1. Introduction
The exploration of self-identity remains a pivotal theme across both philosophical and psychological disciplines, serving as a fundamental aspect for understanding personal continuity and the nuanced nature of the self [1]. David Hume, in his seminal work A Treatise of Human Nature, provides a groundbreaking and challenging perspective that starkly deviates from traditional views[2]. Hume proposes that the self is not a permanent, unchanging entity; rather, it is a dynamic collection of shifting perceptions—encompassing sensory experiences, thoughts, and emotions, all in constant flux[3]. This empirical viewpoint critically challenges the prevailing notion of a stable, core self, which is central to many conventional theories of personal identity, and advocates for a radical rethinking of how personal identity should be conceptualized.
Traditional psychological theories, including trait theory, psychodynamic theory, humanistic psychology, and cognitive-behavioral models, have long emphasized a stable self-concept and a continuous personal identity[4, 5]. These models maintain that personality traits and internal structures are consistent over time, leading to a predictable and enduring self that guides behavior and shapes personal identity. Contrary to these views, David Hume introduces a new perspectives to extend these conventional psychological frameworks by suggesting that the self is not a static entity, but rather a temporary aggregation of various transient perceptions and experiences[6]. This innovative perspective challenges the traditional notion of an enduring self by positing that what we perceive as "self" is merely a collection of fleeting sensations and thoughts in continuous transformation[3, 7, 8].
Hume asserts that there is no underlying permanence connecting these perceptions, thereby questioning the continuity and constancy assumed by earlier psychological theories[9]. In the realm of modern psychological discourse, Hume’s ideas resonate with emerging theories that highlight the fluidity and dynamism of personal identity. Contemporary research increasingly acknowledges that identity is not a fixed construct but is continually shaped and reshaped through ongoing experiences and interactions within a social context[10, 11]. This modern understanding aligns with Hume’s assertion that the self is constantly being reconstructed, suggesting a more intricate interplay between internal perceptions and external influences in shaping personal identity.
This paper aims to provide a sophisticated analysis of self-identity, emphasizing its complex, fluid, and context-sensitive nature through both philosophical and empirical lenses. By extending David Hume's philosophical insights beyond traditional psychological frameworks and integrating them with contemporary psychological theories, this work offers a comprehensive model for advancing the understanding of self-identity within the psychological sciences. This interdisciplinary approach not only deepens theoretical insights but also has substantial implications for clinical practice, including the development of more precise personality assessment models, the enhancement of therapeutic strategies for psychological disorders, and a more nuanced understanding of how cultural and contextual factors influence the construction of self-identity.
2. Conceptualization of the Self through David Hume
David Hume's characterization of the self as a bundle of perceptions marks a significant philosophical departure from the classical understanding of a coherent, unified self. In his exploration, Hume suggests that the self-comprises a dynamic series of different perceptions, including sensations, thoughts, and emotions, that occur in rapid succession[12]. These perceptions are in a state of constant flux, with no underlying essence to bind them together permanently. He vividly illustrates this concept by noting the transient nature of our internal experiences: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception"[2]. Hume’s observation underscores the notion that the traditional concept of a unified self is illusory; instead, what we consider 'self' is merely an assembly of these continuously changing perceptions.
2.1. The Role of Memory in Perceived Continuity
Hume further develops his theory by examining the role of memory in linking these fleeting perceptions across time, thereby forging what we perceive as personal identity. He argues that memory, while pivotal in connecting past experiences to the present, is itself just another type of perception, prone to the same transient and fallible nature as other sensory experiences[13, 14]. The perceived continuity of the self is thus not an inherent attribute but rather a narrative constructed by the mind from these individual perceptions recalled over time[2, 15]. This perspective challenges the metaphysical understanding of identity, suggesting instead that our sense of self-continuity is a psychological construct, shaped and reshaped by the selective recall of past perceptions.
2.2. Imagination and the Construction of Identity
Expanding on the implications of his theory, Hume suggests that the identity we attribute to ourselves and others is largely a product of the imagination[9, 16]. The human mind instinctively searches for patterns and connections among experiences, synthesizing our varied and unrelated perceptions into a semblance of coherence. This process results in what is perceived as the enduring self. Hume argues that this constructed identity is reinforced through the consistency of specific patterns of perception and behavior over time, which leads to the belief in a persistent self[2, 17, 18]. However, he contends that this sense of a continuous self is merely a practical fiction, a construct of the imagination that facilitates our interactions with the world and helps us make sense of our experiences[19].
