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Navigating Transboundary Pollution: Economic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to International Environmental Cooperation
- 1 Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK
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Abstract
This paper examines the economic and game-theoretic approaches to transboundary pollution, focusing on the dynamics of international cooperation to address shared environmental challenges. Transboundary pollution, often framed within game theory as a "Prisoner's Dilemma," presents nations with a choice between cooperation for mutual environmental benefit or defection, risking greater harm. By analyzing public goods models, the study highlights the complexities of collective action, including the free-rider problem, where some nations may benefit from others' efforts without contributing. Through dynamic game-theoretic strategies, such as tit-for-tat and compliance mechanisms, countries can maintain long-term cooperation by aligning national and global incentives. Case studies of international treaties and regional agreements, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and the Danube River Basin Management Plan, demonstrate the practical application of these economic frameworks, showing how strategic incentives and shared responsibilities enhance collective environmental management. This paper underscores the need for economic tools and cooperative strategies to foster sustained global efforts in pollution control, benefiting both national and global environmental health.
Keywords
transboundary pollution, game theory, environmental cooperation
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Cite this article
Tan,H.W. (2025). Navigating Transboundary Pollution: Economic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to International Environmental Cooperation. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,175,64-68.
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Volume title: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Business and Policy Studies
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