resolution increased from 7 to 9, and in some proposal, cases supporting UNSC enlargement, the number reached 14. [12]

Furthermore, nations who try to become new members in the Council would be doubted and opposed by others. As the literature review mentioned, a report from a sixteen-member panel was submitted to secretary general Annan, and provided two models for the reform. [12] Based on them, in 2005, the draft resolution submitted to the UNSC from G-4 nations was almost the same with model A, suggesting adding 6 permanent seats (2 in Africa, 2 in Asia, 1 in Western Europe and 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean) and 4 nonpermanent seats (1 in Africa, 1 in Asia, 1 in Eastern Europe and 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean). [13] The draft resolution from the African Union was also similar to model A, suggesting adding 6 permanent seats (2 in Africa) and 5 nonpermanent seats (3 in Africa). [12][13] The draft resolution from United for Consensus, a group of countries led by Italy and other rivals of G-4, referred to the concept of “permanent nonpermanent seats” (4-year renewable-term seats) in model B, suggested adding 10 nonpermanent seats, with 4-year seats included. [12]

However, none of these proposals was put into vote. Rivalry and competition among “middle powers” who seek to represent their region in the Council have become an obstacle to the enlargement of UNSC. [12] Who could represent Africa, Latin America or other regions became the cause of outbreaks of animosity and the focus of competition between states. [45] If new members get elected successfully after the enlargement, dissatisfaction would be aroused among countries outside the Council, and further enlargement would be requested, and further reduction in efficiency would befall. [12] It is a vicious circle, warning that simply expanding the Council is a problematic measure.

### 3.3.4. Case 4: EU Entry to the UNSC

The EU has been a permanent observer in the UN since 1974, and scholars have been advocating establishing an EU seat in the Security Council. According to Leigh-Phippard, replacing European seats with an EU seat could give the Council more authority without reducing its efficiency, because neither seats nor vetoes have been added. [16] The idea of EU seat has also received official support. German Chancellor Scholz appealed that the EU has one seat with one voice in the UNSC. [46]



One specific option is to replace the UK and France with an EU seat in the UNSC. It would avoid the overrepresentation of European countries in the P-5 and narrow the gap in strength among the permanent members. As mentioned in Figure 7 and 9, in 2023, the GDP of the UK and France was \$3340032m and \$3030904m, while the GDP of the whole European Union was \$18349388m, about 5 times more than of each them, and that of US and China was \$27360935m and \$17794782m. [43][47] Additionally, as shown in Figure 10, the total defense expenditure of the EU in 2022 was €240b, far more than that of France in 2022 and the UK in 2022-23 was €49.7b and £55.5b (about €65b). [48][49] In comparison, China's official defense budget was \$229b (about €210b), and the US funding for national defense was \$777.7b (about €713b) in the same year. [50][51] These figures show that when the EU replaces the UK and France as a member of the UNSC, it has a much greater comprehensive strength that is comparable to the US and China.




Figure 9: Gross Domestic Product 2023  
Data Source: World Bank




Figure 10: Defense Expenditure 2022  
Data Source: European Defense Agency, Statista, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services

### 3.4. Reform of other UN agencies

#### 3.4.1. Judicial Review

For the study of judicial review in international organizations, a more prominent example is the Lockerbie air crash. On December 22, 1988, a Pan American Airways flight exploded and disintegrated in the small town of Lockerbie. Afterwards, the extradition of two Libyan suspects were requested by the USA and the UK. However, Libya rejected the request on the grounds of the Montreal Convention, claiming that domestic law refused extradition, and requested the provisions

from the ICJ. In this case, although the ICJ eventually rejected the relevant request by 11:5, it established an important precedent that any resolution of the UNSC is limited to not violating the UN Charter. [52]

Afterward, ICJ' advisory opinion on Kosovo was an important case. In 2008, the Kosovo authorities, which had long been autonomous under the protection of NATO, issued a "Declaration of Independence" and were recognized by one-third of the UN members, but they were still unable to enter the UN due to the veto of China and Russia. [53] The UNGA, under the lobbying of Serbia, passed a resolution requesting the ICJ to express its legal advice on whether Kosovo's independence violated international law. Eventually, the advisory opinion issued by the ICJ confirmed that the independence is not in violation of international law. Although the judgments are not actually binding, they are regarded as important precedents in this field by some forces, especially international separatist forces. [54] Such cases seem to indicate that the ICJ can play a more important role in major issues of the existence and division of sovereign states.

Based on these two cases, the ICJ can be further expected to have more impact on maintaining international security and peace or enjoy a higher status in international organizations. However, the power of unconstitutional review advocated in this article may still be difficult. The establishment of the power of unconstitutional review requires UN member states to truly regard the UN Charter as a basic principle that they are willing to abide by, rather than just a tool that can be used for realist politics when necessary.