By suggesting that both memory and imagination play crucial roles in forming the self, Hume’s bundle theory offers a framework that sees personal identity not as a fixed essence but as an ongoing psychological narrative. This narrative is contingent upon the mind's ability to link together a series of disparate perceptions and to create a story of continuity where there is none inherently[20, 21].
3. Traditional Psychological Perspectives on Self-Identity
Traditional psychological models have shaped our understanding of self-identity by emphasizing a stable and continuous personal identity. These models view self-identity as a constant framework guiding behavior over time. Hume's bundle theory challenges this by offering a dynamic, fragmented view of identity, which extends and complements these traditional perspectives.
3.1. Fragmentation vs. Continuity of Self
Traditional psychological theories, such as those rooted in Trait Theory and Psychodynamic Theory, emphasize the continuity and stability of the self[5, 22]. These models suggest that self-concept is a relatively constant and enduring entity, shaped by stable personality traits or internal psychic structures that persist over time[23]. Hume’s bundle theory, however, introduces the idea that the self is not a single, continuous entity but rather a collection of discrete and ever-changing perceptions, sensations, and thoughts. This fragmentation of self-identity challenges the traditional view, suggesting that what we perceive as a coherent self is merely a mental construct, a narrative woven by the mind to impose order on a constantly shifting array of experiences[9]. This dynamic view can help explain why individuals may exhibit different aspects of their personality in different situations, without necessarily losing the coherence of their identity.
3.2. Reflexive Impressions and the Construction of Self
Hume’s concept of reflexive impressions—emotional responses and sentiments that arise from perceptions—also offers a significant extension to traditional psychological theories[24, 25]. In traditional models, self-concept is often seen as something that is developed early in life and remains relatively stable, influenced by internal traits, early experiences, and cognitive frameworks[26]. Hume, however, posits that self-identity is not derived from a pre-existing self but is constructed through interactions with external objects and experiences[27]. Reflexive impressions, in Hume’s view, shape how we perceive ourselves, and these impressions are fluid, changing with new experiences.
This idea extends traditional psychological theories by emphasizing the relational aspect of self-identity. It suggests that self-concept is not just an internal construct but is also deeply influenced by external relationships and interactions. This view aligns with and enhances theories in social and cultural psychology that emphasize the role of social context and cultural factors in shaping self-identity[28]. It suggests that self-concept is not just a reflection of internal traits but is also a product of ongoing interactions with the external world.
3.3. Morality, Sentiment, and Self-Identity
Hume’s distinction between the roles of morality and reason in shaping behavior and self-identity also contributes to extending traditional psychological theories. In traditional models, moral reasoning is often seen as a rational process that shapes an individual’s behavior and self-concept[29]. Hume, however, argues that moral judgments are rooted in sentiment and emotional responses rather than reason[30]. This view highlights the importance of emotions in shaping self-identity, suggesting that our sense of self is closely tied to our moral sentiments.
This perspective extends traditional psychological theories by emphasizing the role of emotions in the construction of self-concept. It suggests that self-identity is not just a cognitive or rational construct but is also deeply emotional, shaped by our feelings and moral sentiments. This perspective is consistent with contemporary research on the affective-representational circuitry, which posits that emotions play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of self-perception and identity in psychological processes [31].
4. Contemporary Psychological Perspectives on Self-Identity
Modern psychological theories mirrors Hume's assertion that identity is fluid and subject to change. This alignment can be seen in several key theoretical developments that further expand on Hume’s ideas and their implications for understanding self-identity today.
Erik Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development is a prime example of this connection. Erikson emphasizes that identity formation is not a static event, but an ongoing process influenced by various life stages and experiences, particularly during adolescence[32]. As individuals encounter new challenges and environments, their perceptions and self-concept evolve, reflecting Hume’s notion that identity is not fixed but dynamically shaped by changing circumstances.
Further extending Hume’s perspective is the field of narrative identity theory. This approach posits that individuals construct their sense of self through the stories they tell about their lives[33]. The narrative identity perspective aligns with Hume's critique of a fixed self, suggesting that identity is not an unchanging essence but rather a dynamic narrative formed through continuous interactions and experiences. Through storytelling, individuals create a coherent sense of self that, while fluid, provides continuity over time.
