The Impact of Government Policies on Natural Monopoly Markets based on Evolutionary Games

Research Article
Open access

The Impact of Government Policies on Natural Monopoly Markets based on Evolutionary Games

Zhipeng Chen 1* , Mingxuan Fu 2 , Zixiang Fu 3 , Siying Zhang 4
  • 1 Macau University of Science and Technology    
  • 2 Macau University of Science and Technology    
  • 3 Shanghai Institute of Technology    
  • 4 WLSA Shanghai Academy    
  • *corresponding author 1909853b411002@student.must.edu.mo
Published on 13 September 2023 | https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/11/20230542
AEMPS Vol.11
ISSN (Print): 2754-1177
ISSN (Online): 2754-1169
ISBN (Print): 978-1-915371-49-2
ISBN (Online): 978-1-915371-50-8

Abstract

Financing is difficult during the post-epidemic era. A lot of industries occupied by monopolies are so large that the goods they produce are often "over-priced" and this will have a number of adverse effects on market equilibrium. This paper constructs a game model in which the government, the monopolies and the SMEs wishing to enter the monopoly market are the main actors, and this article analyzes the impact of the government's actions on the monopoly market and make conclusive recommendations. The final choice of three sides of the game can be obtained by discussing whether the government chooses to regulate the monopoly market with subsidies and taxes, whether the monopolies set high or low prices and whether the Small and medium-sized enterprises are willing to enter the monopoly market. The final analysis of the evolutionary game model concludes that: the strength of government regulation is the decisive factor in the final Nash equilibrium point of the game.

Keywords:

post-epidemic era, monopoly, regulation, evolutionary game

Chen,Z.;Fu,M.;Fu,Z.;Zhang,S. (2023). The Impact of Government Policies on Natural Monopoly Markets based on Evolutionary Games. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,11,208-216.
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References

[1]. Hu, A. G., Guo, Y.: Comprehensive Strategy and System Design for Preventing Corruption in the Transition Period. Managing the world (6), 12 (2001).

[2]. Clements, B. J., Hugounen, R., Schwartz, G.: Government Subsidies Concepts, International Trends, and Reform Options. IMF Working Papers 95, 91 (1995).

[3]. Zhu, J. S., Zhu, H.: Can government subsidies stimulate enterprise innovation-Analysis of Innovation Behavior of New and Incumbent Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game. China Management Science 29(12), 15 (2021).

[4]. Cao, L. Y.: Exploring the Optimization of Government Subsidies to Enterprises for Pollution Control Based on Game Model. Humanities magazine (6), 8 (2017).

[5]. Shapiro, C.: The theory of business strategy. The Rand journal of economics 20, 1 (1989).

[6]. Parente, S. L., Prescott, E. C.: Barriers to riches. The MIT Press, (2000).

[7]. Yao, P.Y.: Research on the impact path of government subsidies on SMEs' innovation. Technical economy 41(2), 12 (2022).

[8]. Wu, Q. J., Chen, Z. G., Qiao, W. Q.: Understanding and Regulation Choice of "Predatory Pricing". Reality, (2006).

[9]. Cao, W. Y., Qing, C. Y.: The Feasibility of Introducing Government Subsidies into the Credit Guarantee of Small and Medium sized Enterprises in China: From the perspective of game theory. Shanghai Finance 12, 4 (2009).

[10]. He, R.: Research on the Problem of "Green Drifting" of Enterprises Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game. Shanghai Business 6, 4 (2020).

Cite this article

Chen,Z.;Fu,M.;Fu,Z.;Zhang,S. (2023). The Impact of Government Policies on Natural Monopoly Markets based on Evolutionary Games. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,11,208-216.

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The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

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About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Business and Policy Studies

ISBN：978-1-915371-49-2(Print) / 978-1-915371-50-8(Online)
Editor：Canh Thien Dang, Javier Cifuentes-Faura
Conference website: https://2023.confbps.org/
Conference date: 26 February 2023
Series: Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
Volume number: Vol.11
ISSN：2754-1169(Print) / 2754-1177(Online)

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References

[1]. Hu, A. G., Guo, Y.: Comprehensive Strategy and System Design for Preventing Corruption in the Transition Period. Managing the world (6), 12 (2001).

[2]. Clements, B. J., Hugounen, R., Schwartz, G.: Government Subsidies Concepts, International Trends, and Reform Options. IMF Working Papers 95, 91 (1995).

[3]. Zhu, J. S., Zhu, H.: Can government subsidies stimulate enterprise innovation-Analysis of Innovation Behavior of New and Incumbent Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game. China Management Science 29(12), 15 (2021).

[4]. Cao, L. Y.: Exploring the Optimization of Government Subsidies to Enterprises for Pollution Control Based on Game Model. Humanities magazine (6), 8 (2017).

[5]. Shapiro, C.: The theory of business strategy. The Rand journal of economics 20, 1 (1989).

[6]. Parente, S. L., Prescott, E. C.: Barriers to riches. The MIT Press, (2000).

[7]. Yao, P.Y.: Research on the impact path of government subsidies on SMEs' innovation. Technical economy 41(2), 12 (2022).

[8]. Wu, Q. J., Chen, Z. G., Qiao, W. Q.: Understanding and Regulation Choice of "Predatory Pricing". Reality, (2006).

[9]. Cao, W. Y., Qing, C. Y.: The Feasibility of Introducing Government Subsidies into the Credit Guarantee of Small and Medium sized Enterprises in China: From the perspective of game theory. Shanghai Finance 12, 4 (2009).

[10]. He, R.: Research on the Problem of "Green Drifting" of Enterprises Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game. Shanghai Business 6, 4 (2020).

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