Spatio-temporal Continuity and Personhood: An Analysis of the Diachronicity of Identity Through Two Criterions
- 1 Dublin Jerome High School
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
The concept of and continuity of personal identity has long fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and individuals alike. This essay explores the continuity of the self from childhood onwards, examining how fundamental characteristics, memories, and experiences contribute to the persistence of personal identity through the dualist theory of the mind and body. In this view, a person is the same person as an earlier person if they have the same form as the earlier person and have continuity of matter with them. This essay will assert that human essence, through Olson’s animalism, remains the same and that the enduring connections formed through memories, values, and self-perception, however unreliable, may contribute to a sense of sameness, with the final determination of sameness belonging to the person whose personhood is put to question.
Keywords
animalism, personhood, Lockean theory, diachronicity, cognition
[1]. Olson, E. T. (2007). What are we? Oxford University Press.
[2]. Spencer Brown, G. (1957). Laws of form. Julian Press
[3]. Campbell, R. L. (2004). The ship of Theseus. The Journal of Philosophy, 101(9), 498-516.
[4]. Noonan, H. (1983). Personal identity. Routledge.
[5]. Brennan, A. (1988). Personal identity and psychological continuity. Analysis, 48(4), 225-231.
[6]. Hirsch, E. (1982). The concept of identity. Oxford University Press.
[7]. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). Henry Holt and Company.
[8]. O’Driscoll, C., & Leach, J. (1998). The self and memory. Analysis, 58(4), 277-285.
[9]. Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-reference and self-awareness. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 700-719.
[10]. Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720-725.
[11]. Klein, S. B. (2001). Self-knowledge and self-identity in humans and animals. In The self in social psychology (pp. 13-32). Psychology Press.
[12]. Klein, S. B. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of knowing one’s self. In The cognitive neuroscience of memory (pp. 289-310). Oxford University Press.
[13]. Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review, 116(1), 252-282.
[14]. Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, 1(1), 35-59.
[15]. Earle, W. M. (1972). Perceptual experience and personal identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3), 249-258.
[16]. Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason. Cambridge University Press.
[17]. Lund, H. H. (2005). The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: An enactive affordance-based model. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 369-387.
Cite this article
Zhu,L. (2024). Spatio-temporal Continuity and Personhood: An Analysis of the Diachronicity of Identity Through Two Criterions. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,33,8-11.
Data availability
The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.
Disclaimer/Publisher's Note
The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s). EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.
About volume
Volume title: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Interdisciplinary Humanities and Communication Studies
© 2024 by the author(s). Licensee EWA Publishing, Oxford, UK. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. Authors who
publish this series agree to the following terms:
1. Authors retain copyright and grant the series right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this
series.
2. Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the series's published
version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial
publication in this series.
3. Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and
during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See
Open access policy for details).