The Trend of China-US Strategic Competition and Chinese Domestic Public Opinion about Sino-US Relations from Trump to Biden

Research Article
Open access

The Trend of China-US Strategic Competition and Chinese Domestic Public Opinion about Sino-US Relations from Trump to Biden

Yifei Tian 1
  • 1 School of Foreign Languages, Nankai University, Tianjin, China, 300000    
  • *corresponding author
LNEP Vol.6
ISSN (Print): 2753-7056
ISSN (Online): 2753-7048
ISBN (Print): 978-1-915371-37-9
ISBN (Online): 978-1-915371-38-6

Abstract

Over the past five years, Sino-US relations have taken on an increasingly complex dynamic. This paper will establish an analytical framework based on two key variables affecting China-US strategic competition: interests and comprehensive national power, and then utilizes this framework to analyze the trend of confrontation and cooperation between China and the US from the Trump administration to Biden. In the second part, this paper contains data from a two-wave public opinion poll in China done before and after the 2020 US presidential election and illustrates how public opinion affects foreign policy decisions in authoritarian nations. The conclusions are: the space of China-US competition and cooperation is growing with their increasing conflict interests and common interests due to the increasing strength of China; After Biden became president, Chinese opinions of the USA and the bilateral relationship improved somewhat; The majority of Chinese respondents thought China was the largest and most powerful economy in the world and supported China being the world’s leading power; younger and more educated respondents had more pessimistic opinions. There are significant policy ramifications of these results.

Keywords:

China-US strategic competition, interests, comprehensive national power, public opinion

Tian,Y. (2023). The Trend of China-US Strategic Competition and Chinese Domestic Public Opinion about Sino-US Relations from Trump to Biden. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,6,986-993.
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References

[1]. Songying Fang, Xiaojun Li, Adam Y Liu, Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, Spring 2022, Pages 27–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poac001

[2]. Guobin Yang, “Internet and Civil Society,” in William S. Tay and Alvin Y. So, eds., Handbook of Contemporary China (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012), pp. 437–54; Lianrui Jia, “What Public and Whose Opinion? A Study of Chinese Online Public Opinion Analysis,” Communication and the Public, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2019), pp. 21–34.

[3]. Wenzhao Tao, The Deep Adjustment of America’s China Policy, Peace and Development, 2018(02):1-13+130.

[4]. Zhiyuan Cui, China-us Relations are Undergoing Qualitative Changes, Economic Herald, 2018(11):20-21.

[5]. Honghua Men, China’s Strategy Toward the US in the New Era, Contemporary World and Socialism, 2019(01):15-24.

[6]. Xinbo Wu, On Sino-US Strategic Competition, World Economics and Politics, 2020(05):96-130+159.

[7]. JOHNSON K, GRAMER R.The great decoupling[J]. Foreign policy, 14th May, 2020.

[8]. Mingguo Wang, From Institutional Competition to Institutional Decoupling: the Evolutionary Logic of Sino-American International Institutional Interaction, World Economics and Politics, 2020(10):72-101+158-159.

[9]. Hua Hu, In the Stage of Strategic Stalemate, Seize the Tactical Buffer Period Between China and the US, Journal of International Relations, 2021(06):35-40.

[10]. Wei Da, Hongyu Cai, Fifty Years of China-Us Relations From the Perspective of the US National Security Strategy, Journal of International Security Studies, 2022,40(02):3-46+157.

[11]. Xuetong Yan, An Analysis of the Instability of Sino-US Relations, World Economics and Politics, 2010(12):4-30+152.

[12]. Xuetong Yan, Diplomatic Transformation, Interest Sequencing and the Rise of Great Powers, Journal of Strategy and Decision Making, 2017,8(03):4-11.

[13]. Angang Hu, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers and Opportunities For China: National Comprehensive National Assessment, Economic Herald, 2017(03):14-25.

[14]. Angang Hu, North-South Patterns and the Rise of Peace: A Study of the Comprehensive Power of the G20, Contemporary International Relations, 2017(11):42-49+65.

[15]. Yongding Yu, Several thoughts on the decoupling between China and the US, China Economic Review, 2021(Z1):56-58.

[16]. Daming Diao, Hongyu Cai, The U.S. Debate on Competitive Strategic Realignment with China, Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 2020,5(04):115-149.

[17]. Qi Zhou, On Trump’s China Policy and its Decision-making Environment, World Economics and Politics, 2019(03):57-78+157-158.

[18]. Yongsheng Tang, Structural Contradictions in U.S.-China Relations and Their Resolution, Contemporary International Relations, 2007(06):52-60.

