
Addressing Public Interest Violation Through Independent Anti-Corruption Bodies -A Case Study of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission in South Korea
- 1 Cornell University
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
South Korea is a young, experimental democracy with a relatively effective government, often praised as a model of state-led economic development. Although civil liberties have been bolstered since the successful transition from an authoritarian state to a consolidated democracy, corruption remains a persistent concern as hierarchical and authoritarian thinking are profoundly ingrained in society. Since the 1997 Asian economic crisis spurred the emergence of a liberal consensus on government corruption, diverse public institutions and civil society organizations have been actively involved in the fight for transparency and accountability. The creation of an independent anti-corruption agency, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), sent a strong message that the government is committed to preventing abuse of power and preserving the public interest. This paper aims to identify and understand the driving factors that led to the committee’s success in bringing transparency and accountability to the South Korean public sector, so that it may be replicated in other countries. It takes a descriptive approach to examine the strengths and weaknesses of ACRC and analyze its impact through various indirect indicators. The study reveals that the ACRC’s all-encompassing strategy for anti-corruption reform has improved the level of integrity and public awareness. However, its autonomy and power are still called into question, suggesting future improvements are needed to realize its full potential, thereby bringing about more profound changes.
Keywords
corruption, anti-corruption initiative, South Korea, ACRC
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Cite this article
Li,C. (2023). Addressing Public Interest Violation Through Independent Anti-Corruption Bodies -A Case Study of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission in South Korea. Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media,21,42-51.
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