#### 3.4.2. More powerful GA

Examples of the adjustment of the power of the UNGA include "Uniting for Peace" in 1950 and the UNGA Resolution 76/262 in 2022. After the war in Korea happened, the Soviet Union chose to boycott the UNSC meetings and the relevant resolution that authorized the use of force required the votes of all P5 members. In this case, the US proposed a resolution in the UNGA, which stipulated that if the UNSC could not reach a consensus, the UNGA could authorize collective actions, including the use of force, to recover peace. This shows that in the event of the UNSC's incapacity, the UNGA can be given the responsibility of maintaining international security and peace.

In contrast, UNGA Resolution 76/262 is a more recent example. Given that Russia used its veto power in 2022 to frequently veto resolutions related to its invasion of Ukraine, the UNSC has reached a deadlock on the issue in Ukraine. The resolution, adopted by consensus with the co-signature of 84 countries, requires that every time a P5 member of the UNSC uses the veto, the UNGA should convene a formal conference within limited working days after such event to review and comment on the behavior, thereby putting pressure on the abuse of the veto. This mechanism of using the UNGA to restrict the veto mechanism shows that as the most representative agency of the UN, it seems to be given more ability to check and balance the Security Council.

From the above cases, we can see that under these circumstances, the UNGA is willing to be given greater power to handle the deadlock of the UNSC under the power game of major powers. However, the above cases do not involve the amendment of the existing regulations of the UN Charter. If the UNGA is to be given a political veto, that is, it is clearly stipulated that the resolutions of the UNGA have higher authority than the resolutions of the UNSC, this may mean that the authority of the UNSC is formally weakened at the institutional level, and the UNGA will not only play the role of a tool to promote the agenda or exert pressure, which may not be recognized by P5.

#### 3.4.3. Comprehensive case for EU

Although historical cases can leave room for association, making people think that relevant institutions can play a greater role, it is still needed to find out whether there are relevant institutions

that operate in this way in international relations. In this regard, the European Union (EU) is an example that can answer this question more comprehensively. As a supranational union, it is enough to help us examine whether an international organization can have a strong representative body, a more independent executive body and a more effective judicial body to uphold constitutional principles.

Among the series of major power institutions in the EU, the European Parliament can be compared horizontally with the UNGA. As a deliberative body elected by universal suffrage, it does not have the powerful powers of legislative initiative and cabinet formation enjoyed by the parliaments of general democratic countries. Instead, it is exercised by the European Council and the Council of the European Union, which are the primary decision-making organs and upper houses of the EU, but their members are composed of heads of state and ministers of EU members. [55] In terms of the independence of the executive body, the President of the European Commission is appointed by consultation with the European Council, an institution within the European Union equivalent to the UNSC. Although the position has extensive legislative initiative powers, it is not given the powers that a normal head of government should have, such as leading a standing armed force. This shows that executive power is still largely restricted by representatives of member states.

In addition to legislative and executive powers, it is particularly noteworthy that the EU is one of the few international organizations with an independent judiciary. Due to the abstract nature of the constitutional text, to reduce the ambiguity in the power distribution process, countries accept that the authority of the constitution is maintained by an independent judiciary through constitutional review. [56] However, for international organizations, the relevant constitutional texts are often based on treaties between countries. In this regard, although the European Court does not have the constitutional review power stipulated by the system, it exercises judicial review power in practice and plays the role of a *de facto* Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.

Based on the analysis of the operating model of the European Commission, what can be discovered is in current international organizations (IO), power ultimately comes from the granting of sovereign states. A representative body elected by all the population of the member states is not trusted to exercise major powers; the power of the executive body is still greatly limited and has to be constrained by the heads and parliaments of the member states. However, Macron's call for a "European army" also shows that under the current international law framework, it is acceptable for international organizations to lead standing armed forces, and even if it is expanded to the global level, it will still face many challenges. [57] The example of the EU provides an illustration that, for an international organization, its institutional model must be built based on respect on national sovereignty, and its internal structural design cannot be separated from this premise.

## **4. Recommendations**

Following the cases in three perspectives, the corresponding recommendations are detailly described below.

