References
[1]. FitzGerald, R. (2007) Historians and the Cuban Missile Crisis: the Evidence–Interpretation Relationship as seen through Differing Interpretations of the Crisis Settlement. Irish studies in international affairs. [Online] 18 (1), 191–203.
[2]. Allison, G. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, HarperCollins, first edition.
[3]. Zelikow, P. and Allison, G. (1999) Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman.
[4]. National Security Council (NSC). (1962) Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council. [Online] Available at <https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct20/doc1.html > [Accessed 19 November 2021]
[5]. Tierney, D. (2007) Pearl Harbor in Reverse: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of cold war studies. [Online] 9 (3), 49–77.
[6]. Zhang, S. (2012) An Analysis of Khrushchev's motivation and Decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba -- written on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russian Central Asian and Eastern European Studies (06),57-70+98.
[7]. Cohen, A. (2012) A crisis of character; Cuban Missile Crisis ended peacefully because two leaders resisted hardline pressure. Toronto star. 25–.
[8]. Nathan, J. A. (2012) The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked. Foreign affairs (New York, N.Y.). 91 (6), pp.163–165
[9]. Voorhees, T. (2020). The Silent Guns of Two Octobers: Kennedy and Khrushchev Play the Double Game. University of Michigan Press.
[10]. Malinovsky, R (1962) Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev), October 27, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive [Online], Available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117326>.
[11]. Kringlen, E. (1985) The myth of rationality in situations of crisis. Medicine and war, 1(3), 187-194.
[12]. FRUS (1962) Off the Record Meeting on Cuba the White House Washington”, October 16, 1962, 6:30-7:55 p.m., [online], Available at<https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc3.html>.
[13]. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (1962) “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective” [online], Available at<https://www.jfklibrary.org/events-and-awards/forums/past-forums/transcripts/the-cuban-missile-crisis-an-eyewitness-perspective>.
[14]. Liu, C. (2017) Psychological Transmission and Crisis Decision-making: A Study based on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ph. D. Dissertation, China Foreign Affairs University, 2017.
[15]. Blight, J. (1992) The shattered crystal ball: Fear and learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rowman & Littlefield.
[16]. Winter, D. G. (2013) Khrushchev Visits the Bolshoi: [More Than] a Footnote to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Peace and conflict. [Online] 19 (3), 222–239.
[17]. National Security Council (NSC). President Kennedy's appointments, October 16, 1962[ online], Available at<https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc2.html >.
[18]. Savranskaya, S. (2005) New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of strategic studies. [Online] 28 (2), 233–259.
[19]. Norris, R. and Kristensen, H. (2012) The Cuban Missile Crisis: A nuclear order of battle, October and November 1962. Bulletin of the atomic scientists. [Online] 68 (6), 85–91.
[20]. Natioanl Security Archive. (2002) The submarines of October: U.S. and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis.”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book. No. 75. [Online] Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/>.
[21]. Ketov, R. A. (2005) The Cuban Missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope. Journal of strategic studies. [Online] 28 (2), 217–231.
[22]. Mozgovoi, A. (Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya) (2002) Recollections of Vadim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59) We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy. The Cuban Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962, The National Security Archive. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/asw-II-16.pdf>.
[23]. De Mesquita, B. (2010) Foreign policy analysis and rational choice models. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies.
[24]. Scott, L. (2022) The essential inevitability of worrying about the bomb: new writing on the Cuban missile crisis. Intelligence & National Security. [Online] 37 (3), 438–463.
Cite this article
Qiao,B. (2023). A Research of the Historiographical Approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis: Exploring the Impact of Irrational Factors on the Peaceful Ending. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,4,546-553.
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References
[1]. FitzGerald, R. (2007) Historians and the Cuban Missile Crisis: the Evidence–Interpretation Relationship as seen through Differing Interpretations of the Crisis Settlement. Irish studies in international affairs. [Online] 18 (1), 191–203.
[2]. Allison, G. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, HarperCollins, first edition.
[3]. Zelikow, P. and Allison, G. (1999) Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman.
[4]. National Security Council (NSC). (1962) Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council. [Online] Available at <https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct20/doc1.html > [Accessed 19 November 2021]
[5]. Tierney, D. (2007) Pearl Harbor in Reverse: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of cold war studies. [Online] 9 (3), 49–77.
[6]. Zhang, S. (2012) An Analysis of Khrushchev's motivation and Decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba -- written on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russian Central Asian and Eastern European Studies (06),57-70+98.
[7]. Cohen, A. (2012) A crisis of character; Cuban Missile Crisis ended peacefully because two leaders resisted hardline pressure. Toronto star. 25–.
[8]. Nathan, J. A. (2012) The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked. Foreign affairs (New York, N.Y.). 91 (6), pp.163–165
[9]. Voorhees, T. (2020). The Silent Guns of Two Octobers: Kennedy and Khrushchev Play the Double Game. University of Michigan Press.
[10]. Malinovsky, R (1962) Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev), October 27, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive [Online], Available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117326>.
[11]. Kringlen, E. (1985) The myth of rationality in situations of crisis. Medicine and war, 1(3), 187-194.
[12]. FRUS (1962) Off the Record Meeting on Cuba the White House Washington”, October 16, 1962, 6:30-7:55 p.m., [online], Available at<https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc3.html>.
[13]. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (1962) “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective” [online], Available at<https://www.jfklibrary.org/events-and-awards/forums/past-forums/transcripts/the-cuban-missile-crisis-an-eyewitness-perspective>.
[14]. Liu, C. (2017) Psychological Transmission and Crisis Decision-making: A Study based on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ph. D. Dissertation, China Foreign Affairs University, 2017.
[15]. Blight, J. (1992) The shattered crystal ball: Fear and learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rowman & Littlefield.
[16]. Winter, D. G. (2013) Khrushchev Visits the Bolshoi: [More Than] a Footnote to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Peace and conflict. [Online] 19 (3), 222–239.
[17]. National Security Council (NSC). President Kennedy's appointments, October 16, 1962[ online], Available at<https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc2.html >.
[18]. Savranskaya, S. (2005) New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of strategic studies. [Online] 28 (2), 233–259.
[19]. Norris, R. and Kristensen, H. (2012) The Cuban Missile Crisis: A nuclear order of battle, October and November 1962. Bulletin of the atomic scientists. [Online] 68 (6), 85–91.
[20]. Natioanl Security Archive. (2002) The submarines of October: U.S. and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis.”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book. No. 75. [Online] Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/>.
[21]. Ketov, R. A. (2005) The Cuban Missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope. Journal of strategic studies. [Online] 28 (2), 217–231.
[22]. Mozgovoi, A. (Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya) (2002) Recollections of Vadim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59) We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy. The Cuban Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962, The National Security Archive. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/asw-II-16.pdf>.
[23]. De Mesquita, B. (2010) Foreign policy analysis and rational choice models. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies.
[24]. Scott, L. (2022) The essential inevitability of worrying about the bomb: new writing on the Cuban missile crisis. Intelligence & National Security. [Online] 37 (3), 438–463.