

The Forgotten Internationalism of the Weimar Republic: A Reassessment of Its Diplomatic, Economic, and Ideological Legacy

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Abstract: The Weimar Republic, which is conventionally defined by nationalist resurgence and internal strife, was a period of internationalism in diplomacy, economics, and ideology. In our views, diplomatic measures like the Locarno Treaties and working together with Soviet Russia demonstrated a creative approach to multilateralism and reunification; on the other hand, economic programs like the Dawes Plan all expressed concern to set up an efficient beleaguered Germany through cooperation. From the standpoint of ideology, the Republic was to be the Europeanist state that revived the Kantian philosophy of the perpetual peace with pacifist movements and inspired political parties like the Social Democratic Party advocating for European cooperation. This paper challenges the deterministic and conventional understanding of nationalism's role in the Republic's collapse, arguing that internationalist endeavors were significant yet overlooked factors that shaped the Republic's policies. In addition, this paper shows how internationalism is vulnerable to economic and political forces and the implications for the present-day international system.

Keywords: Weimar Republic, Internationalism, Interwar Diplomacy, Economic Policy, Ideological Legacy

1. Introduction

The failure of Weimar Germany can be attributed to rising nationalism, political instability, and the economic devastation caused by World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, which left Germany politically disgraced and economically crippled. However, this overlooks critical evidence of diplomatic efforts and internationalism that shaped Weimar Germany's policies, particularly in the early years of the republic. While the aftermath of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles left Germany politically disgraced and economically crippled, the Weimar Republic also pursued initiatives aimed at reintegrating Germany into the global community [1]. The power struggle between nationalism and internationalism that followed the post-WWI period set the stage for the Weimar Republic and the development of a political course for Germany.

The research question for this research is: Was nationalism the only dominant discourse in the Weimar Republic? This is significant because the questioning of the inevitability of Weimar's

nationalist course offers a fresh insight into Europe's attempts at post-war cooperation – which is important for understanding overall Europe after WWI. In this case, internationalism is understood as activities and initiatives to promote cooperation between nations closely associated with Europeanism and pacifism. Europeanism is the push for European political and economic integration, while pacifism is the drive to prevent future conflicts after the devastation of WWI.

The primary argument of this research is that while nationalism was dominant in Weimar Germany, the country attempted considerable steps towards internationalism and Europeanism. This essay explores the Weimar Republic's navigation between nationalism and internationalism in three key areas: diplomacy, economic policy, and ideology. This is done by examining Germany's foreign relations, highlighting efforts to balance national interests with international cooperation through treaties like Locarno. Next the research will present the argument — the internationalism and Europeanism in Weimar Germany — through three steps. First, diplomatically, Germany sought reconciliation and cooperation through initiatives like the Locarno Treaties, which aimed to stabilize European borders and promote peace. Second, economically, plans like the Dawes Plan demonstrated Germany's commitment to cooperating with foreign powers to stabilize its economy. Third, ideologically, pacifism and the influence of Europeanist ideas were parts of the political discussions, proving that internationalism was a part of Weimar Germany's activity, which cannot be neglected.

2. Literature reviews

The debate over whether the Weimar Republic's policies were primarily nationalist, or internationalist has produced divergent views among scholars. Some argue that the Republic's policies reflected international collaboration and economic diplomacy, while others contend that nationalism remained a driving force, even under the guise of internationalist efforts.

2.1. Nationalism

Nationalism in Germany during the Weimar Republic is characterized by a resurgence of national identity following World War I. Some scholars maintain that nationalism persisted as an underlying cause in the Weimar Republic's foreign policies even when embodied under internationalism. For instance, Fischer asserts that although Weimar's economic policies were presented in a friendly light, they aimed to regain Germany's autonomy and financial strength [2].

Some political scientists, including Gartzke and Lupu, have focused on the home factors that influenced Weimar's foreign policies [3]. According to Gartzke and Lupu, Stresemann and other Weimar diplomats found themselves under enormous pressure from nationalist groups in Germany who were actively against any compromises with the Allies [3]. According to Fischer, these internal divisions limited the options of the Weimar leadership to appease foreign powers as well as domestic demands [4].