The recognition of identity’s fluidity also has significant practical implications for psychological well-being and mental health care. As modern psychology increasingly acknowledges, a flexible approach to identity can be crucial for mental health, particularly when helping individuals navigate identity-related challenges such as life transitions or crises[34]. This understanding echoes Hume’s insights into the variability and context-dependency of personal identity, encouraging a more nuanced and adaptive approach to mental health care[35]. By considering the diverse and evolving nature of self-concept, practitioners can better support individuals in developing resilient and authentic identities. In summary, contemporary psychological perspectives on self-identity strongly resonate with and extend Hume’s philosophical insights, highlighting the fluid, narrative, and context-dependent nature of personal identity and its implications for psychological practice and well-being.
5. Implications for Psychological Practice and Research
The integration of Hume’s philosophical perspective with traditional psychological theories on self-identity has significant implications for both psychological practice and research. Hume’s view of the self as a fluid and dynamic construct challenges the conventional understanding of identity as a stable and enduring entity, offering new avenues for therapeutic approaches and research paradigms.
5.1. Therapeutic Flexibility and Adaptive Interventions
In psychological practice, Hume’s insights suggest the need for greater flexibility in therapeutic approaches. Traditional therapies often focus on reinforcing stable aspects of self-identity, such as core personality traits and long-standing cognitive patterns[36]. However, if self-identity is seen as fluid and context-dependent, as Hume proposes, therapists might need to shift their focus toward helping clients navigate the dynamic aspects of their identities. This could involve fostering adaptability and resilience in the face of change, guiding clients through identity transitions, and exploring how external circumstances and relationships influence their sense of self. For instance, therapeutic interventions could be designed to help individuals recognize and embrace the variability in their self-concept, rather than striving for an unrealistic sense of consistency. This might involve techniques that encourage clients to explore different aspects of their identity, understand the context in which these aspects emerge, and integrate these diverse self-perceptions into a cohesive yet flexible self-concept.
5.2. Expanding Research Methodologies
From a research perspective, Hume’s ideas invite a broader exploration of how self-identity is constructed and maintained. Traditional psychological research often prioritizes the measurement of stable traits and cognitive frameworks. However, integrating Hume’s philosophy could lead to the development of new research methodologies that better capture the fluidity and complexity of self-identity. Researchers might explore longitudinal studies that track changes in self-concept over time, examining how different life events, social contexts, and emotional experiences contribute to shifts in identity. Such research could provide valuable insights into how individuals navigate identity changes throughout their lives, shedding light on the processes that promote psychological well-being during periods of transition. Additionally, qualitative research methods, such as in-depth interviews and narrative analysis, could be particularly useful in exploring the dynamic nature of self-identity[37]. These methods would allow for a more nuanced understanding of how individuals perceive and articulate their sense of self, providing a richer and more detailed picture of identity construction than traditional quantitative measures alone.
6. Conclusion
Hume’s philosophy offers a crucial historical foundation that enriches our understanding of self-identity in contemporary psychological science. By extending beyond stable aspects of self-identity and encourages dynamic status of self-identity offers integrated perspective and valuable insights for psychological theory and practice. It encourages a more flexible and adaptive approach to understanding and supporting self-identity, recognizing the complex interplay between stability and change in the human experience. This perspective continues to influence and inform the development of psychological theories on identity in the modern era.
References
[1]. McAdams, D.P. and K.S. Cox, Self and identity across the life span. The handbook of life‐span development, 2010.
[2]. Hume, D., A treatise of human nature. 2000: Oxford University Press.
[3]. Freeman, J.W., Hume and Husserl: philosophy of the self. 2010, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
[4]. Luyten, P., J. Corveleyn, and S.J. Blatt, The convergence among psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral theories of depression: A critical review of empirical research. The theory and treatment of depression, 2013: p. 95-135.
[5]. Hixson, T.P., Psychotherapist personality, theoretical orientation, and integration: Personality traits of psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral clinical psychologists. 2003: Adelphi University, The Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies.
[6]. Pike, N., Hume's bundle theory of the self: A limited defense. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1967. 4(2): p. 159-165.
[7]. Lichtenstein, H., The dilemma of human identity: Notes on self-transformation, self-objectivation, and metamorphosis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1963. 11(1): p. 173-223.
[8]. Segall, S.Z. and S.Z. Segall, Self and self-transcendence. Buddhism and Human Flourishing: A Modern Western Perspective, 2020: p. 115-141.
[9]. Strawson, G., The evident connexion: Hume on personal identity. 2011: OUP Oxford.
[10]. Moje, E.B. and A. Luke, Literacy and identity: Examining the metaphors in history and contemporary research. Reading research quarterly, 2009. 44(4): p. 415-437.
