1. Introduction

Although Heidegger advocated phenomenology which can remove the shield and let people see things directly, he despised dialectics and thought that dialectics was "groundless" in his system [1], but the author thinks that Being and Time makes extensive use of dialectics in the operational thinking method, and can be interpreted thematically on the dialectics connotation of Being and Time.

The dialectics I understand here is a method of speculation based on internal contradictions. The key lies in discovering the contradictory aspect of a concept or thing that does not conform to the identity, namely its internal contradictions, and using such contradictions to realize the self-sublation of the concept or thing to a higher stage.

This method is absurd in the view of formal logic, after all, the identity is the supreme law of formal logic. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology provides the basis for formal logic and itself complies with formal logic. In many places in Being and Time, Heidegger uses the ideological resource of dialectics instead of Husserl's phenomenology.

2. Existence and its own

The problem of existence, or the problem of "being", itself seems to be too big and too general. After all, "being" does not belong to any category of things, its universality "exceeds the universality of all categories"[1] , so it cannot be defined by the method of "being plus difference". Philosophers therefore often choose to turn to discussing what can be connected with the word "being", that is, the existent. It is obvious that this range is also all-inclusive: the kettle in front of us exists, the history of mankind exists, the mythical image in the imagination also exists in a sense... But in this all-embracing field there is a strange inherent contradiction: it seems that existence can be found in a seemingly ordinary being, that is to say, man has a prior understanding of existence, "the understanding of existence is itself the specification of existence"[1] .

Here the principle of identity seems to be broken, existence, in its highest universality, can be associated with all beings, but in this big book of all beings, there appears a "set theory problem": a set has an element that is itself. If the beings are regarded as elements in the set, and existence as the set itself, man, a small being in the set, can understand the largest and boundless existence. In classical dialectics, "existence returns to itself through man, the being". In order to distinguish "human" from "human" in the sense of biology and anthropology, Heidegger called human "being"[1] . Heidegger believed that the study of this being, or "existential analysis" [1], could clarify the problem of existence, which is much easier than the meditation on empty existence. For the relationship between being and existence, Zhang Zhiwei's conclusion that "being and existence have a special relationship of'mutual need'" [2] can be said to be to the point. On the one hand, being is a kind of being, which is defined by being; on the other hand, "being is the context in which being can be manifested, and without being, being can not be manifested" [2]. It may be difficult to express this relationship in formal logic, but if we regard being as the embodiment of the inherent contradiction of existence, as the internal side of the violation of the sameness, being returns to itself through the intermediary of being, making itself manifest, the problem will be simplified.

The following analysis of this in is logical: this in does not have a fixed present quality like the general beings, it plans itself, etc.

The discussion of the world and ordinary people, including "hands", "in hand", "meaning", "to far", "co-existence", etc. is often discussed as Heidegger's original contribution, but the author thinks that this part does not go too far beyond the scope of Husserl's phenomenology, and does not need a special discussion. Rather than a unique existentialism, this part is a reasonable extension of the analysis of intentionality: Heidegger regards the looking intentional activity in the activity of working with the living things in hand as the more fundamental. The particularity of this intentionality lies more in the fact that the separation between the thing and the self has not yet emerged. At the same time, dealing with others is also a unique intentional activity, which Heidegger called "handling", which is not discussed much here. The author thinks that until the fifth chapter of the first part, Being and Time really begins.

3. Dialectics of Sublimation

Heidegger believed that there are three basic existential structures in the world: emotion, understanding and discourse [1] . Among the two, the former is more related to the labor activities of things, while the latter can carry out a "inter-subject" communication (quotation marks are used here because Heidegger only talks about "being" and not "subject"). These two construct the world in which Being lives.

Heidegger believed that understanding precedes spoken language, but can be expressed in spoken language. For example, when using a hammer, there has been an unspoken planning for the use of the hammer. Once the hammer is not smooth, there will be such words as "change a hammer", and then form such judgment sentences as "this hammer is too bad". This is also very basic content, but it will not be expanded here.

Heidegger's innovation lies in using this theory to explain why people forget these important links. In fact, any philosophy will face this problem: philosophy can boldly outline the ontological vision before ordinary consciousness, and can depict the subtle transcendental framework, but it must explain the life of ordinary people, must explain why ordinary people are usually unaware of these profound things, and must explain how ordinary people are influenced and even dominated by these things in their daily lives. Otherwise, the most exquisite system is just a castle in the air.

In the author's opinion, Heidegger's solution to this problem is still dialectics.