However, issues arise within this body of literature, particularly regarding understanding German nationalism's relationship with democratic ideals. Many historians argue that the narrative of a homogeneous national identity oversimplifies the complex realities of the period, including regional identities and class distinctions that existed alongside nationalist sentiments. But as Hagemann points out, this is not just nationalism; for example, internationalism during the Weimar Republic emerged as a counter-narrative to the prevailing nationalism, advocating for collaboration and diplomatic engagement with other nations in the aftermath of the war.

2.2. Internationalism

Several scholars emphasize the internationalist dimension of Weimar economic policy. For example, Hagemann maintains that the policies of the Weimar Republic, especially under the Stresemann

administration, cannot be considered solely nationalist [5]. Similarly, Vogt points specifically to German economic policies before WWI, arguing that they were not exclusively nationalist as there were attempts to pursue international economic cooperation, such as liberalization of trade barriers and intensification of industrial cooperation [6]. Likewise, while Laffan notes the highly unfavorable economic conditions laid down for Germany at Versailles, she also emphasizes that Weimar leaders were eager to rebuild Germany's image in the eyes of the world [1].

Although internationalism could have brought positive effects, it could not address systemic global problems effectively. A predominant theme in the analysis is the tension between nationalistic fervor and internationalist ideals, as many political factions pushed for a revival of German strength that often undermined these cooperative efforts. Additionally, some scholars argue that the Dawes Plan was not an altruistic and diplomatic endeavor to advance interdependence but a functional necessity for states to shift the reparations and reconstruct German industrial power—policies, which in many ways were nationalism in disputes atop an apparent economic structure [7].

As such, this research will address the knowledge gap by reviewing the literature on diplomacy, economic policy, and ideology to establish if the Weimar Republic's economic policies were primarily nationalist or internationalist. In the next section, the research will analyze Weimar Germany's diplomacy, economic policy, and ideology.

3. Diplomatic aspect

Diplomatically, the Weimar Republic demonstrated its commitment to internationalism and European cooperation through three pivotal initiatives: negotiations with Allied powers regarding reparations and disarmament, involvement in multilateral security agreements such as the Locarno Pact, and cross-ideological cooperation with Soviet Russia through the Treaty of Rapallo. These diplomatic efforts surpassed traditional national interests and embraced broader European cooperation. They also embodied Weimar Germany's transformation from a bitter loser into a key architect of international collaboration and European stability.

3.1. Post-war diplomatic activity of breaking through isolation done by the Weimar Republic

The government of the Weimar Republic adopted an approach of proactive communication with the Allied Powers in its diplomacy regarding post-war reparations, rather than adopting a stance of complete resistance fueled by national sentiment. The Spa Conference [8] addressed the enforcement of the military clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, particularly those concerning Germany's disarmament. Despite some opposition to disarmament within Germany, the German delegation actually inked the protocol stipulating the disarmament of the militia and the full surrender of weapons. Concurrently, the conference deliberated on the matter of coal supplies from Germany as stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles. The German delegation, led by *Paul von Hindenburg*, eventually appended their signature to the protocol proposed by the Entente, mandating the delivery of coal within a six-month timeframe [9]. Although nationalists were present at the conference, its final outcome was not heavily tinged with nationalism.

Moreover, the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic's government leaned towards compromise and cooperation with the Allied Powers. As Simons stated in the German Parliament, "this misconception, that a peace treaty wasn't to be taken seriously and wouldn't be taken seriously by the other side, was prevalent among our people until recent months. It's only now that the German populace is coming to realize the burden on their shoulders." The Weimar government's attitude towards the sinking of the convoy in the Bay of Scapa also underscored its emphasis on reconciliation. At the end of the First World War, the German High Seas Fleet was captured by the Allied Powers

in the Bay of Scapa. During subsequent debates in the *Reichstag*, the incident of scuttling the fleet in Scapa Bay was deemed an excessive and unlawful act. Meanwhile, the disarmament decree, based on the Spa Protocols, was supported by a majority of Social Democrats and German Democrats in the Reichstag [10]. This was indicative of the anti-nationalistic leanings of the Weimar government.

