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Rapid Rhythm and Overambitious Objectives: The Dual Mismatch in Japan's Rising Process
- 1 Beijing Language and Culture University
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Abstract
On August 15, 1945, Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu signed the instrument of surrender, marking Japan's formal capitulation to the Allied forces. This surrender signaled the defeat of the Axis powers and effectively halted Japan's rising trajectory. Grounded in positional realism and the theory of strategic rhythm, this paper introduces a novel analytical framework to examine the discrepancies between strategic objectives and rhythm in Japan's rising process. Subsequently, the paper chronologically reviews Japan's historical ascent, utilizing this analytical lens to assess the alignment between Japan's early, middle, and late-stage strategic objectives with its comprehensive capabilities, as well as the congruence between objectives and strategic rhythm. The analysis suggests that Japan initially maintained a strategic equilibrium with appropriate objectives and rhythm. However, discrepancies emerged in the middle period between strategic objectives and rhythm, escalating to a misalignment between objectives and comprehensive capabilities in the later stages. This confluence of misalignments culminated in a "dual mismatch," ultimately interrupting Japan's rise.
Keywords
strategic objectives, strategic rhythm, dual mismatch
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[2]. Hegemonic nations possess the strongest comprehensive capabilities, with aspiring hegemonic nations typically reaching 80% of a hegemon's comprehensive capabilities. Potential aspiring hegemonic nations usually achieve about 50% of a hegemon's comprehensive capabilities, while non-aspiring hegemonic nations generally have capabilities equivalent to only 30% or even less of a hegemon's strength.
[3]. Song Wei, 位置现实主义：一种外交政策理论 [Positional Realism: A Theory of Foreign Policy] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2021), 84.
[4]. Song Wei, 位置现实主义：一种外交政策理论 [Positional Realism: A Theory of Foreign Policy] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2021), 271.
[5]. Xu Jin, "战略目标与崛起进程" [Strategic Objectives and the Rising Process] . Quarterly Journal of International Politics 28, no. 4 (2022): 4.
[6]. Xu Jin, "战略目标与崛起进程" [Strategic Objectives and the Rising Process] . Quarterly Journal of International Politics 28, no. 4 (2022): 5.
[7]. Zhou Piqi, 大战略分析 [Strategic Analysis] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2009), 47.
[8]. Xu Jin, "战略目标与崛起进程" [Strategic Objectives and the Rising Process] . Quarterly Journal of International Politics 28, no. 4 (2022): 7.
[9]. Xu Jin, "战略目标与崛起进程" [Strategic Objectives and the Rising Process] . Quarterly Journal of International Politics 28, no. 4 (2022): 6.
[10]. Zhou Piqi, 大战略分析 [Strategic Analysis] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2009), 47. This article argues that such a definition remains overly simplistic. The term "objective conditions" encompasses a broad spectrum; the query remains: to which aspects and conditions does it specifically refer?
[11]. While Zhou Piqi's strategic environment concept encompasses the domestic environment, within the context of reforms or transformations, this article posits that the domestic environment essentially denotes the balance of power between reformists and conservatives.
[12]. To elaborate, both strategic capabilities and comprehensive capabilities pertain to a state's prowess. Specifically, strategic capabilities = national capabilities × strategic operational capability, where national capabilities signifies tangible material power and strategic operational capabilities denotes a leader's ability to utilize national strength to achieve strategic objectives. In contrast, comprehensive capabilities = operational capability × resource-based capability. The latter combines military, economic, and cultural capabilities, while the former represents the capability to harness these resources. Evidently, these two sets of concepts bear striking similarities. See Yan Xuetong, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019),75-76.
[13]. Li Julian, Gu Yunshen, Yu Weimin (Eds.), 第二次世界大战百科词典(修订本) [Encyclopedia Dictionary of World War II (Revised Edition)] (Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 2015), 115.
[14]. The term "reserve comprehensive capabilities" hypothesizes a nation's comprehensive capabilities when all its resources are converted. Typically, a nation's comprehensive capabilities represent only a fraction of its resources. When these capabilities diminish, a nation can still leverage remaining resources to restore or even elevate its comprehensive capabilities. However, as resources are consumed in this process, the reserve comprehensive capabilities decrease. If resources are excessively depleted, and if comprehensive capabilities are compromised again, the nation might struggle to restore them to their original levels, facing the risks of failure or collapse.
[15]. In reality, the Kuomintang government at that time remained hopeful, anticipating international mediation led by the League of Nations' investigation team to regain sovereignty over the Northeast region.
[16]. Mao Zedong, 论持久战 [On Protracted War] (Beijing: People's Publishing House), 16.
[17]. Akira Iriye, translated by Zhu Jin and Wang Fengzhi, 山本五十六传 [Biography of Yamamoto Isoroku] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1990), 127.
[18]. Yan Jingsheng (Ed.), 日本帝国海军兴亡史 [History of the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Imperial Navy] (Inner Mongolia: Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House, 2011), 219.
Cite this article
Liu,Y. (2024). Rapid Rhythm and Overambitious Objectives: The Dual Mismatch in Japan's Rising Process. Advances in Social Behavior Research,7,1-7.
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