### **4.1. Reform of veto system**

The contradictions of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, and especially its scant ring of definition of the notion of "dispute" by the Suez Crisis and Veto power, can be exploited by governments to refuse their duties. This can lead to the misuse of veto power. The extension of limitation to Chapter VII issues, which deal with threats to the peace, would force all parties to manage themselves and advance the influence of the Security Council regarding peace and security issues. Three potential solutions to this problem are: (1) a constitutional amendment of the UN Charter; (2) negotiation of an agreement among the permanent members to limit concluding vetoes with respect to cases of action endangering

the peace; or (3) encouragement of the presidencies in the General Assembly, which is supported by middle powers such as Switzerland, Singapore, Canada, and Argentina, to impose restrictions on the veto.

As the cases of the Suez Crisis and the Russo-Ukrainian War show, the ambiguity of Article 27(3), and especially its scant ring of the definition of the notion of “dispute” can be exploited by governments to refuse their duties. the ambiguity in the definition of “dispute” in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter leaves room for governments to abstain from fulfilling their obligations, leading to the misuse of the veto power. The extension of limitation to Chapter VII issues, which require involved parties to abstain, thereby empowering the UNSC to play a more significant role in international affairs. Three potential solutions to this problem are (1) a constitutional amendment of the UN Charter; (2) negotiation of an agreement among the permanent members to limit vetoes with respect to cases of action endangering the peace; or (3) proposals of the General Assembly, supporting by middle powers such as Switzerland, Singapore, Canada, and Argentina, to introduce resolutions restricting the scope of the veto.

The feasibility of amending the UN Charter may be questioned, although it is undoubtedly the most effective and fundamental approach. Recognizing the current challenges, it is more realistic to insist on a negotiation among the permanent members to limit their use of the veto specifically in respect of certain peace and security clauses. Nonetheless, such an agreement would imply that the elite members are ready for the reform of veto power, which some scholars believe is unfeasible, especially concerning China and Russia. Such countries, which are mainly considered as part of the “soft balancing” mechanism against the US, would rarely agree on restricting their veto which in turn is directly linked to the success of their foreign policy and influence within the Council. As the fact shows, it has become a pattern that China, especially since 1971, has been frequently using the veto as a means of blocking resolutions supported by the US, the EU, or other countries that are intended to realize their major interests targeting through the Security Council. [58] Therefore, at the very least, at this point in time, even if some countries are willing to reform the veto, it will still be difficult to reach an agreement, and it is likely that China and Russia will not agree, while the United States, given the need to keep China and Russia in check, will prefer to maintain the status quo. More radical reform would have to be driven by external pressure, as the third approach shows.

The last strategy seems commendable, reinforced by the successful precedents. In April 2022, Liechtenstein's UN Ambassador, Christian Wenaweser, put forward the draft resolution that centered on developing a General Assembly debate as a standing mandate for cases where a veto is cast, which was adopted without a vote.[59] While this resolution does not place a direct limit on the veto rights of the permanent members, it does increase the political calculation involved in the usage of veto. In order to shield from reproach from other countries within the GA, perhaps the council members would tend to exercise the veto power with case-to-case discretion betwixt the matters of no utmost significance and the life-or-death issues. Middle powers could also adopt such measures to limit the use of the veto.

#### 4.2. Structural Reform of Seats

From the historical events reflecting permanent members' ineffectiveness in defending peace, and data comparison of rising powers with P-5 in national powers, it can be spotted that permanent membership is a critical defect in the UNSC structural problem, so one of the options is to abolish permanent seats, and all members in the UNSC would be elected for a two-year term without veto power. It will make all the seats reflect that they are properly distributed according to national power and contributions, and can better reflect the principle of equality and contain hegemonism. All of the 15 seats can be allocated by region, and the attitude of international society will be absolutely reflected without the restriction of veto. Anyone in the UNSC who fails to fulfill their responsibility

or break the peace will be kicked out in the next election. If a rising power is contributing more to global affairs, it may get elected as well. Also, the abolition of permanent seats would prevent the council from being paralyzed by mutual vetoes caused by internal conflicts among the P-5 nations. [14]

However, this reform scheme is bound to face stiff opposition from the current five UNSC permanent members and is likely to be difficult to implement. Achieving this will require not only the rest of the world to unite closely, but also that they use the UN General Assembly as the only channel to amend the Charter. In fact, according to Article 108, the Charter amendment needs to be adopted by all the permanent members of the Security Council and 2/3 members of the General Assembly. [23] Therefore, this proposal will only be possible when the international community comes together to exert sufficient pressure on the P-5 nations.