There is an opposing viewpoint that Weimar Germany's foreign policy after World War I was the embodiment of a strong national character. This nationalism is evident in the events exemplified by the Ruhr Crisis. In response, Germany adopted a policy of "passive resistance."

However, this viewpoint overlooks the nature of the Ruhr Crisis itself and solely focuses on the mood of resistance [11]. In this instance, France's actions violated Weimar Germany's fundamental national interests, prompting a firm response from Weimar Germany [12]. Simultaneously, the Ruhr Crisis paved the way for the signing of the Locarno Pact [13], which was a powerful demonstration of the need to improve relations between France and Germany and stabilize the situation in Europe [14]. Thus, from this perspective, the Ruhr Crisis does not fully negate the existence of an internationalist diplomacy in Weimar Germany.

3.2. Other contributions of Weimar Germany

Weimar Germany also made contributions to halting the war and advocating for world peace. By signing treaties that positively impacted the maintenance of common security, Weimar Germany was not blinded by national sentiments of revenge and resentment, contrary to traditional scholarly claims. On December 1, 1925, Weimar Germany was among the participants in signing the Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, which stipulated that Germany, France, and Belgium mutually guaranteed the inviolability of the German-Belgian and German-French borders, adhered to the demilitarization of the Rhineland as outlined in the Peace of Versailles, and that Great Britain and Italy acted as guarantors, assuming the obligation to assist any invaded country.

Additionally, another arbitration treaty included in the Locarno Convention provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes between Germany, Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Each group of contracting parties established a permanent conciliation commission to address issues among them [15]. By guaranteeing the status quo on Germany's borders with its western neighbors, the Pact temporarily alleviated European security concerns, improved relations between the Allied Powers, particularly France and Germany, and ushered in a period of relative stability in European international relations [16]. Furthermore, the Pact enabled Germany to join the League of Nations as one of its permanent members, providing a better platform for Germany's active engagement in international affairs. In a secret letter to the former German Crown Prince in 1925, *Gustav Stresemann* outlined his foreign policy, concluding with the words: "German foreign policy should be as adept as *Klemens von Metternich* after 1809, avoiding major decisions." *Klemens von Metternich* was a prominent representative of the Austrian opposition to nationalism in the 19th century and presided over the Congress of Vienna.

After this, Weimar Germany signed the Paris Non-War Convention on August 27, 1928, which explicitly prohibited the use of war as a means to implement state policy and advocated for the peaceful settlement of disputes [17]. The Convention established the principles of peaceful resolution of international disputes or conflicts and non-aggression, providing a crucial legal foundation for the principle of non-aggression in international law. These principles have been widely acknowledged and applied in subsequent international relations. This also demonstrates that the Weimar Republic objectively embodied a certain spirit of internationalism.

3.3. Weimar Germany's co-operation with Russia

Weimar Germany's cooperation with Russia exemplified an internationalism that transcended ideological boundaries. During the Soviet-Polish War from February 1919 to March 1921, Weimar Germany's stance reflected a tendency to support Soviet Russia. While the cooperation between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia was partly motivated by self-interest, both countries aimed to overcome their diplomatic isolation following World War I and challenge the Versailles system. However, Weimar Germany's actions also encompassed internationalist attitudes that transcended ideology. Breit Scheid of the Independent Social Democratic Party extended to Russia "the salute of the German brothers in the sacred struggle to defend the fruits of the revolution." This was an acknowledgment of the revolutionary spirit of Soviet Russia. From this perspective, Weimar Germany's behavior cannot be solely attributed to national interests; it also included recognition of the socialist regime in Soviet Russia.

