Research Article
Open access
Published on 28 February 2023
Download pdf
Export citation

Can Virtue Ethics Derived from Neo-Aristotelianism be Perfectly Self-Explanatory

Su Chen *,1,
  • 1 China University of Geoscience (Beijing), Beijing, China

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/2/20220493

Abstract

As a result of the rise of neo-Aristotelianism in recent times, the discussion of 'virtue' has led to the question of whether virtue ethics can exist as a sound system. Prior to this, there was no normative standard for 'virtue', deontology ignored human nature, and utilitarianism focused more on instrumental reason, ignoring the plurality of the 'good'. Anscombe defined 'virtue ethics' in his Modern Moral Philosophy, and Nussbaum built on this by arguing that goodness does not depend only on the rationality of the actor, but also on morality and institutions, and Hesterhaus provided a normative interpretation of virtue ethics from an Aristotelian standpoint. However, as virtue ethics defines and regulates virtue ethics, it is difficult to form a logically coherent system, as either virtue ethics is more or less connected to other ethics, and there are even contradictions between specific claims.

Keywords

virtue ethics, neo-aristotelianism, hursthouse, modern moral philosophy

[1]. Nussbaum M C(1999). Virtue ethics: A misleading category?[J]. The Journal of Ethics, 3(3): 163-201.

[2]. Hursthouse R (2017). On Virtue Ethics[M]//Applied Ethics. Routledge, 2017: 29-35.

[3]. Carr D, Steutel J (2005). Virtue ethics and moral education[M]. Routledge, 2005.

[4]. Shanahan K J, Hyman M R (2003). The development of a virtue ethics scale[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(2): 197-208.

[5]. Vogler C (2013). Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe, and the new virtue ethics[J]. Aquinas and the Nicomachean ethics, 2013: 239-57.

[6]. Hacker-Wright J (2010). Virtue ethics without right action: Anscombe, Foot, and contemporary virtue ethics[J]. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 44(2): 209-224.

[7]. Nussbaum M (2013). Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian approach1[M]//Moral Disagreements. Routledge, 2013: 168-179.

[8]. McAleer S (2007). An Aristotelian account of virtue ethics: An essay in moral taxonomy[J]. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88(2): 208-225.

[9]. Simpson P (1992). Contemporary virtue ethics and Aristotle[J]. The Review of Metaphysics, 45(3): 503-524.

[10]. Hursthouse R (2012). Human nature and Aristotelian virtue ethics[J]. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 70: 169-188.

Cite this article

Chen,S. (2023). Can Virtue Ethics Derived from Neo-Aristotelianism be Perfectly Self-Explanatory. Communications in Humanities Research,2,166-171.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

Disclaimer/Publisher's Note

The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s). EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Educational Innovation and Philosophical Inquiries (ICEIPI 2022), Part III

Conference website: https://www.iceipi.org/
ISBN:978-1-915371-11-9(Print) / 978-1-915371-12-6(Online)
Conference date: 4 August 2022
Editor:Nasir Mahmood, Abdullah Laghari
Series: Communications in Humanities Research
Volume number: Vol.2
ISSN:2753-7064(Print) / 2753-7072(Online)

© 2024 by the author(s). Licensee EWA Publishing, Oxford, UK. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. Authors who publish this series agree to the following terms:
1. Authors retain copyright and grant the series right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this series.
2. Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the series's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this series.
3. Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See Open access policy for details).