[11]. Somers, M.R. and G.D. Gibson, Reclaiming the epistemological other: narrative and the social constitution of identity. 1993.
[12]. Azeri, S., Hume’s theory of social constitution of the self. Filozofija i društvo, 2019. 30(4): p. 511-534.
[13]. Fernández, J., Memory: A self-referential account. 2019: Oxford University Press, USA.
[14]. Biro, J.I., Hume on self-identity and memory. The Review of Metaphysics, 1976: p. 19-38.
[15]. Valenza, R., Editing the self: David Hume's narrative theory. The Eighteenth Century, 2002. 43(2): p. 137-160.
[16]. Penelhum, T., Hume on personal identity. The Philosophical Review, 1955. 64(4): p. 571-589.
[17]. Winkler, K.P., " All Is Revolution in Us": Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume. Hume Studies, 2000. 26(1): p. 3-40.
[18]. Schau, H.J., Identity projects and the marketplace. Consumer culture theory, 2018: p. 19-39.
[19]. Taylor, J.A., Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy. 2015: Oxford University Press, USA.
[20]. Herman, D., Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind. 2017: MIT press.
[21]. Siegel, D.J., The developing mind: How relationships and the brain interact to shape who we are. 2020: Guilford Publications.
[22]. Bornstein, R.F., Psychodynamic theory and personality disorders. Handbook of personology and psychopathology, 2005: p. 164-180.
[23]. Roberts, B.W. and A. Caspi, The cumulative continuity model of personality development: Striking a balance between continuity and change in personality traits across the life course. Understanding human development: Dialogues with lifespan psychology, 2003: p. 183-214.
[24]. Penelhum, T., Hume. 1975: Springer.
[25]. Noxon, J., Senses of Identity in Hume's Treatise. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, 1969. 8(3): p. 367-384.
[26]. Alsaker, F.D. and J. Kroger, Self-concept, self-esteem, and identity, in Handbook of adolescent development. 2020, Psychology Press. p. 90-117.
[27]. Lynch, S.M., Hume on self-constitution: the interplay behind the fiction. 1998, UNSW Sydney.
[28]. Spencer, M.B., Social and cultural influences on school adjustment: The application of an identity-focused. Educational psychologist, 1999. 34(1): p. 43-57.
[29]. Jennings, P.L., M.S. Mitchell, and S.T. Hannah, The moral self: A review and integration of the literature. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 2015. 36(S1): p. S104-S168.
[30]. Neslioğlu, E.F., The formation of the self as mental unity and moral agency in hume’s philosophy. 2008.
[31]. Zavalloni, M., The affective-representational circuit as the foundation of identity. New ideas in psychology, 1986. 4(3): p. 333-349.
[32]. Erikson, E., Theory of identity development. E. Erikson, Identity and the life cycle. Nueva York: International Universities Press. Obtenido de http://childdevpsychology. yolasite. com/resources/theory% 20of% 20ident ity% 20erikson. pdf, 1959.
[33]. McAdams, D.P., The psychology of life stories. Review of general psychology, 2001. 5(2): p. 100-122.
[34]. Downey, G., J. Eccles, and C. Chatman, Navigating the future: Social identity, coping, and life tasks. 2006: Russell Sage Foundation.
[35]. Ainslie, D.C., Scepticism about persons in book II of Hume's Treatise. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1999. 37(3): p. 469-492.
[36]. Klimstra, T.A. and J.J. Denissen, A theoretical framework for the associations between identity and psychopathology. Developmental psychology, 2017. 53(11): p. 2052.
[37]. Coyle, A. and N. Murtagh, Qualitative approaches to research using Identity Process Theory. Identity process theory: Identity, social action and social change, 2014: p. 41-64.
Cite this article
Guo,Z. (2025). Integrating David Hume’s Philosophy with Contemporary Psychology: A Dynamic Approach to Understanding Self-Identity. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,81,63-69.
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References
[1]. McAdams, D.P. and K.S. Cox, Self and identity across the life span. The handbook of life‐span development, 2010.
[2]. Hume, D., A treatise of human nature. 2000: Oxford University Press.
[3]. Freeman, J.W., Hume and Husserl: philosophy of the self. 2010, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
[4]. Luyten, P., J. Corveleyn, and S.J. Blatt, The convergence among psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral theories of depression: A critical review of empirical research. The theory and treatment of depression, 2013: p. 95-135.
[5]. Hixson, T.P., Psychotherapist personality, theoretical orientation, and integration: Personality traits of psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral clinical psychologists. 2003: Adelphi University, The Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies.