In contrast, the Treaty of Rapallo also reflected Weimar Germany's recognition and emphasis on Soviet Russia. In 1922, the European Economic Conference was held in Genoa, Italy. At the conference, Soviet Russia's representatives expressed their willingness to pursue economic cooperation with capitalist countries on the basis of reciprocity and equality. However, the Allied Powers' demand for the repayment of Soviet Russia's huge foreign debt and nationalized foreign property led to a stalemate. This reflected the high degree of vigilance and rejection of Soviet Russia's ideology by the Allied Powers.

Meanwhile, on April 16, 1922, Weimar Germany's Foreign Minister Walter and the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister Georgi signed the Treaty of Rapallo in the Genoese suburb of Rapallo [18]. The treaty announced that both sides renounced their territorial and reparation claims against each other under the Peace Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles, as well as those stemming from World War I. Additionally, Weimar Germany renounced reparation claims arising from the nationalization of its public and private property in Russia by the Soviet government. At the same time, diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries were immediately restored, and economic and trade relations were developed on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle. These provisions marked a significant improvement in Soviet-German relations and laid the groundwork for economic cooperation between the two countries [19].

Following this, on July 23, 1923, Weimar Germany became the first Western country to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This was followed by a series of agreements and multifaceted cooperation between the two countries. This not only reflected the spirit of international cooperation between the two nations, transcending ideology, but also contributed to security in the European region.

3.4. Implication

The diplomatic structures created by the Weimar Republic were essential precursors to post-WWII European integration, especially through their innovative approach to multilateral security agreements and transnational collaboration. The Locarno Pact's framework of mutual guarantees and arbitration mechanisms established fundamental principles that would subsequently be mirrored in the integration model of the European Coal and Steel Community. The diplomatic reconciliation efforts of Weimar Germany with former adversaries, despite internal opposition, established the framework for Franco-German cooperation that became essential to European unity post-1945. The transformation of international relations, notably illustrated by the Rapallo Treaty, established the foundation for economic reconstruction initiatives that would redefine Germany's role in the European financial system.

4. Economic aspect

The Weimar Republic considered itself primarily nationalistic. However, its economic outlook was more internationalist. This section will explore the complex economic landscape of the Weimar Republic, beginning with an overview of Germany's economic devastation post-Versailles and subsequent stabilization efforts through international collaboration. The Weimar Republic attempted to reintegrate Germany into the European and world economy by participating in international markets, taking advantage of foreign loans to stabilize its currency, and pursuing policy initiatives such as the Locarno Treaties. This section will examine significant economic policies such as the Dawes and Young Plans, which promoted collaboration with other nations, and Germany's political attempts to improve ties with its European neighbors. Finally, arguments against the idea that nationalism was responsible for the demise of the Weimar Republic will be examined. These views argue that the demise of the Republic was due to broader global economic problems.

4.1. Post-war economic challenges and international cooperation

The Treaty of Versailles halted Germany's economy after World War I. The tremendous financial load imposed on the country, along with large war expenses, budget deficits, exhausted resources, and capital flight from Europe, left the continental economy devastated [20]. During the war, the collapse of the gold standard, along with Germany's isolation from European creditors, mainly in Great Britain, prompted drastic measures such as monetizing state debt. Germany's reluctance and inability to pay the large Treaty reparations eventually led to the development of the Dawes Plan in 1923. This plan reorganized German finances under foreign supervision and reduced immediate reparations payments. At the same time, it stabilized the currency with the introduction of the Reichsmark. Later, the Young Plan of 1928 extended reparations payments for 58 years [7].

Conventional wisdom often depicts World War I as the end of commercial liberalism, economic integration, and political interdependence. However, such viewpoints neglect the unequal distribution of economic wealth throughout Europe [3]. After all, the conflict originated in Austria-Hungary, not Germany. Postwar European economies abandoned free trade in favor of government involvement and highly regulated markets marked by protectionism and economic nationalism. High unemployment, fiscal deficits, and hyperinflation followed from interventionist attempts to address household economic issues in Germany [21]. Although this point of view is accurate, stressing nationalism as the only driver of German economic policy during this period overlooks the aspirations of internationalism of the Weimar Republic.

