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Research on Anti-monopoly Regulation of the MFN Clause on Internet Platforms
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Abstract
With the continuous development of electronic information technology, internet companies are playing an increasingly important role in the business field. This evolution has not only catalyzed shifts in business models and transaction habits but has also introduced novel practices, such as the integration of Most-Favored-Nation clauses (MFN clauses) that were formerly exclusive to traditional business domains. Currently, MFN clauses are widely used in commercial activities between internet platform companies, which require high attention from antitrust enforcement agencies. Through a comprehensive analysis of existing literature and research, this study aims to shed light on the similarities and differences between these two types of MFN clauses, offering valuable insights into the evolving landscape of business practices within the digital age. In addition, the article also uses case analysis to examine two typical cases in foreign jurisdictions, demonstrating the regulatory approaches of the extraterritorial judiciary towards MFN clauses within internet platforms. Based on the analysis, the conclusion of this paper is that the for “collusive” MFN clause, the “illegal per se doctrine” should be applied for “exclusive” MFN clause, the principle of reasonableness should be applied, taking account of both the effects on restricting and promoting competition.
Keywords
antitrust law, MFN clause, internet platforms, US apple e-book case, EU amazon case
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Cite this article
Yu,H. (2023). Research on Anti-monopoly Regulation of the MFN Clause on Internet Platforms. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,21,179-184.
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