As a planning, understanding has something different from itself: pure "seeing". If understanding is regarded as a set, there are understandings combined with various things, and the eyes looking for various purposes. But in this set, there is something that belongs to the set most and is different from the set most: the set itself. "Seeing" itself, that is, the eyes looking for seeing itself, constructs a small set in the large set of understanding. This small set is only one part of the large set, but this part seems to contain the large set: "seeing" is all-inclusive, and everything can be "seen". Here the identity seems to be broken again, which, in the author's opinion, is the embodiment of dialectics.

This kind of "seeing" does not combine with anything, or constantly flees from other things, but pursues seeing itself. (For the sake of understanding, we can probably take the state when watching a boring short video as an example.) The being deeply immersed in this state will regard seeing for seeing's sake as the most fundamental. Metaphysics starting from the Three Sophists in ancient Greece has taken this road and missed the more fundamental ontological foundation. Ordinary people are also captured by this state, and are constantly "pulled out" by this kind of seeing their ontological foundation, and forget their ontological foundation. [1]

The same is true of language. Language can convey various structures of existence, but language also has an inherent contradiction: what language wants to convey is the being it talks about, but what it can convey is often only "the thing that the words talk about itself". The two seem to be the same, but there is a huge difference. The conveyance of the being itself is "to make the listener participate in the existence spreading towards the thing that the words talk about"[1] , while the conveyance of "the thing that the words talk about itself" is only to let the listener have a "mean" understanding. The average understanding cannot make the listener have the "primary existential connection" [1]with the being being talked about , but only a kind of understanding which goes to words.

The author thinks that this also reflects the principle of dialectics which attaches importance to the inherent contradiction: the contradiction between "the being being talked about" and "what the words say" [1] is actually the contradiction of language itself: any language has to be divided into language and language meaning, which seem to be the same in form, but in fact they are full of contradictions.

The being captured by gossip and curiosity thinks it knows everything and everything, and has a cynical attitude in his heart, immersed in the world of "opinions", which is OK, and that is almost the same. This being will look for an explanation for itself from the general knowledge provided by gossip and curiosity. Because the general understanding provided by gossip and curiosity is ostensibly all-inclusive, this must be found, but this explanation must be a kind of general explanation under the influence of public opinion, which can only be understood in this general way. For example, in the identity politics of the West today, people tend to understand themselves as a "position" in public discourse. But this is actually missing or misunderstanding themselves. Heidegger called this situation "depravity". The so-called depravity is immersed in the daily state shaped by gossip, curiosity and other structures, forgetting the original ontological structure, "falling from itself to itself"[3]

In summary, since depravity can be explained, and even to a certain extent in ontology, how to get out of depravity and find the original? Here the dialectics is used.

4. The dialectics of emotion and fear

The two ontological structures were discussed in the previous section, and it was shown that these two ontological structures will form something different from itself within themselves, which makes it slide towards depravity.

How to break through this depravity? It cannot be simply emphasized that this depravity is derived: it is of course derived, but the dialectic makes the derived thing hide from what derives it, so that the person immersed in it cannot see what derives it. The only way is to follow the dialectic to the end.

Heidegger here chooses the most important ontological structure: emotion. For Heidegger, this structure is more primitive than the other two.

The particularity of emotion is that it is something different from the here and now within itself. On the one hand, emotion, like understanding and speech, is involved in the unfolding of the world, and without emotion it is impossible to understand our connections with the world, to understand why we do not have a single eye of observation, but a variety of fresh eyes. But on the other hand, emotion not only unfolds the world, but also unfolds the here and now within itself. Understanding and speech can certainly grasp or convey the here and now within itself, but this is only possible because of emotion, that is to say, indirectly.

Some psychologists who emphasize rationality regard emotion (or rather negative emotion) as a useless residue, believing that rationality can see the current state of affairs, rationality knows what is best, and emotion is a useless interference. But it is this inexplicable residue that can tell people that this is "your" thing, this is "your" life, this is "your" life, this is "your" burden. It is this inexplicable thing that tells Being that it is inexplicably thrown into the world, and it has to bear this being thrown in a "first person" way. With emotion, Being can truly grasp itself.

As the previous dialectics showed, emotion itself also has a decisive internal contradiction, but this contradiction will not let Being fall into the sink, but can pull Being out of the sink, which is "fear"[1] .

Fear is an emotion of gernal fear, the particularity of this emotion is that it has no object to fear, it fears the existence of Being that is thrown into and unfolds a world for no reason, that is to say, it fears Being's existence.