Germany's involvement in the Dawes and Young Plans demonstrates the Weimar Republic's dedication to international cooperation. Both actions proved Germany's preparedness to participate within the framework of international cooperation by means of multilateral negotiations. Criticizing the Versailles Treaty, John Maynard Keynes advocated state-run economies to correct the flaws in laissez-faire capitalism. Though sometimes in conflict with neoclassical economic theory, his viewpoint mirrored a greater movement toward internationalist economic management including Germany's efforts in postwar Europe [21]. These initiatives also included awareness of the dangers of uneven economic integration, which created reliance between nations and heightened conflicts [3].

4.2. International collaborations and Germany's economic policies

Gustav Stresemann led Germany in implementing an economic program that meticulously harmonized national objectives with international collaboration. He had a broader vision of economic revitalization. Stresemann, who served as Chancellor and later as Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929, played a key role in formulating this strategy. He supported for economic collaboration, notably "mutual exchange of goods on mutually favorable terms," while opposing excessive taxation of

German industry to finance reparations [22]. Stresemann's influence was critical in negotiating the Dawes Plan, which obtained financing from the United States to help rebuild Germany's industrial foundation. His writings, especially in *Zeit*, emphasized that “the time of national isolation... is over,” cautioning against over-reliance on international organizations like the League of Nations while stressing the importance of international cooperation to Germany's recovery [22].

Germany's reintegration into the global economy was further demonstrated by the Locarno Pact, as mentioned in the diplomacy section, aiming to promote peace, stability, and foreign investment. At the same time, German economists such as Ernst Wagemann, President of the Reich Statistical Office, advocated for measures aimed at economic stability [23]. Wagemann's nominalism thesis, which held that money served a symbolic purpose supported by governmental authority, was important to Germany's post-hyperinflation recovery [1]. The introduction of the Rentenmark, alongside prudent fiscal policies and international loans, helped restore Germany's national economy. Throughout this period, Germany's leadership, especially Stresemann, sought to normalize relations with European powers, signaling a clear departure from nationalist economic policies and reaffirming Germany's commitment to international collaboration [1]. Despite these efforts, Germany's economy was crippled by territorial losses and military disarmament, compelling it to accept the Treaty of Versailles. To prevent Germany from regaining control, France and the United Kingdom undertook political and economic policies. However, Stresemann's efforts show that Germany did not relinquish nationalism completely; rather, the Weimar Republic attempted international cooperation, sometimes even collaborating with communist Russia. This nuanced approach demonstrates that Stresemann's economic diplomacy was not exclusively inward-looking; rather, it was designed to reintegrate Germany into the economic order of Europe.

The Locarno Treaties of 1925 were a major step toward Germany's reintegration into the European political and economic sphere. Hugh F. Spender noted in “Notes from Locarno” that the treaties symbolized a collective desire “to forget the bitterness of the past... and aim for a settlement based on the common good” [24].

Germany's economic troubles were aggravated by the global depression of 1927. Ferguson and Temin point out that by 1931, the “level of human misery had reached colossal proportions,” exacerbating Germany's instability [25]. Despite this, German exports had overtaken those of the United Kingdom and France at that moment, demonstrating Germany's economic competitiveness. Notably, this economic growth happened before the Nazi ascent to power and was fueled by industrial exports rather than military expansion [5]. As a result, the fall of the Weimar Republic cannot be blamed primarily on a return of nationalism. Instead, it was caused by unresolved reparations, global economic isolation, hyperinflation, unemployment, and worldwide market failure. The emergence of authoritarianism in Germany was affected by nationalism, but it was more precisely caused by failures in international economic integration and the disintegration of free trade systems.

