

# ***Legal and Practical Aspects of the WTO Market Access Principle: The Application of National Security Exceptions***

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**Abstract:** The national security exception in WTO jurisprudence, under Article 21 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), permits members to invoke trade restrictions in the name of security. However, the blanket and vague nature of this clause has raised suspicions that it would be invoked protectionist in its application. This paper reflects on how the national security exception is interacting with the World Trade Organization (WTO) market access principles and how their application has had economic and legal impacts. This study analyzes the important cases of US-Steel and Aluminum Tariffs to quantify the way that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has approached these. The study concludes that the exception has been relied on more and more, often in a way that is not transparent in criteria, and the risk of abuse. This paper concludes that there should be clearer rules of law, more transparency, and stronger multilateral consultations to prevent abuse and protect the stability of the world trading system. There are suggested reforms to balance national security concerns and the demand for open, rules-based trade.

**Keywords:** Security, Trade, Exception, Governance, Dispute

## **1. Introduction**

In an increasingly interconnected global economy, the tension between national security and trade liberalization has become a pressing issue. The World Trade Organization (WTO) seeks to maintain open markets, but GATT Article 21 allows members to impose trade restrictions for national security reasons. Recent cases, such as *US-Steel and Aluminum Tariffs*, have highlighted concerns over the vague and self-judging nature of this exception, raising the risk of its misuse for protectionist purposes. While scholars have explored its legal and economic implications, gaps remain in understanding its long-term effects on global trade governance and potential reforms to prevent abuse.

This study examines the interaction between the national security exception and WTO market access principles. It explores how WTO members justify trade restrictions under Article 21, the legal challenges involved, and the role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in regulating security-related trade disputes.

Using legal and economic analysis, this research reviews WTO case law and evaluates the broader impact of security-driven trade measures on global supply chains and trade policy. By enhancing transparency, promoting multilateral dialogue, and clarifying legal criteria, this study aims to contribute to future policy discussions on maintaining a stable and predictable trading system amid growing geopolitical tensions.

## **2. The WTO Market Access Principle and Its Importance**

### **2.1. Definition and Scope of Market Access**

Market access refers to the arrangements that regulate the entry of foreign services and goods into the market of a nation. The WTO aims to create a predictable and transparent trading environment, enhancing market access for all members [1]. Market access is a core principle of the WTO integrated into the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides the legal foundation for market access commitments [2]. The provisions in these arrangements ensure expected and non-discriminatory trade policies in member nations.

Two fundamental principles ensure market access: Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, which halts discrimination among WTO members, and National Treatment, which requires equal treatment for foreign and domestic products once they are in a marketplace. These two are intended to provide fair competition and reduce protectionism.

Market access is affected by tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Even though WTO rules encourage the reduction of tariffs, non-tariff barriers like import quotas, licensing requirements, and technical regulations play a strong role in influencing trade. Transparency in these measures is the guarantee of a predictable international trading system.

### **2.2. Challenges to Market Access in the 21st Century**

While critical, access to markets is ever more challenging. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as environmental and health regulations may be policy-driven but also offer the opportunity for trade restriction. For example, stringent food safety standards can disproportionately single out imports.

One of the new challenges is the use of national security exceptions to bypass market access commitments. Countries have increasingly been invoking GATT Article 21 to justify trade restriction measures. The U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, invoked on grounds of national security, are one of them. Recent trade disputes have highlighted the increasing use of national security justifications, raising questions about the future stability of the WTO dispute settlement system [3].

Further, the fragmentation of trade governance under regional and bilateral agreements generates regulatory complexity, thus complicating compliance for firms. To counter this, WTO members need to strengthen transparency, provide that security exceptions are not exploited, and further enhance global cooperation in trade.

## **3. The National Security Exception in WTO Law**

### **3.1. Legal Basis and Interpretation of GATT Article 21**

The exception for national security under WTO law lies in GATT Article 21, in which WTO members reserve the right to apply measures deemed by them as necessary for their fundamental security concerns, especially where there is war or international tension. The language of this exception is vague and ill-defined, particularly for the expression "essential security interests." GATT Article 21 gives WTO members an exceptional right to impose measures they deem necessary for national security. However, its ambiguous and broad phrasing has raised challenges in interpretation and enforcement [4]. Vagueness of this nature has sparked fears that the exception will be exploited as a disguise for protectionist tactics, which will undermine the basic principles of the WTO, namely liberalization of trade and non-discrimination. For example, the expanding use of national security justifications for economic measures threatens to erode the foundational principles of the WTO, particularly the commitment to non-discriminatory trade [5].

The vagueness of Article 21 has made it an occasion of recurring disputes regarding its interpretation. Many states have invoked the exception to justify trade measures on grounds of restrictions, but generally without sufficient proof that the measures are indeed related to security matters. Because of the flexibility of the provision, there is a fear that it can be perverted to shelter domestic industries under the pretext of security. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) would then determine whether these measures are really related to national security or a misuse of the exception. The jurisprudence of WTO dispute settlement bodies has shaped the interpretation of security exceptions, but it remains a contentious issue in international trade law [6].

### **3.2. How the WTO Dispute Settlement System Handles National Security-related Disputes**

The WTO Dispute Settlement Body plays a significant role in managing national security exception disputes. The DSB, however, adopts restraint in meddling with matters of national security while still deferring to member states' sovereignty to determine what harms national security. Even though the DSB does not necessarily examine the merits of national security reasons per se, it does examine whether the measures adopted are in conformity with the overall principles of the WTO agreements. This is so that national security as a cited justification does not equate to national protection under the pretext of legitimate security interests.