[19]. Houjia Wang, Yujia Zhao, Space for Bilateral Cooperation Between China and the United States Further Narrowed, International Political Science, 2021,6(04):180-186.

[20]. Fei Chen, Binhua Jian, Reshaping the Regional Order: The Biden Administration’s Southeast Asia Policy and Its Impact, Southeast Asian Studies, 2022(02):71-91+155-156.

[21]. Hailong Ju, The Biden Administration’s South China Sea Policy: Regional Implications and Their Limits, International Studies, 2022(02):102-118+157.

[22]. Nikkei Asia, “How It Happened: Transcript of the US-China Opening Remarks in Alaska,” 19 March, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happened-Transcript-of-the-US-China-opening-remarks-in-Alaska; Matthew Lee and Mark Thiessen, “US, China Spar in First Face to-Face Meeting under Biden,” AP News, 19 March 2021, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-alaska-antony-blinken-yang-jiechi-wang-yi-fc23cd2b23332fa8dd2d781bd3f7c178.

[23]. Huang Lanlan and Yang Sheng, “Netizens Applaud Chinese Delegation’s Sharp Response to US at Alaska Talks,” Global Times, 19 March 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218897.shtml; Justin McCurry, “US and China Publicly Rebuke Each Other in First Major Talks of Biden Era,” The Guardian, 19 March 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/19/us-china-talks-alaska-biden-blinken-sullivan-wang.

[24]. Reuters, “Sellers of T-Shirts, Phone Cases Make Most of China’s Diplomatic Riposte,” 22 March, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/sellers-t-shirts-phone-cases-make-most-chinas-diplomatic-riposte-2021-03-22/.

[25]. Jennie Welch, “China’s Domestic Pressures Shape Assertive Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 November 2012, http://www.cogitasia.com/chinas-domestic-pressures-shape-assertive-foreign-policy/; Christopher W. Bishop, “To Understand China’s Aggressive Foreign Policy, Look at Its Domestic Politics,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 October 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/understand-chinas-aggressive-foreign-policy-look-its-domestic-politics.

[26]. Nicole Gaouette, et al., “Extraordinary Diplomatic Clash Signals Tough Times Ahead for the US and China,” CNN, 20 March 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/20/politics/us-china-friction-ahead/index.html.

[27]. For example, Andrew Chubb argues that since 2012, Beijing has carefully integrated popular nationalistic sentiments into its South China Sea policy, developing “grassroots deterrence” against other disputants and potential foreign interventions into the issue. See Andrew Chubb, Chinese Popular Nationalism and PRC Policy in the South China Sea, PhD dissertation (University of Western Australia, 2016).

[28]. “Biden Wins: What’s Next for China-US Relations?” Global Times, 8 November 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1206038.shtml.

[29]. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

Cite this article

Tian,Y. (2023). The Trend of China-US Strategic Competition and Chinese Domestic Public Opinion about Sino-US Relations from Trump to Biden. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,6,986-993.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

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About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of the International Conference on Interdisciplinary Humanities and Communication Studies (ICIHCS 2022), Part 5

ISBN：978-1-915371-37-9(Print) / 978-1-915371-38-6(Online)
Editor：Muhammad Idrees, Matilde Lafuente-Lechuga
Conference website: https://www.icihcs.org/
Conference date: 18 December 2022
Series: Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media
Volume number: Vol.6
ISSN：2753-7048(Print) / 2753-7056(Online)

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References

[1]. Songying Fang, Xiaojun Li, Adam Y Liu, Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, Spring 2022, Pages 27–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poac001

[2]. Guobin Yang, “Internet and Civil Society,” in William S. Tay and Alvin Y. So, eds., Handbook of Contemporary China (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012), pp. 437–54; Lianrui Jia, “What Public and Whose Opinion? A Study of Chinese Online Public Opinion Analysis,” Communication and the Public, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2019), pp. 21–34.

[3]. Wenzhao Tao, The Deep Adjustment of America’s China Policy, Peace and Development, 2018(02):1-13+130.

[4]. Zhiyuan Cui, China-us Relations are Undergoing Qualitative Changes, Economic Herald, 2018(11):20-21.

[5]. Honghua Men, China’s Strategy Toward the US in the New Era, Contemporary World and Socialism, 2019(01):15-24.

[6]. Xinbo Wu, On Sino-US Strategic Competition, World Economics and Politics, 2020(05):96-130+159.

[7]. JOHNSON K, GRAMER R.The great decoupling[J]. Foreign policy, 14th May, 2020.