4.3. Counterarguments

Two main counterarguments exist regarding the Weimar Republic's economic recovery efforts through international partnerships. The first argues that internationalist initiatives like the Locarno Treaties and the Dawes Plan failed to prevent Germany's eventual political and financial collapse, merely delaying the rise of Nazism. The second contends that these internationalist policies were merely a façade designed to serve nationalist purposes by strengthening Germany's power under the guise of international cooperation.

Still, the first counterargument falls short in three main areas. First, short-term economic stabilization of Germany was achieved via internationalist measures. Second, the fall of the Weimar Republic was not just the outcome of bad home economic policies. Starting in 1929, the Great Depression globally devastated companies all over, including Germany's. It raised economic

uncertainty and unemployment [2]. Third, political radicalism and social discontent as well as harsh economic conditions helped to fuel Nazism; both of which failed economic policies could not solve [26]. Ignoring these complex problems compromises the argument that internationalism has no value at all.

The second counterargument also has four significant flaws. First, while Germany did benefit from these policies economically, they were far from self-serving. The Dawes Plan and Young Plan were the result of extensive international negotiations, reflecting the demands of Allied powers as much as Germany's ambitions [27]. Second, as the Locarno Treaties so clearly show, the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic under Gustav Stresemann was essentially focused on ensuring peace and stability in Europe [26]. Third, the Treaty of Versailles limited Germany's sovereignty and capacity to pursue solely nationalist objectives, which had a profound influence on her internationalist policy. Due to these constraints, Germany was obliged to collaborate on a global scale in order to revive its economy. Finally, it is important to recognize that Stresemann's leadership was mainly concerned with reconciliation and integration into the European system, rather than a return to pre-World War I militarism, even if these acts aided in the fulfillment of certain nationalist aims [28]. The argument that internationalism served nationalist ends fails to acknowledge the broader context of Weimar diplomacy and economic recovery efforts.

The economic policies of the Weimar Republic contributed to create a national identity with nationalist as well as internationalist elements. Signifying a break from pre-war isolationism, the Dawes and Young Plans as well as efforts like the Locarno Treaties showed Germany's commitment to international collaboration and reintegration into the global economy. However, economic internationalism is a controversial subject as the cost of foreign control and reparations inspired animosity among nationalist groups. This conflict had a major impact on German political parties; international collaboration helped to stabilize the economy in the 1920s; yet, the worldwide crisis of 1929 exposed the shortcomings of these programs, which allowed nationalist movements such as the Nazi Party to amass popularity. At ultimately, Weimar's economic policies mirrored more general society issues between nationalism and internationalism, which led to the identity crisis triggering fascism [29].

5. Ideological aspect

One of the significant characteristics of the Weimar Republic is the inflated development of ideologies: With uncertainty and chaos dominated the society, Germans under the republic region began to seek for the resolution of current national issues. Among this prosperity of ideology and political fantasy, the idea of internationalism and its subclass, Europeanism, often deemed unimportant by researchers. However, to the history of the development of internationalist theories in Germany, Weimar Republic was an important stage with the connection linked between the preceding and the following. This section is aimed at discovering the ideological orientation behind the back of Weimar diplomacy and the development of internationalism during this period.

5.1. Prometheus and eagle: perpetual peace and early development of internationalism in Germany

There is no doubt about Immanuel Kant's status and influence in the history of German ideology. As one of the founders of German philosophy, Kant is the Prometheus who gives fire to Germans living in shadow and confusion. In 1795, Kant finished one of his most significant essays: "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" as the resolution he offered to the European continent suffered by the repeated wars and conflicts. In the essay, Kant proposed a series of clauses to prevent hostilities and build peace. Among these clauses, he believed that the ideal resolution was to build a world republic

with the elimination of contradiction and the concept of national states. However, as the establishment of world republic might become the alienation to the freedom of individual states, Kant tended to create a federation of nations as the contemporary replacement [30]. From his viewpoint, republican system fixed to this theory the most as citizens had capacity to participate in politics and acknowledged the potential danger and cost of conflicts. Meanwhile, Kant emphasized that peace should be one of the important parts of the moral imperative and nations had obligation to reach it: "For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic, -which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace-this would serve as a center of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations [31]."