Only fear can create a separation between this in and its world out of thin air. On the one hand, this in expands the world through understanding, toiling, speaking and other activities, and itself lives in the world. On the other hand, this in that expands the world cannot fully merge with the world, and fear constantly reminds it that it is inexplicably and forced to expand the world, that it is an individual "ghost" that cannot even count as a point, that it is thrown away, and that its existence is ultimately rootless.

Here is an immature insight: if gossip and curiosity are small sets in the large set that are "identical" to the large set, then fear can be seen as an empty set, which belongs to any set but is nothing itself, which appears out of nowhere and abruptly. This empty set can reveal the rootlessness of this in. The author thinks that this actually represents the ghost-like subjectivity in the German philosophical tradition, but Heidegger himself would never agree with this.

5. Dialectic of Life towards Death, Dialectic of Conscience, Dialectic of Time

Only through fear can we grasp the existence of this in. Heidegger calls this existence worry. Worry is "In the already in...... The existence of the first in itself”[1].It is hard to say that there is much difference between worry and Husserl's intentionality, which holds that there is a subject "point" as pure cogito, but the only function of this point is to carry out various intentional activities, which, in this sense, are in things and precede the subject.

But to say that the way of being is worry or intentionality does not solve the problem, because intentionality only explains that the existence of this is always deficient and incomplete, and needs to constantly "point" to something different from itself.

How can this be achieved?

Worry is to worry about possibilities, but among these possibilities, there is a possibility that is not a possibility, that is death, the particularity of this possibility is that it is an insurmountable possibility, it represents an impossibility.People cannot die like eating, which is related to things (namely food), and people can also plan what to do after eating. But death is irrelevant to anything or anyone, and it is impossible to plan a "life" after death. At the same time, people can deceive themselves through gossip and curiosity. But it is impossible not to "die of their own death".Death does not have "indirect transferability"[4] between people. Death is an absolute possibility for this.

This possibility, which has no connection with things and others and cannot be crossed, indicates that it is groundless in the final analysis. It comes and goes inexplicably, but because it is groundless, it is free. The possibility of death, from the perspective of dialectics, is also something different from the whole possibility of the possibilities of the worry.

Our fear of emotions has also been explained. The fear of death is the fear of being alive, the fear of this inexplicable state of being thrown away, and the fear of their groundless state.

But how to experience and witness these profound existential findings just now in actual existence? This requires further study of other existential structures.

There is a silent voice inside discourse, which Heidegger called "conscience" [1]. This silent voice can "call the overall structure of this in the existence of the world" [5]. The absence, innocence and unfounded this in calls the ordinary person this in, pulling the ordinary person this in to its unfounded situation. This conscience makes this in understand its guilt. The author tends to regard guilt as negativity, namely the basis of "not state". This in has to exist and set up the basis for itself, but cannot control these basis.

Thus, conscience is the negation inside discourse, and guilt is also the same for planning.

The emotion of fear, silent conscience, understanding and planning for guilt, three "empty sets", together constitute the true existence of this in. The author believes that this this in found by Heidegger is as an absolute negative and absolute free subject, similar to Kant's moral subject who is always doubting and denying his own previous actions and always tending to "the ultimate good", but more thorough than Kant.

Heidegger believes that time is necessary to connect these three threads. Time is "blooming". When the here-in-the-world makes plans, it "blooms" temporality, and we have a vision that encompasses all three threads.

The final dialectic of the book is that time can produce its own opposite: timekeeping. Through the labor of the day and night, the height of the sun, temporality produces within itself the vulgar time, flattened into an even river of time. We mistake it for real time. This answers the question of why we have difficulty in feeling the blooming of time in our daily lives.

6. The Question of "The True"

Heidegger thinks he has found the true here-in, the fearful, mortal, negative, absolutely free subject that inexplicably unfolds a world. Heidegger would never call it a subject, of course.

However, Heidegger believes that the genuine life and the most common daily existence can be achieved the same, as if the genuine this in once grasped the structure of life to death, fear, conscience, etc., can directly break the gossip, curiosity and ambiguity leading to the state of depravity. In short, its life and daily life seem to have no difference, but it is unconditionally genuine.

Is it possible? We have seen that the whole book of Being and Time is basically driven by this kind of negation of dialectics. After many negatives, the genuine this in can be found. Although the genuine this in is "in" the world of daily life, but as a strong negation, can it really achieve complete unity with the world of daily life? Isn't it just this strong negation, the strong freedom that drives people to seek a "true" home? Is this "true" really "true"?

This article ends here. Sometimes it is beneficial to keep the question open for a while.

7. Conclusion

This article analyzes the dialectical methods in the book Being and Time as mentioned above, and concludes that Being and Time extensively uses dialectical methods, and discusses its concept of "The truth".