Download pdf
Application of Game Theory in Different Auction Forms
- 1 Shenyang New Channel high school
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
Auctions are employed in many areas all across the world. It is a key topic of study in game theory. This article primarily summarizes the winning strategies in auctions from a game theory perspective. To examine this issue, this paper reviews the past literature from three auction angles. The winning strategies applied in English auctions, Dutch auctions, and first-price auctions will differ depending on the form of auction. During a customary English auction, the winning strategy is to bid at their genius willingness. However, when multiple goods and deadlines are added to the auction, the winning strategy becomes to bid lower than the valuation. In Dutch auctions, bidders should bid at the beginning at a lower price. In first-price auctions, bidders should bid for all combinations when there are many items, and overbid when there is standard information feedback. This article is a review of previous relevant articles and provides references to related articles.
Keywords
game theory, English auction, Dutch auction, first-price sealed-bid auction
[1]. Mitchell T. Rethinking economy. Geoforum, 2008, 39(3): 1116-1121.
[2]. Holton R J. Economy and society. Routledge, 2013.
[3]. Straffin P D. Game theory and strategy. MAA, 1993.\
[4]. Xu YG. A review of auction economic theory. Economic Analysis, 2002.
[5]. Jackson M O. Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions. Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13(1): 137-145.
[6]. Adam M T P, Eidels A, Lux E, et al. Bidding behavior in Dutch auctions: Insights from a structured literature review. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2017, 21(3): 363-397.
[7]. Wei, Lijia. Evolutionary models of diverse gaming strategies: a theoretical and empirical investigation, 2012.
[8]. Liu Shulin and Wang Mingxi. The fundamental principles and expansion of auctions Scientific Press, 2011.
[9]. Kamecke U. Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction. International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27(3): 407-426.
[10]. Gul F, Stacchetti E. The English auction with differentiated commodities. Journal of Economic theory, 2000, 92(1): 66-95.
[11]. David E, Azoulay-Schwartz R, Kraus S. Bidders' strategy for multi-attribute sequential english auction with a deadline//Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems. 2003: 457-464.
[12]. Bhargava B, Jenamani M, Zhong Y. Counteracting shill bidding in online English auction. International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems, 2005, 14(02n03): 245-263.
[13]. Jennifer Neujahr, Qiao Wei. How to ensure the sustainability of the Dutch auction business. China Flower and Gardening, 2006(13):3.
[14]. Cox J C, Roberson B, Smith V L. Theory and behavior of single object auctions[J]. Research in experimental economics, 1982, 2(1): 1-43.
[15]. Carare O, Rothkopf M. Slow dutch auctions. Management Science, 2005, 51(3): 365-373.
[16]. Mishra D, Parkes D C. Multi-item vickrey–dutch auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66(1): 326-347.
[17]. Li Z, Kuo C C. Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 215(3): 721-729.
[18]. Xia Wanjun. Research on the difficulties local governments face in luring investment—a game analysis using the first price sealed auction. Economics and Trade Journal of Capital University, 2008(3):3.
[19]. Lebrun B. Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions. Economic Theory, 1996, 7(3): 421-443.
[20]. Neugebauer T, Selten R. Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 54(1): 183-204.
[21]. Wilenius J, Andersson A. Discovering equilibrium strategies for a combinatorial first price auction//The 9th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology and The 4th IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services (CEC-EEE 2007). IEEE, 2007: 13-20.
[22]. Jin Y, Lu P. First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient, arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.01761, 2022.
Cite this article
Jia,W. (2023). Application of Game Theory in Different Auction Forms. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,10,180-184.
Data availability
The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.
Disclaimer/Publisher's Note
The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s). EWA Publishing and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.
About volume
Volume title: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Business and Policy Studies
© 2024 by the author(s). Licensee EWA Publishing, Oxford, UK. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. Authors who
publish this series agree to the following terms:
1. Authors retain copyright and grant the series right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this
series.
2. Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the series's published
version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial
publication in this series.
3. Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and
during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See
Open access policy for details).