In practice, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has overall taken a restrained approach on national security exceptions, recognizing that it is not possible for it to measure the justification of a member's security interests but rather determine if the measures taken are in accordance with WTO norms [7]. Particularly regarding non-discrimination and trade liberalization.

The difficulty lies in striking a balance between the protection of a member's right to safeguard its security interests and the protection of the integrity of the multilateral trading system. The DSB must ensure that the exception is not being used as a form of protectionism, under which it could be used to divert international flows of trade.

## **4. Striking a Balance: Legal and Economic Perspectives**

### **4.1. Preventing the Abuse of National Security Exceptions**

The GATT Article 21 national security exception is on a mass basis criticized for being overly broad and vague in language and therefore vulnerable to misuse. The security exception in the multilateral trade regime has mostly lain dormant for seventy years but has recently become a focal point, raising concerns about potential misuse [8]. As the exception allows countries to adopt measures necessary for the protection of their "essential security interests" without definition or criteria, it is an open invitation to protectionism disguised as security concerns. Countries may invoke this exception to impose economic or political trade limitations or tariffs, rather than genuine security threats. Such measures undermine the WTO's basic postulates of fair competition, non-discrimination, and free trade. The WTO dispute settlement system plays a crucial role in containing the abuse of the national security exception, though the limits of its jurisdiction remain a subject of debate [9]. To prevent such misuse, specialists suggest that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) apply stricter judicial scrutiny in deciding whether national security claims are valid. Lumping various disparate objectives under the broad umbrella of national security hinders the identification of optimal policies and that scrutiny of specific instruments offers a better starting point toward diagnosing complex security policy [10]. A more stringent process of examination would be to ensure that action taken under the guise of national security is in harmony with WTO principles and is indeed addressing issues of security rather than economic protectionism. More specific guidelines and greater oversight through the WTO can help ensure that members' vital principles are maintained without excluding valid national security concerns.

## 4.2. Implications for Global Trade Governance and Reform Proposals

The application of national security exceptions has broad consequences for the global governance of trade, particularly in global supply chains and trade policy. In today's interdependent world, trade restraints on the basis of national security can result in supply chain disruptions, increased costs, and reduced availability of goods and services. For example, trade restrictions imposed on the basis of national security can be detrimental to industries that rely on international buyers and suppliers. The arbitrary application of national security exceptions also has the ability to create uncertainty in foreign markets, which deters investment and hinders long-term business planning. With more countries potentially using this exception, the prospect of a breaking international trading system increases, with countries acting alone to advance their security interests rather than cooperatively under multilateral trade rules.

In response to these dangers, several reform proposals have been made. Among the chief recommendations is the need to spell out specifically the conditions on which the national security exception is invoked. More specified parameters would ensure that actions of security are adequately recorded and conform to international requirements. A second recommendation is the transparency that such actions be subjected to by forcing nations to notify the WTO whenever measures are instituted concerning national security. This would allow the organization to keep track of the use of the exception and prevent it from being abused. The balance between allowing national security exceptions and preventing their misuse is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the WTO's legal framework [11]. Furthermore, strengthening multilateral dialogue between WTO members would ease tensions and foster cooperation in addressing trade-related issues involving national security. Through increased transparency and accountability, the reforms would allow the WTO to balance adhering to members' legitimate security concerns while offering a stable and predictable international trading system.

## 5. Conclusion

The national security exception in the WTO law, as embodied in Article 21 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), provides member countries with the maneuverability of regulating trade in their national security areas. Nevertheless, its broad and self-judgmentary text has also spurred apprehension with regard to abuses insofar as the text is open to abuses by the member countries since their national security programs are qualified as a matter of self-judgment. This research has traced the complex relationship between national security interests and WTO market access disciplines, underscoring the implications of the national security exception on global trading system stability.

Through examination of high-profile cases such as US-Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, this study has demonstrated that while national security is a legitimate and required interest, the lack of clear legal standards for invoking Article 21 gives rise to significant challenges. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has, on the whole, been prudent to handle such matters, not being judgmental as to whether or not security concerns are legitimate, but rather focused on whether measures are consistent with the WTO. This is done with some circumspection by raising concerns of whether or not the WTO would have to get tougher at the examination of the judicial review of national security measures.

The effects of national security exceptions transcend individual trade disagreements, spilling over into supply chains worldwide and the broader trading policy climate. The more often countries invoke the security exception, the higher the risk of the global trading regime fragmenting with potentially harmful economic cooperation and development consequences. This necessitates the need for reform to better delineate the applicability of Article 21 as well as discourage its abuse. Proposed reforms in

such instances are to increase transparency, require more explanation for security-based trade measures, and expand multilateral consultations among WTO members so that security concerns do not undermine the principles of non-discrimination and free trade.

In general, as national security is a state sovereignty right, it should not be exercised to the detriment of the broader interests of the WTO, i.e., the expansion of international trade and economic cooperation. National security exceptions must be controlled in such a way that the legitimate necessity of security measures is fulfilled without harming the integrity of the international trading system. More precise legal norms, higher transparency, and stronger multilateral dialogue will be required to maintain the world economy's stability in a more uncertain geopolitical environment.

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