[6]. Pike, N., Hume's bundle theory of the self: A limited defense. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1967. 4(2): p. 159-165.
[7]. Lichtenstein, H., The dilemma of human identity: Notes on self-transformation, self-objectivation, and metamorphosis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1963. 11(1): p. 173-223.
[8]. Segall, S.Z. and S.Z. Segall, Self and self-transcendence. Buddhism and Human Flourishing: A Modern Western Perspective, 2020: p. 115-141.
[9]. Strawson, G., The evident connexion: Hume on personal identity. 2011: OUP Oxford.
[10]. Moje, E.B. and A. Luke, Literacy and identity: Examining the metaphors in history and contemporary research. Reading research quarterly, 2009. 44(4): p. 415-437.
[11]. Somers, M.R. and G.D. Gibson, Reclaiming the epistemological other: narrative and the social constitution of identity. 1993.
[12]. Azeri, S., Hume’s theory of social constitution of the self. Filozofija i društvo, 2019. 30(4): p. 511-534.
[13]. Fernández, J., Memory: A self-referential account. 2019: Oxford University Press, USA.
[14]. Biro, J.I., Hume on self-identity and memory. The Review of Metaphysics, 1976: p. 19-38.
[15]. Valenza, R., Editing the self: David Hume's narrative theory. The Eighteenth Century, 2002. 43(2): p. 137-160.
[16]. Penelhum, T., Hume on personal identity. The Philosophical Review, 1955. 64(4): p. 571-589.
[17]. Winkler, K.P., " All Is Revolution in Us": Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume. Hume Studies, 2000. 26(1): p. 3-40.
[18]. Schau, H.J., Identity projects and the marketplace. Consumer culture theory, 2018: p. 19-39.
[19]. Taylor, J.A., Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy. 2015: Oxford University Press, USA.
[20]. Herman, D., Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind. 2017: MIT press.
[21]. Siegel, D.J., The developing mind: How relationships and the brain interact to shape who we are. 2020: Guilford Publications.
[22]. Bornstein, R.F., Psychodynamic theory and personality disorders. Handbook of personology and psychopathology, 2005: p. 164-180.
[23]. Roberts, B.W. and A. Caspi, The cumulative continuity model of personality development: Striking a balance between continuity and change in personality traits across the life course. Understanding human development: Dialogues with lifespan psychology, 2003: p. 183-214.
[24]. Penelhum, T., Hume. 1975: Springer.
[25]. Noxon, J., Senses of Identity in Hume's Treatise. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, 1969. 8(3): p. 367-384.
[26]. Alsaker, F.D. and J. Kroger, Self-concept, self-esteem, and identity, in Handbook of adolescent development. 2020, Psychology Press. p. 90-117.
[27]. Lynch, S.M., Hume on self-constitution: the interplay behind the fiction. 1998, UNSW Sydney.
[28]. Spencer, M.B., Social and cultural influences on school adjustment: The application of an identity-focused. Educational psychologist, 1999. 34(1): p. 43-57.
[29]. Jennings, P.L., M.S. Mitchell, and S.T. Hannah, The moral self: A review and integration of the literature. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 2015. 36(S1): p. S104-S168.
[30]. Neslioğlu, E.F., The formation of the self as mental unity and moral agency in hume’s philosophy. 2008.
[31]. Zavalloni, M., The affective-representational circuit as the foundation of identity. New ideas in psychology, 1986. 4(3): p. 333-349.
[32]. Erikson, E., Theory of identity development. E. Erikson, Identity and the life cycle. Nueva York: International Universities Press. Obtenido de http://childdevpsychology. yolasite. com/resources/theory% 20of% 20ident ity% 20erikson. pdf, 1959.
[33]. McAdams, D.P., The psychology of life stories. Review of general psychology, 2001. 5(2): p. 100-122.
[34]. Downey, G., J. Eccles, and C. Chatman, Navigating the future: Social identity, coping, and life tasks. 2006: Russell Sage Foundation.
[35]. Ainslie, D.C., Scepticism about persons in book II of Hume's Treatise. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1999. 37(3): p. 469-492.
[36]. Klimstra, T.A. and J.J. Denissen, A theoretical framework for the associations between identity and psychopathology. Developmental psychology, 2017. 53(11): p. 2052.
[37]. Coyle, A. and N. Murtagh, Qualitative approaches to research using Identity Process Theory. Identity process theory: Identity, social action and social change, 2014: p. 41-64.