Germany’s Strategic Misjudgment of World War I: Based on the Impact of Anglo-German Diplomatic Interaction

Research Article
Open access

Germany’s Strategic Misjudgment of World War I: Based on the Impact of Anglo-German Diplomatic Interaction

Cihang Yang 1*
  • 1 Lund University    
  • *corresponding author ci5480ya-s@student.lu.se
Published on 20 November 2023 | https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/24/20230598
LNEP Vol.24
ISSN (Print): 2753-7056
ISSN (Online): 2753-7048
ISBN (Print): 978-1-83558-127-8
ISBN (Online): 978-1-83558-128-5

Abstract

This article reviews and analyzes the Anglo-German diplomatic activities and interactions of some officials from both Britain and Germany before the First World War. It focuses on specific cases involving figures such as Henry Wilson and Prince Lichnowsky, aiming to explore the factors in the pre-war diplomatic interactions between Britain and Germany that led to Germany’s strategic misjudgment and ultimately culminated in the outbreak of the war. Structural realism and the concept of “security dilemma” are employed to examine the intentions and positions of officials and the upper echelons on both sides. This study concludes that the prolonged strategic preparations by Britain and its vigilant attitude towards Germany’s aggression demonstrated thorough consideration of the impending war. On the other hand, factors such as the German military’s satisfaction with its own development and the filtering of genuine information within its internal diplomatic system intensified the likelihood of war. Additionally, the ambiguous stance displayed by Britain towards the prospect of war also exerted a certain influence. Taking a research perspective centered on the analysis of mutual or internal interactions between the two parties, this article aims to offer novel insights for future investigations into the realm of strategic misjudgment preceding World War I.

Keywords:

strategic misjudgment, Anglo-German relationship, structural realism, diplomatic activities

Yang,C. (2023). Germany’s Strategic Misjudgment of World War I: Based on the Impact of Anglo-German Diplomatic Interaction. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,24,83-88.
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References

[1]. Geiss, I. (1966). The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims, Journal of Contemporary History, 1(3), 75-91.

[2]. Mombauer, A. (2013). The Fischer Controversy, Documents and the ‘Truth’ About the Origins of the First World War, Journal of Contemporary History, 48(2), 290-314.

[3]. Schroeder, P. W. (1989). The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium, Review of International Studies, 15(2), 135-153.

[4]. Snyder, J. and Lieber, K. A. (2008). Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I. International Security, 33(1), 174–194.

[5]. Van Evera, S. (1984). The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. International Security, 9(1), 58–107.

[6]. Willis, E. F. (1938). Anglo-German Rivalry Before the World War. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 19(3), 292–303.

[7]. Lynn-Jones, S. M. (1986). Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914. International Security, 11(2), 121–150.

[8]. Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (2019). World War I and IR Theory. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 43(1), 5–18.

[9]. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton.

[10]. Rosato, S. (2021). Intentions in Great Power Politics: Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict. Yale University Press. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9

[11]. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

[12]. Jeffery, K. (2008). Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[13]. Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2011). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[14]. Reid, W. (2006). Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig. Birlinn. Retrieved from https://books.google.se/books?id=5UNnAAAAMAAJ

[15]. Bennett, E. W. (1988). Intelligence and History from the Other Side of the Hill. Retrieved from The Journal of Modern History, 60(2), 312–337.

[16]. Young, H. F. (1976). The Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914, The Journal of Modern History, 48(4), 644-655.

[17]. Morley, J. V. (2013). Memorandum On Resignation. Read Books Limited.

[18]. Clark, C. (2016). Sir Edward Grey and the July Crisis. The International History Review, 38(2), 326–338.

[19]. Koss, S. E. (1985). Asquith. London: Penguin Books, Limited.


Cite this article

Yang,C. (2023). Germany’s Strategic Misjudgment of World War I: Based on the Impact of Anglo-German Diplomatic Interaction. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,24,83-88.

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About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of the International Conference on Global Politics and Socio-Humanities

ISBN:978-1-83558-127-8(Print) / 978-1-83558-128-5(Online)
Editor:Enrique Mallen, Javier Cifuentes-Faura
Conference website: https://www.icgpsh.org/
Conference date: 13 October 2023
Series: Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media
Volume number: Vol.24
ISSN:2753-7048(Print) / 2753-7056(Online)

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References

[1]. Geiss, I. (1966). The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims, Journal of Contemporary History, 1(3), 75-91.

[2]. Mombauer, A. (2013). The Fischer Controversy, Documents and the ‘Truth’ About the Origins of the First World War, Journal of Contemporary History, 48(2), 290-314.

[3]. Schroeder, P. W. (1989). The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium, Review of International Studies, 15(2), 135-153.

[4]. Snyder, J. and Lieber, K. A. (2008). Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I. International Security, 33(1), 174–194.

[5]. Van Evera, S. (1984). The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. International Security, 9(1), 58–107.

[6]. Willis, E. F. (1938). Anglo-German Rivalry Before the World War. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 19(3), 292–303.

[7]. Lynn-Jones, S. M. (1986). Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914. International Security, 11(2), 121–150.

[8]. Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (2019). World War I and IR Theory. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 43(1), 5–18.

[9]. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton.

[10]. Rosato, S. (2021). Intentions in Great Power Politics: Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict. Yale University Press. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9

[11]. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

[12]. Jeffery, K. (2008). Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[13]. Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2011). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[14]. Reid, W. (2006). Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig. Birlinn. Retrieved from https://books.google.se/books?id=5UNnAAAAMAAJ

[15]. Bennett, E. W. (1988). Intelligence and History from the Other Side of the Hill. Retrieved from The Journal of Modern History, 60(2), 312–337.

[16]. Young, H. F. (1976). The Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914, The Journal of Modern History, 48(4), 644-655.

[17]. Morley, J. V. (2013). Memorandum On Resignation. Read Books Limited.

[18]. Clark, C. (2016). Sir Edward Grey and the July Crisis. The International History Review, 38(2), 326–338.

[19]. Koss, S. E. (1985). Asquith. London: Penguin Books, Limited.