Although Kant's theory of Perpetual Peace was lack of feasibility and more detailed theoretical construction, it became the direct enlightenment to the internationalist theorists in Germany. Unfortunately, during the Second Reich, the advocacy to international cooperation and universal peace was covered by more and more intense competition between imperialist countries all around the world. Kant's "kindling" faded silently and re-ignited until the end of a violent world war.

5.2. World War I: Europe's crisis and the renaissance of German internationalism

When Berlin declared war to the Entente on March 1914, no one expected the consequence of recklessly entering a world war: Unlike the naive, romantic, and chivalrous imagination people held to the war and combat, WWI showed the cruelty and destruction of modern industrial warfare. After millions of meaningless casualties and the collapse of Hohenzollern regime, the war ended with scar and humiliation. The world war not only brought severe material losses to the belligerent states, but also inflicted violent influence on European spiritual world. The outbreak of such a mass conflict was thought as the annihilation of intellectualism as European states lost their self-control and immersed into enthusiastic nationalist atmosphere. Meanwhile, the storm of revolution had raged as proletariats decided to seek their liberation. For a moment, the European continent was placed under extreme chaotic sense once again. Under this circumstance, More and more people believed that the golden age of Europe faded [32], and the moment of crisis had come. One of the nations which the emotion of crisis influenced the most was the new-born Weimar Republic: The signature of the Treaty of Versailles brought intense stigma and pressure on Germans; the early era of the republic was suffered by frequent economic crisis and unstable political situation. With extreme frustration to current situation, and exceeding distrust to the republican institution, Germans began to discover the resolution of current issues especially to the crisis among their spiritual worlds. Oswald Spengler., one of the scholars who maintained this idea, published "Decline of the West" in 1922. He gave his judgment to current situation:

"For we live in an enormous time. It is the greatest which the culture of the West has ever experienced and which it will ever experience-equal to that which the ancient world experienced between Cannae and Actium-equal to the one from which the names of Hannibal, Scipio, Gracchus, Marius, Sulla, and Caesar still shine for us. The world war was for us only the first lightning and thunder from the cloud passing across our century heavy with destiny. The form of the world is being recreated today from the ground Up [33]."

Under serious circumstance, Defenders of the republican system were eager to break current diplomatic dilemma and let international community accept Weimar Republic. As a result, the early leaders of Weimar government had been committed to the icebreaking diplomatic actions and succeed in joining into the League of Nations in 1926. Meanwhile, internationalism was also described as the resistance to the flood of nationalism. Under this condition, many political factions in Weimar tried to demonstrate the position of Germany among international affairs and even the future of the world.

5.3. The internationalist tendency of pacifism in Weimar

The cruelty of World War spawned the development of pacifism which was aimed at preventing the war by social protests, the advocacy to disarmament, and the expansion of international cooperation. To German pacifists and internationalists, Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and the foundation of the League of Nations made them see the possibility to practice Kant's idea of Perpetual Peace. In early 1920s, the pacifist movement became intense and showed the tendency of building an international network to join the vast pacifism in Europe. In August 1920, the first NO-More-War demonstration organized by pacifist activists was held in Berlin. This demonstration was described as the peak of pacifist movement in Weimar and received considerable praise from their colleagues in France and Great Britain. One year later, Arthur Crispian, the chairman of the Independent Democratic Party of Germany, USPD, participated and made speech at the memorial service for slain French antimilitarist and Social Democrat Jean Jaure's which symbolized to the unity of German and French pacifist movements [34]. In the following time of the republic, Despite the general hatred to the Treaty of Versailles among Weimar society, German pacifists devoted themselves to bring Germany back to the international peace system and boosted the consummation of antimilitary laws. In 1926, Paul von Schoenaich, the chairman of German Peace Society, DFG, signed the International Manifesto against Compulsory Military Service with Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and many other foreign advocates of pacifism [35]. These cases proved that German pacifists played significant roles in international pacifist movements