[8]. Mingguo Wang, From Institutional Competition to Institutional Decoupling: the Evolutionary Logic of Sino-American International Institutional Interaction, World Economics and Politics, 2020(10):72-101+158-159.

[9]. Hua Hu, In the Stage of Strategic Stalemate, Seize the Tactical Buffer Period Between China and the US, Journal of International Relations, 2021(06):35-40.

[10]. Wei Da, Hongyu Cai, Fifty Years of China-Us Relations From the Perspective of the US National Security Strategy, Journal of International Security Studies, 2022,40(02):3-46+157.

[11]. Xuetong Yan, An Analysis of the Instability of Sino-US Relations, World Economics and Politics, 2010(12):4-30+152.

[12]. Xuetong Yan, Diplomatic Transformation, Interest Sequencing and the Rise of Great Powers, Journal of Strategy and Decision Making, 2017,8(03):4-11.

[13]. Angang Hu, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers and Opportunities For China: National Comprehensive National Assessment, Economic Herald, 2017(03):14-25.

[14]. Angang Hu, North-South Patterns and the Rise of Peace: A Study of the Comprehensive Power of the G20, Contemporary International Relations, 2017(11):42-49+65.

[15]. Yongding Yu, Several thoughts on the decoupling between China and the US, China Economic Review, 2021(Z1):56-58.

[16]. Daming Diao, Hongyu Cai, The U.S. Debate on Competitive Strategic Realignment with China, Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 2020,5(04):115-149.

[17]. Qi Zhou, On Trump’s China Policy and its Decision-making Environment, World Economics and Politics, 2019(03):57-78+157-158.

[18]. Yongsheng Tang, Structural Contradictions in U.S.-China Relations and Their Resolution, Contemporary International Relations, 2007(06):52-60.

[19]. Houjia Wang, Yujia Zhao, Space for Bilateral Cooperation Between China and the United States Further Narrowed, International Political Science, 2021,6(04):180-186.

[20]. Fei Chen, Binhua Jian, Reshaping the Regional Order: The Biden Administration’s Southeast Asia Policy and Its Impact, Southeast Asian Studies, 2022(02):71-91+155-156.

[21]. Hailong Ju, The Biden Administration’s South China Sea Policy: Regional Implications and Their Limits, International Studies, 2022(02):102-118+157.

[22]. Nikkei Asia, “How It Happened: Transcript of the US-China Opening Remarks in Alaska,” 19 March, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happened-Transcript-of-the-US-China-opening-remarks-in-Alaska; Matthew Lee and Mark Thiessen, “US, China Spar in First Face to-Face Meeting under Biden,” AP News, 19 March 2021, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-alaska-antony-blinken-yang-jiechi-wang-yi-fc23cd2b23332fa8dd2d781bd3f7c178.

[23]. Huang Lanlan and Yang Sheng, “Netizens Applaud Chinese Delegation’s Sharp Response to US at Alaska Talks,” Global Times, 19 March 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218897.shtml; Justin McCurry, “US and China Publicly Rebuke Each Other in First Major Talks of Biden Era,” The Guardian, 19 March 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/19/us-china-talks-alaska-biden-blinken-sullivan-wang.

[24]. Reuters, “Sellers of T-Shirts, Phone Cases Make Most of China’s Diplomatic Riposte,” 22 March, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/sellers-t-shirts-phone-cases-make-most-chinas-diplomatic-riposte-2021-03-22/.

[25]. Jennie Welch, “China’s Domestic Pressures Shape Assertive Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 November 2012, http://www.cogitasia.com/chinas-domestic-pressures-shape-assertive-foreign-policy/; Christopher W. Bishop, “To Understand China’s Aggressive Foreign Policy, Look at Its Domestic Politics,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 October 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/understand-chinas-aggressive-foreign-policy-look-its-domestic-politics.

[26]. Nicole Gaouette, et al., “Extraordinary Diplomatic Clash Signals Tough Times Ahead for the US and China,” CNN, 20 March 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/20/politics/us-china-friction-ahead/index.html.

[27]. For example, Andrew Chubb argues that since 2012, Beijing has carefully integrated popular nationalistic sentiments into its South China Sea policy, developing “grassroots deterrence” against other disputants and potential foreign interventions into the issue. See Andrew Chubb, Chinese Popular Nationalism and PRC Policy in the South China Sea, PhD dissertation (University of Western Australia, 2016).

[28]. “Biden Wins: What’s Next for China-US Relations?” Global Times, 8 November 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1206038.shtml.

[29]. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

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