As the case of EU entry into the UNSC indicates, another method to reform the UNSC membership structure is to create regional seats. This way can narrow the strength gap among the UNSC members, and enhance regional representation while ensuring efficiency as the number of seats can be actually remained or reduced by combining several national seats into one regional seat. It does not mean that all national seats will be replaced by regional ones, because countries in some regions haven't achieved such conditions yet. The historical UNSC reform proposals showed that despite the geographical proximity, rivalry and disagreement exist between some countries, such as China, Japan and Korea in East Asia. [12]

The same idea of the EU seat can also be applied to the African Union, Arab League or other state coalitions. Regardless of whether the seat is permanent or non-permanent, regional seats which turn out to be a joint of power from a group of states, can always enjoy a stronger voice than the original seats, as well as give a voice to countries who would not otherwise have a seat in the Council.

It must be noted that establishing regional seats also needs to amend the UN Charter, because the EU or other blocs of nations do not fit the statehood criterion required in Article 4. [23][15] Nevertheless, compared with abolishing permanent seats, this amendment will face less opposition from the P-5 nations, thus will be more feasible. Moreover, the worries about the EU seat being objected by the UK and France because they aren't willing to give up their permanent memberships, do not exist anymore due to Brexit. [15] The UK could keep its original seat when the EU seat is created. To France, the EU seat is consistent with its foreign policy of ensuring regional solidarity and promoting European integration, and its leadership within the EU is strengthened without the participation of Britain. [60]

In practice, the UK could still join the EU seat as there exists a basis for decades of cooperation. The same is true under other circumstances, states can either take part in the regional seat or choose to quit and keep their own identity if they want to. But, the potential reason for their quit, which can be isolationism or inter-state disagreement in the same region does matter indeed. If accumulating without being properly resolved, they would have a serious negative impact even leading to the collapse of the regional seat.

#### 4.3. Reform of Other UN Agencies

The cases researching relevant reforms needed for other UN agencies reflected that it is difficult for international organizations to establish a decentralized system similar to that of modern democratic countries, especially in the United Nations, where the P5 members have a veto over any amendment to the UN Charter. From the perspective of political feasibility, this article recommends the following reforms to other UN agencies: give the ICJ the authority to interpret the UN Charter, and further issue advisory opinions on whether the actions of the UNSC and other agencies are in accordance with the UN Charter without asking; give the UNGA the power to require the Secretariat to implement its will when the UNSC fails to fulfil its duties to uphold international security and peace.



To gradually limit the power of the UNSC and establish a constitutional system within the United Nations, it may be necessary to first establish a consciousness - that is, to actually establish the UN Charter as the basic principal for maintaining international security and peace that all UN member states are willing to comply with, rather than continuing to rely on the checks and balances between major powers to barely maintain the status quo. Therefore, any form of infringement on the UN Charter should be clearly regarded as a deviation from this purpose. According to Carl Schmitt's interpretation, what needs to be defended here is the constitutional principle as a "charter", not "constitutional laws" of a positive nature. [61] Therefore, any clause suspected of violating the fundamental concept of the UN Charter can be declared by the ICJ to be a violation of the Charter. If any UN agency fails to fully defend If the ICJ cannot uphold the objectives and principles of the UN Charter, it need to be replaced by other institutions.

Among these institutional reforms, the reform of the ICJ may be relatively easy to achieve because it can be confirmed by recognized precedents without involving the amendment of the UN Charter. Given that the UN Charter provides for the power of interpretation of the Charter, the ICJ can issue imcompulsory advice on the interpretation of the Charter based on the request of the UNGA and relevant precedents that can play the role which is similar with *Madison v. Marbury*. Once similar precedents are established, the ICJ can gradually establish the authority of the power of constitutional review.

Giving greater authority to the UNGA and the Secretariat may be relatively difficult because it involves amending the UN Charter. However, Boutros-Ghali has made it clear in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 that a fully armed peacekeeping force must be established. [62] If it is fully recognized that the current situation of the UN peacekeeping force relying on funds from various countries is quite unstable, countries may wish to consider agreeing to the Secretariat to form a relatively independent armed force to avoid affecting the maintenance of peace in a certain region due to the veto of the UNSC.

If the above complete conception is to be realized, the powers of relevant institutions need to be amended in accordance with Article 108 of the UN Charter, and also Statute of the ICJ.

## 5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study demonstrates that the structure of the United Nations is no longer effective in contemporary global context. The abuse of the veto and the decline in the representativeness and legitimacy of the major powers have made it difficult for the UNSC to play its role in maintaining peace and security. In response to these challenges, this paper rethinks the the veto system, permanent seats on the Security Council, and the allocation of power responsibility among the United Nations bodies through cases such as the Russo-Ukrainian war, the EU, and the ICJ, combined with data analysis. Furthermore, three targeted approaches to reform the veto system. In addition, by examining and evaluating the existing system of the Security Council, this paper reconstructs a set of reform proposals integrating both internal and external aspects, aiming to enhancing the effectiveness of the UNSC in peacekeeping.

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