Volume 86

This essay examines distinction made by David Hume between the "vulgar system" and the "philosophical system" as explanations for belief in the continued and distinct existence of objects. Via a reconstruction of the arguments by Hume, the essay analyzes how these systems attempt to account for human perceptual experience. The vulgar system conflates perceptions with objects, while the philosophical system posits a double existence of both, yet neither can adequately explain the causal link between them. Furthermore, the study engages with interpretations of readings on Hume by considering the double existence counterargument by Pears and the systematic explanatory hypothesis proposed by Mackie to circumvent the need for naive realism. Finally, the essay evaluates the strength of these criticisms and considers their implications for Hume's overall skeptical position regarding external objects. The skepticism of Hume regarding the possibility of establishing a firm foundation for epistemic belief in external objects remains potent, even in light of these attempts at providing alternative explanations.

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