5.4. Heidelberg programme 1925

During Weimar Republic, Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) played important role in the government. Meanwhile, SPD was famous for its inconstant policies and vacillation of priority of work [34]. As mentioned above, SPD offered a certain degree of support to unofficial pacifist movements. However, the cooperation between SPD and pacifists was unstable: After SPD decided to mainly focus on national interests and domestic politics, they tended not to support pacifist movements too much. SPD described itself as the defender of republican system and suppressed anti-republican movements seriously. Among the behavior of SPD at this time, one of the most notorious cases would be the suppression to Spartakusbund which was thought as the betrayal to socialist ideology. However, it would be unfair to conclude that SPD was limited with internationalist elements. In fact, the Heidelberg Programme issued in 1925 showed the unique internationalist proposition of SPD.

The programme of 1925 was passed on the congress of party representatives of SPD and named by the venue of the meeting. Heidelberg Program had significant meaning to the history of SPD: It was thought as the "Wayback" of the party as the program focused more on class struggle and Marxist social development. Meanwhile, the program depicted the party concept to international relations and the future of Europe. The program advocated more cooperation with foreign socialist movements to resist imperialism and fascism. The idea of national self-determination and peaceful settlement of international disputes had been emphasized. Among the clauses related to diplomatic policies, the party also pointed out the importance of creating a European economic unit as one of the formations for the construction of "a United States of Europe [36]." From their viewpoint, Germany had to participate more among international affairs. It ought to not only maintain the normal function of current international system, but also fought for the unification of Europe,

From this programme, it is obvious to determine the vast vision SPD held to the future of Germany. At this moment, Kant's theory of Perpetual Peace was awakened once again, and SPD had made the unification of Europe as one of the major historical missions for Germans. At the same year, the sign of Locarno treaties represented to the important step toward the normalization of diplomatic

relationship between Weimar Republic and the international communities. In 1926, The League of Nations accepted Weimar Republic as one of the permanent member states. To SPD, the republic marching towards the bright future. Unfortunately, the storm of economic depression shattered the illusion of unification.

5.5. Implications

The frustrated end of the Weimar Republic drafted the direction of research to the initiation and development of nationalism and Nazism. At the same time, the attempts for internationalism in Weimar Republic had been ignored or misinterpreted as only oriented by realistic national interests. In fact, the theoretical construction in Weimar Republic succeeded classical Kant's ideas and enlightened the development of internationalist and Europeanist theories after WWII. Some of them were absorbed into the design of the construction of European Union. However, we ought not to ignore the lessons from the failure of Weimar internationalism. The tragic end of this ideological movement proved the vulnerability of the theory and questioned the people in this age about the stability of internationalism especially during the era of upheaval and uncertainty.

6. Conclusion

This study revisits the Weimar Republic's history to re-evaluate the commonly held assumption that its collapse was driven solely by nationalist forces, arguing instead that there was a significant presence of internationalism shaping the Republic's economic, diplomatic, and ideological policies. The analysis shows that, while nationalism played a prominent role in shaping political discourse and responding to domestic pressures, the Weimar government also pursued internationalist strategies aimed at securing economic stability and diplomatic reconciliation. These measures, however, were insufficient in protecting the Weimar Republic from the effects of global economic factors such as the Great Depression, which only exacerbated internal turbulence, leading to the emergence of authoritarianism.

The implications of this paper challenge the deterministic view that the Weimar Republic's collapse and the rise of Nazism were inevitable. Instead, the transition is better understood as a product of historical contingency, shaped by Germany's complex struggle between nationalism and internationalism. This perspective cautions against ex-post rationalization, where outcomes are used to retroactively explain causes. The Weimar Republic's policies show that Germany was not simply on a direct path to authoritarianism, but rather navigating a complicated political and economic landscape that contributed to its eventual downfall.

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